132 research outputs found
Social games in a social network
We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by
agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their
strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that
different topologies, ranging from regular lattices to random graphs, produce a
variety of emergent behaviors. This is a contribution towards the study of
social phenomena and transitions governed by the topology of the community
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with optional participation
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an
evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are
risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed
earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type cyclic dominance of the
three strategies. The players are located either on square lattices or random
regular graphs with the same connectivity. Occasionally, every player
reassesses its strategy by sampling the payoffs in its neighborhood. The loner
strategy efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish, defective
behavior and avoids deadlocks in states of mutual defection. On square
lattices, Monte Carlo simulations reveal self-organizing patterns driven by the
cyclic dominance, whereas on random regular graphs different types of
oscillatory behavior are observed: the temptation to defect determines whether
damped, periodic or increasing oscillations occur. These results are compared
to predictions by pair approximation. Although pair approximation is incapable
of distinguishing the two scenarios because of the equal connectivity, the
average frequencies as well as the oscillations on random regular graphs are
well reproduced.Comment: 6 pages, 7 figure
Dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence: Prisoners' dilemma game on small-world networks
A two-dimensional small-world type network, subject to spatial prisoners'
dilemma dynamics and containing an influential node defined as a special node
with a finite density of directed random links to the other nodes in the
network, is numerically investigated. It is shown that the degree of
cooperation does not remain at a steady state level but displays a punctuated
equilibrium type behavior manifested by the existence of sudden breakdowns of
cooperation. The breakdown of cooperation is linked to an imitation of a
successful selfish strategy of the influential node. It is also found that
while the breakdown of cooperation occurs suddenly, the recovery of it requires
longer time. This recovery time may, depending on the degree of steady state
cooperation, either increase or decrease with an increasing number of long
range connections.Comment: 5 pages, 6 figure
Two-dimensional projections of an hypercube
We present a method to project a hypercube of arbitrary dimension on the
plane, in such a way as to preserve, as well as possible, the distribution of
distances between vertices. The method relies on a Montecarlo optimization
procedure that minimizes the squared difference between distances in the plane
and in the hypercube, appropriately weighted. The plane projections provide a
convenient way of visualization for dynamical processes taking place on the
hypercube.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figures, Revtex
Diffusion-limited reaction for the one-dimensional trap system
We have previously discussed the one-dimensional multitrap system of finite
range and found the somewhat unexpected result that the larger is the number of
imperfect traps the higher is the transmission through them. We discuss in this
work the effect of a small number of such traps arrayed along either a constant
or a variable finite spatial section. It is shown that under specific
conditions, to be described in the following, the remarked high transmission
may be obtained for this case also. Thus, compared to the theoretical large
number of traps case these results may be experimentally applied to real
phenomenaComment: 18 pages, 8 PS Figures; 3 former figures were removed, a new section
added and the representation is improve
Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma
We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of
players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or
defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest
neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy
with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given
neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their
own strategy therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a
multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the
motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the
maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.Comment: 7 pages, 7 figure
Systematic Regge theory analysis of omega photoproduction
Systematic analysis of available data for -meson photoproduction is
given in frame of Regge theory. At photon energies above 20 GeV the
reaction is entirely dominated by Pomeron exchange.
However, it was found that Pomeron exchange model can not reproduce the
and data at high energies
simultaneously with the same set of parameters. The comparison between
and data indicates a large room for meson exchange contribution to
-meson photoproduction at low energies. It was found that at low
energies the dominant contribution comes from and -meson exchanges.
There is smooth transition between the meson exchange model at low energies and
Regge theory at high energies.Comment: 7 pages, 8 figures, revtex
Disordered Environments in Spatial Games
The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the
onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In
the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in
heterogeneous ecosystems in spatial evolutionary games by considering site
diluted lattices. The main result is that due to disorder, the fraction of
cooperators in the population is enhanced. Moreover, the system presents a
dynamical transition at , separating a region with spatial chaos from
one with localized, stable groups of cooperators.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure
Cooperation and its evolution in growing systems with cultural reproduction
We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary
game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present
a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and
individuals with imitation capacity. We consider the topological structure and
the evolution of strategies decoupled instead of a coevolutionary dynamic. We
show conditions to build up a cooperative system with real topological
structures for any natural selection intensity. When the system starts to grow,
cooperation is unstable but becomes stable as soon as the system reaches a
small core of cooperators whose size increase when the intensity of natural
selection decreases. Thus, we reduce the emergence of cooperative systems with
cultural reproduction to justify a small initial cooperative structure that we
call cooperative seed. Otherwise, given that the system grows principally as
cooperator whose cooperators inhabit the most linked parts of the system, the
benefit-cost ratio required for cooperation evolve is drastically reduced
compared to the found in static networks. In this way, we show that in systems
whose individuals have imitation capacity the growing process is essential for
the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figures. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with
arXiv:1111.247
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