The European Union and Turkey : transforming the European periphery into European borderlands

Turkey has always been one of the key players in the EU's periphery, in terms of its economic capabilities, geographical position and political significance. While the EU's stance towards Turkey has been ambivalent over recent decades, Turkey, nonetheless, plays an important role both regionally and globally: one that the EU cannot overlook. This paper looks at the evolution of the EU's role in transforming Turkey into a European borderland with rule and norm transfers in multiple areas. It then proceeds to an analysis of the shifting dynamics of dependence and the resulting lack of a power asymmetry between the EU and Turkey, as factors that limited this rule transfer, especially after 2008. To do so, the paper analyses the historical evolution of this relationship, the EU's role in Turkish political reforms, and the degree to which the EU’s role altered within the confines of the accession process. The paper addresses first the EU’s rule transfer to Turkey in political terms, and identifies the significant blocs in that process with regards to the declining attractiveness of the EU as an economic magnet. Second, the paper analyses the economic aspects of the EU's rule transfer within the confines of the Turkish-EU association and the shifting dynamics of dependence. The paper provides empirical proof with regards to Turkish adaptation to the EU's technical rules as part and parcel of the accession process. It takes note of the limits of the EU's power to transfer its rules to its periphery, when there is no major asymmetry of power, as in the Turkish case, and when the credibility of the accession process is low. While the changing asymmetries of economic and military power and shifting dynamics of dependence feature in the paper as the main factors limiting the EU's capacity for rule and norm transfer to Turkey, it is, nonetheless, important to note that the EU influenced significant political and economic transformation in the country. The paper, then, investigates the expansion of the EU's functional, political and legal rules to Turkey on the one hand, and uncovers the role that power dynamics might play in Turkish adaptation to these norms on the other. As a result, this analysis of Turkish-EU relations provides a glimpse into the EU's role in its periphery, and its ability to transform the periphery into a European borderland by means of the export of its rules and norms.Funded by the European Research Council (ERC) within the 7th Framework Programme, the BORDERLANDS project is hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, and directed by Professor Raffaella A. Del Sarto

Gender equality in Turkey

This note reviews gender equality in Turkey with a focus on the existing legislation and programs. The issue of gender equality in Turkey is particularly important for Turkey’s adoption of EU norms and acquis. The main challenges in this respect are violence against women, equal opportunities at the work place, paid and unpaid labour, hidden forms of discrimination and access to political decision-making and representation

The EU’s common foreign, security and defense policies and the Turkish perceptions

The EU's common foreign and security role is tied to the EU's normative role and this has been one of the critical aspects of the debate concerning Turkey's accession. Turkey's membership negotiations are critical in terms of the future of the European integration process, specifically with respect to the EU's role as a global actor. How Turkey perceives the EU's CFSP is critical in assessing Turkey's potential role in the larger integration process, as well as the future development of the EU's international role. The article investigates whether there are wide differences among the Turkish public vis-a-vis the EU's CFSP and to what extent these differences are visible in Turkey's negotiation talks with the EU. The paper explores the extent to which European norms in foreign policy has diffused into Turkey and how this diffusion might have impacted the process of foreign policy making in Turkey

External differentiation in the EU

External differentiation refers to the various relationships the EU has with neighbouring countries with which it has a formal agreement. There is a general principle that the more access associated countries have to the EU Single Market, the more regulatory alignment they must accept. There is, however, no standard formula for achieving this. The only standardised arrangement is the European Economic Area and even that varies in detail for the individual states. Otherwise the arrangements differ according to concerns about sovereignty, sectoral interests, regulatory styles, power politics and the salience of particular issues and the overall trajectory of associated states towards or away from the EU.This project received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 822304. The content of this document represents only the views of the InDivEU consortium and is its sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains

Practitioners report on external differentiation

According to the Interlaken principles, relations with third countries should not slow down the process of integration; compromise the EU’s decision-making autonomy; or share power with non-members. Access to the benefits of the EU Internal Market is conditional, with partner states expected to assume key elements of the acquis communautaire. In practice, there is not a linear relationship. The EU prefers structured, institutionalised arrangements conforming to existing models and encompassing all aspects of the relationship. Yet the existing models themselves, including those in Michel Barnier’s ‘ladder’ are themselves the product of ad hoc deals and often far from comprehensive.This project received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 822304. The content of this document represents only the views of the InDivEU consortium and is its sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains

The accession games: a comparison of three limited-information negotiation designs

We analyze the European Union enlargement process from a rational institutionalist perspective and argue that the accession negotiations are designed to resolve the uncertainty that the existing EU members have in terms of the candidates preferences. We model the negotiations as a Bayesian game and demonstrate how exactly the design in place helps the Union in gathering information about the candidate country. Our model also enables us to compare alternative negotiation designs in terms of their ability to alleviate informational problems. We compare the resulting equilibrium payo¤s under di¤erent negotiation designs to see whether there is any ground for a player to prefer a particular design over others. Our analysis supports the earlier arguments in the literature about the informative role of accession negotiations, and demonstates how exactly the negotiations carry out this role