Experimental Philosophy of Pain

The standard view of pains among philosophers today is that their existence consists in being experienced. The typical line of support offered for this view is that it corresponds with the ordinary or commonsense conception of pain. Despite this, a growing body of evidence from experimental philosophers indicates that the ordinary understanding of pain stands in contrast to the standard view among philosophers. In this paper, we will survey this literature and add to it, detailing the results of seven new studies on the ordinary understanding of pain using both questionnaire and corpus analysis methods

The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference

In a number of influential papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich have presented a powerful critique of so-called arguments from reference, arguments that assume that a particular theory of reference is correct in order to establish a substantive conclusion. The critique is that, due to cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions supposedly undermining the standard methodology for theorising about reference, the assumption that a theory of reference is correct is unjustified. I argue that the many extant responses to Machery et al.’s critique do little for the proponent of an argument from reference, as they do not show how to justify the problematic assumption. I then argue that it can in principle be justified by an appeal to Carnapian explication. I show how to apply the explication defence to arguments from reference given by Andreasen (for the biological reality of race) and by Churchland (against the existence of beliefs and desires)

Static Aeroelastic Model Validation of Membrane Micro Air Vehicle Wings

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/76488/1/AIAA-2007-1067-747.pd

What’s so bad about scientism?

In their attempt to defend philosophy from accusations of uselessness made by prominent scientists, such as Stephen Hawking, some philosophers respond with the charge of ‘scientism.’ This charge makes endorsing a scientistic stance, a mistake by definition. For this reason, it begs the question against these critics of philosophy, or anyone who is inclined to endorse a scientistic stance, and turns the scientism debate into a verbal dispute. In this paper, I propose a different definition of scientism, and thus a new way of looking at the scientism debate. Those philosophers who seek to defend philosophy against accusations of uselessness would do philosophy a much better service, I submit, if they were to engage with the definition of scientism put forth in this paper, rather than simply make it analytic that scientism is a mistake

Phylogenetic Relationships of Monocots Based on the Highly Informative Plastid Gene ndhF

We used ndhF sequence variation to reconstruct relationships across 282 taxa representing 78 monocot families and all 12 orders. The resulting tree is highly resolved and places commelinids sister to Asparagales, with both sister to Liliales—Pandanales in the strict consensus; Pandanales are sister to Dioscoreales in the bootstrap majority-rule tree, just above Petrosaviales. Acorales are sister to all other monocots, with Alismatales sister to all but Acorales. Relationships among the four major clades of commelinids remain unresolved. Relationships within orders are consistent with those based on rbcL, alone or in combination with atpB and 18S nrDNA, and generally better supported: ndhF contributes more than twice as many informative characters as rbcL, and nearly as many as rbcL, atpB, and 18S nrDNA combined. Based on functional arguments, we hypothesized that net venation and fleshy fruits should both evolve—and thus undergo concerted convergence—in shaded habitats, and revert to parallel venation and dry, passively dispersed fruits in open, sunny habitats. Our data show that net venation arose at least 26 times and disappeared 9 times, whereas fleshy fruits arose 22 times and disappeared 11 times. Both traits arose together at least 15 times and disappeared together 5 times. They thus show a highly significant pattern of concerted convergence (P \u3c 10-9) and are each even more strongly associated with shaded habitats (P \u3c 10-10 to 10-23); net venation is also associated, as predicted, with broad-leaved aquatic plants. Exceptions to this pattern illustrate the importance of other selective constraints and phylogenetic inertia

Flammable biomes dominated by eucalypts originated at the Cretaceous-Palaeogene boundary

Fire is a major modifier of communities, but the evolutionary origins of its prevalent role in shaping current biomes are uncertain. Australia is among the most fire-prone continents, with most of the landmass occupied by the fire-dependent sclerophyll and savanna biomes. In contrast to biomes with similar climates in other continents, Australia has a tree flora dominated by a single genus, Eucalyptus, and related Myrtaceae. A unique mechanism in Myrtaceae for enduring and recovering from fire damage likely resulted in this dominance. Here, we find a conserved phylogenetic relationship between post-fire resprouting (epicormic) anatomy and biome evolution, dating from 60 to 62 Ma, in the earliest Palaeogene. Thus, fire-dependent communities likely existed 50 million years earlier than previously thought. We predict that epicormic resprouting could make eucalypt forests and woodlands an excellent long-term carbon bank for reducing atmospheric CO2 compared with biomes with similar fire regimes in other continents

Does Non-Moral Ignorance Exculpate? Situational Awareness and Attributions of Blame and Forgiveness

In this paper, we set out to test empirically an idea that many philosophers find intuitive, namely that non-moral ignorance can exculpate. Many philosophers find it intuitive that moral agents are responsible only if they know the particular facts surrounding their action. Our results show that whether moral agents are aware of the facts surrounding their action does have an effect on people’s attributions of blame, regardless of the consequences or side effects of the agent’s actions. In general, it was more likely that a situationally aware agent will be blamed for failing to perform the obligatory action than a situationally unaware agent. We also tested attributions of forgiveness in addition to attributions of blame. In general, it was less likely that a situationally aware agent will be forgiven for failing to perform the obligatory action than a situationally unaware agent. When the agent is situationally unaware, it is more likely that the agent will be forgiven than blamed. We argue that these results provide some empirical support for the hypothesis that there is something intuitive about the idea that non-moral ignorance can exculpate

Supporting Spartina: Interdisciplinary perspective shows Spartina as a distinct solid genus

In 2014 a DNA-based phylogenetic study confirming the paraphyly of the grass subtribe Sporobolinae proposed the creation of a large monophyletic genus Sporobolus, including (among others) species previously included in the genera Spartina, Calamovilfa, and Sporobolus. Spartina species have contributed substantially (and continue contributing) to our knowledge in multiple disciplines, including ecology, evolutionary biology, molecular biology, biogeography, experimental ecology, environmental management, restoration ecology, history, economics, and sociology. There is no rationale so compelling to subsume the name Spartina as a subgenus that could rival the striking, global iconic history and use of the name Spartina for over 200 years. We do not agree with the arguments underlying the proposal to change Spartina to Sporobolus. We understand the importance of taxonomy and of formalized nomenclature and hope that by opening this debate we will encourage positive feedback that will strengthen taxonomic decisions with an interdisciplinary perspective. We consider the strongly distinct, monophyletic clade Spartina should simply and efficiently be treated as the genus Spartina