The Case for Quantum Key Distribution

Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises secure key agreement by using quantum mechanical systems. We argue that QKD will be an important part of future cryptographic infrastructures. It can provide long-term confidentiality for encrypted information without reliance on computational assumptions. Although QKD still requires authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, it can make use of either information-theoretically secure symmetric key authentication or computationally secure public key authentication: even when using public key authentication, we argue that QKD still offers stronger security than classical key agreement.Comment: 12 pages, 1 figure; to appear in proceedings of QuantumComm 2009 Workshop on Quantum and Classical Information Security; version 2 minor content revision

Analysis of detector performance in a gigahertz clock rate quantum key distribution system

We present a detailed analysis of a gigahertz clock rate environmentally robust phase-encoded quantum key distribution (QKD) system utilizing several different single-photon detectors, including the first implementation of an experimental resonant cavity thin-junction silicon single-photon avalanche diode. The system operates at a wavelength of 850 nm using standard telecommunications optical fibre. A general-purpose theoretical model for the performance of QKD systems is presented with reference to these experimental results before predictions are made about realistic detector developments in this system. We discuss, with reference to the theoretical model, how detector operating parameters can be further optimized to maximize key exchange rates

Controlling passively-quenched single photon detectors by bright light

Single photon detectors based on passively-quenched avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than a nanowatt. I describe a bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key distribution system containing such detectors. In this regime, all single photon detectors in the receiver Bob are uniformly blinded by continuous illumination coming from the eavesdropper Eve. When Eve needs a certain detector in Bob to produce a click, she modifies polarization (or other parameter used to encode quantum states) of the light she sends to Bob such that the target detector stops receiving light while the other detector(s) continue to be illuminated. The target detector regains single photon sensitivity and, when Eve modifies the polarization again, produces a single click. Thus, Eve has full control of Bob and can do a successful intercept-resend attack. To check the feasibility of the attack, 3 different models of passively-quenched detectors have been tested. In the experiment, I have simulated the intensity diagrams the detectors would receive in a real quantum key distribution system under attack. Control parameters and side effects are considered. It appears that the attack could be practically possible.Comment: Experimental results from a third detector model added. Minor corrections and edits made. 11 pages, 10 figure

Quantum Cryptography

Quantum cryptography could well be the first application of quantum mechanics at the individual quanta level. The very fast progress in both theory and experiments over the recent years are reviewed, with emphasis on open questions and technological issues.Comment: 55 pages, 32 figures; to appear in Reviews of Modern Physic