The explosive growth of the ABCP market between 2004 and 2007: A "search for yield" story

The years immediately preceding the financial crisis of 2007 witnessed an explosive growth in the supplies both of the long-term securities issued by the shadow banking entities, the asset-backed securities (ABSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and of the short-term securities issued by these entities, notably asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). Although there is now some acknowledgment that the search for yield was the major driver of ABS and CDO growth in the United States, the same is not true of the U.S. ABCP market where other factors such as regulatory arbitrage on the part of banks or the safety and liquidity concerns of institutional investors are seen as having been the more important growth driving force. This article argues that the search for yield did play a crucial role in U.S. ABCP growth between 2004 and 2007. To back up this argument, the article points to four variables that were closely correlated with this growth: the federal funds rate; U.S. money market mutual funds asset holdings; the change in the geographical breakdown of the institutions supplying ABCP; and, finally, the change in the program breakdown of the ABCP market

Germany's brake on European capital-market development

In February 2015, the European Commission published a Green Paper in which it put forward the goal to ‘build a true single market for capital’ for all European Union member states by 2019. The present paper argues that there is no realistic prospect of achieving this goal given that the Green Paper omits any reference to a formidable impediment blocking a European capital-market union: the German government's stance on debt. The inescapable fact is that this government's reluctance to increase the supply of its bonds is depriving the European capital market of one of the essential ingredients necessary to its enlargement on the one hand and to the efficiency of its operation on the other: the former because capital-market enlargement crucially depends on attracting institutional investors who must hold a substantial proportion of their bond portfolios in the form of safe government bonds; the latter because the efficient functioning of the capital markets crucially depends on the efficiency of the money markets where safe government bonds are by far the most important form of collateral

The role of shadow banking entities in the financial crisis: a disaggregated view

This article examines the role of the shadow banking system in the global financial crisis of 2007–9. In order to do this, one must first explain the reasons for the explosive growth of shadow banking in the immediate pre-crisis era. Current explanations for this growth tend to hold two contrasting sector (notably regulatory arbitrage and financial innovation); the other emphasising exogenous factors (notably the ‘search for yield’). Integrating these two explanations, in this article we develop a disaggregated view of the shadow banking system. After clarifying the nature of the relation between the regulated and shadow banking systems, we inquire more closely into the different entities that inhabit the shadow banking system, the different activities that these entities performed and the different financial products that these entities supplied. The disaggregated view of shadow banking suggests that while some parts of the system played an important role in the initial subprime phase of the crisis through their involvement with the toxic securities that were at its centre, other parts of the system were key to the subsequent money and inter-bank phases of the crisis through their close ties with the regulated banks

The colonization of the future: An alternative view of financialization and its portents

Financialization is generally interpreted by heterodox economists to be a dysfunctional and thus historically transient outgrowth of contemporary capitalism: dysfunctional because it is seen to be driven by attempts to escape production and profit realization constraints in the real economy, transient because these attempts are seen to be ultimately futile. This article proposes the contrary argument that financialization is a functionally useful feature of contemporary capitalism that is entirely in keeping with the latter’s continuing development as a commodity system. Specifically, it will be argued that just as globalization represents the extension of the commodity principle along the axis of geographical space, financialization represents the extension of this same principle along the axis of time: the future is being colonized so as to make it take the overspill of the pressures on organizations operating in the present

Financialisation and the limits of circuit theory

The theory of the monetary circuit aims to provide a highly stylised account of the workings of a modern monetary production economy. While there may have been a time when it succeeded in this aim, that time is over. The key development in the monetary sphere of capitalism over recent decades is the advent of financialisation, a phenomenon that circuit theory cannot explain other than by omitting some of its most important characterising features while indiscriminately dismissing those features that it does address as dysfunctional outgrowths. The fact is that a theory that has the aggregate monetary circuit as its methodological framework and whose sole focus is on the financing needs of firms is simply not flexible enough to accommodate the new reality of financialisation. To make that accommodation what is needed is a framework that is sufficiently elastic as to be able to encompass a broad range of socio-economic factors, most notably those associated with demographic change, as co-drivers of financialisaton. This article argues that a framework based on Marx’s commodity principle meets this requirement

The contribution of wealth concentration to the subprime crisis: a quantitative estimation.

The crisis that broke out in mid-2007 was caused by the fact that the CDO market had grown to a size sufficient to wreak general havoc when it suddenly collapsed. Several authors have argued that economic inequality was important to the growth of this market. This paper attempts to strengthen this argument by concentrating attention on global wealth concentration. After summarising recent evidence on the negative impact of investor demand on US bond yields in the pre-crisis period, new evidence regarding the specific contribution of high net worth individuals to this negative impact is presented. The paper then goes on to show how, after having helped to caused a yield problem in the major US debt markets, high net worth individuals (via hedge funds) continued to be a major source of the pressure on US banks to resolve this yield problem through the mass production of CDOs

The proposed EU Financial Transactions Tax is both illogical and likely to be economically damaging

In 2011, the European Commission proposed a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) to raise revenue from the financial sectors in EU countries following the financial crisis. To date, however, only 11 EU states have so far agreed to implement such a tax. John Grahl and Photis Lysandrou write that while they broadly agree with the objectives behind the FTT, the approach adopted toward the financial sector is simplistic. By applying an indiscriminate tax to all forms of trading, the FTT could create serious unintended consequences and fail to meet its intended goals

The contribution of us bond demand to the us bond yield conundrum of 2004 to 2007: an empirical investigation

Although the federal funds rate started rising from mid-2004 US long term rates continued to fall. A likely contributory factor to this conundrum was the contemporaneous increase in US bond demand. Using ARDL-based models, which accommodate structural breaks, this paper estimates the impact of demand on US bond yields in the conundrum period. This impact is shown to have been everywhere significantly negative. The fact that our model fully explains the bond yield conundrum gives support to the hypothesis that the US CDO market was rapidly expanded before 2007 chiefly to absorb the overspill of global demand for safe asset

Germany's brake on European capital-market development

In February 2015, the European Commission published a Green Paper in which it put forward the goal to ‘build a true single market for capital’ for all European Union member states by 2019. The present paper argues that there is no realistic prospect of achieving this goal given that the Green Paper omits any reference to a formidable impediment blocking a European capital-market union: the German government's stance on debt. The inescapable fact is that this government's reluctance to increase the supply of its bonds is depriving the European capital market of one of the essential ingredients necessary to its enlargement on the one hand and to the efficiency of its operation on the other: the former because capital-market enlargement crucially depends on attracting institutional investors who must hold a substantial proportion of their bond portfolios in the form of safe government bonds; the latter because the efficient functioning of the capital markets crucially depends on the efficiency of the money markets where safe government bonds are by far the most important form of collateral

The best of both worlds: scale economies and discriminatory policies in London’s global financial centre

From the early 1960s onwards London has managed to vie with New York for the top spot as an international financial centre. Ever since then, London has reigned as a leading global financial hub, despite not having behind it anything like the political or economic backing enjoyed by New York. This paper seeks to explain this phenomenon by building on Kindleberger’s classic analysis of financial centres as international hubs that arise due to economic, geographic and infrastructural advantages, and more recent theories of specialized financial centres which suggest that financial centres deploy discriminatory business practices in order to compete with the scale economy-based centres. Our central claim is that London’s continuing financial supremacy can be traced to the way that the opposing ‘economic’ and ‘political’ sets of criteria necessary for a financial centre are here inextricably fused together in a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Three case studies are used to support this claim: the market for international loans and deposits; the forex (FX) and over the counter (OTC) derivatives markets; and the area of asset and collateral management