Estimating the Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission for Crew Spacecraft

Once the US Space Shuttle retires in 2011, the Russian Soyuz Launcher and Soyuz Spacecraft will comprise the only means for crew transportation to and from the International Space Station (ISS). The U.S. Government and NASA have contracted for crew transportation services to the ISS with Russia. The resulting implications for the US space program including issues such as astronaut safety must be carefully considered. Are the astronauts and cosmonauts safer on the Soyuz than the Space Shuttle system? Is the Soyuz launch system more robust than the Space Shuttle? The Soyuz launcher has been in operation for over 40 years. There have been only two loss of life incidents and two loss of mission incidents. Given that the most recent incident took place in 1983, how do we determine current reliability of the system? Do failures of unmanned Soyuz rockets impact the reliability of the currently operational man-rated launcher? Does the Soyuz exhibit characteristics that demonstrate reliability growth and how would that be reflected in future estimates of success? NASA s next manned rocket and spacecraft development project will have to meet the Agency Threshold requirements set forth by NASA. The reliability targets are currently several times higher than the Shuttle and possibly even the Soyuz. Can these targets be compared to the reliability of the Soyuz to determine whether they are realistic and achievable? To help answer these questions this paper will explore how to estimate the reliability of the Soyuz Launcher/Spacecraft system, compare it to the Space Shuttle, and its potential impacts for the future of manned spaceflight. Specifically it will look at estimating the Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission (LOM) probability using historical data, reliability growth, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment techniques used to generate these numbers

Applications of the International Space Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model

Recently the International Space Station (ISS) has incorporated more Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) in the decision making process for significant issues. Future PRAs will have major impact to ISS and future spacecraft development and operations. These PRAs will have their foundation in the current complete ISS PRA model and the current PRA trade studies that are being analyzed as requested by ISS Program stakeholders. ISS PRAs have recently helped in the decision making process for determining reliability requirements for future NASA spacecraft and commercial spacecraft, making crew rescue decisions, as well as making operational requirements for ISS orbital orientation, planning Extravehicular activities (EVAs) and robotic operations. This paper will describe some applications of the ISS PRA model and how they impacted the final decision. This paper will discuss future analysis topics such as life extension, requirements of new commercial vehicles visiting ISS

ISS Overview and the Future of Spaceflight

This viewgraph presentation reviews the International Space Station and the future of spaceflight. Pictures of robotics, planetary exploration, astrobiology, space tourism, and space commercialization are all shown

NASA's Accident Precursor Analysis Process and the International Space Station

This viewgraph presentation reviews the implementation of Accident Precursor Analysis (APA), as well as the evaluation of In-Flight Investigations (IFI) and Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) data for the identification of unrecognized accident potentials on the International Space Station

Methodology for Developing a Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model of Spacecraft Rendezvous and Dockings

In 2007 NASA was preparing to send two new visiting vehicles carrying logistics and propellant to the International Space Station (ISS). These new vehicles were the European Space Agency s (ESA) Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), the Jules Verne, and the Japanese Aerospace and Explorations Agency s (JAXA) H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV). The ISS Program wanted to quantify the increased risk to the ISS from these visiting vehicles. At the time, only the Shuttle, the Soyuz, and the Progress vehicles rendezvoused and docked to the ISS. The increased risk to the ISS was from an increase in vehicle traffic, thereby, increasing the potential catastrophic collision during the rendezvous and the docking or berthing of the spacecraft to the ISS. A universal method of evaluating the risk of rendezvous and docking or berthing was created by the ISS s Risk Team to accommodate the increasing number of rendezvous and docking or berthing operations due to the increasing number of different spacecraft, as well as the future arrival of commercial spacecraft. Before the first docking attempt of ESA's ATV and JAXA's HTV to the ISS, a probabilistic risk model was developed to quantitatively calculate the risk of collision of each spacecraft with the ISS. The 5 rendezvous and docking risk models (Soyuz, Progress, Shuttle, ATV, and HTV) have been used to build and refine the modeling methodology for rendezvous and docking of spacecrafts. This risk modeling methodology will be NASA s basis for evaluating the addition of future ISS visiting spacecrafts hazards, including SpaceX s Dragon, Orbital Science s Cygnus, and NASA s own Orion spacecraft. This paper will describe the methodology used for developing a visiting vehicle risk model

Estimating the Reliability of a Soyuz Spacecraft Mission

Once the US Space Shuttle retires in 2010, the Russian Soyuz Launcher and Soyuz Spacecraft will comprise the only means for crew transportation to and from the International Space Station (ISS). The U.S. Government and NASA have contracted for crew transportation services to the ISS with Russia. The resulting implications for the US space program including issues such as astronaut safety must be carefully considered. Are the astronauts and cosmonauts safer on the Soyuz than the Space Shuttle system? Is the Soyuz launch system more robust than the Space Shuttle? Is it safer to continue to fly the 30 year old Shuttle fleet for crew transportation and cargo resupply than the Soyuz? Should we extend the life of the Shuttle Program? How does the development of the Orion/Ares crew transportation system affect these decisions? The Soyuz launcher has been in operation for over 40 years. There have been only two loss of life incidents and two loss of mission incidents. Given that the most recent incident took place in 1983, how do we determine current reliability of the system? Do failures of unmanned Soyuz rockets impact the reliability of the currently operational man-rated launcher? Does the Soyuz exhibit characteristics that demonstrate reliability growth and how would that be reflected in future estimates of success? NASA s next manned rocket and spacecraft development project is currently underway. Though the projects ultimate goal is to return to the Moon and then to Mars, the launch vehicle and spacecraft s first mission will be for crew transportation to and from the ISS. The reliability targets are currently several times higher than the Shuttle and possibly even the Soyuz. Can these targets be compared to the reliability of the Soyuz to determine whether they are realistic and achievable? To help answer these questions this paper will explore how to estimate the reliability of the Soyuz Launcher/Spacecraft system, compare it to the Space Shuttle, and its potential impacts for the future of manned spaceflight. Specifically it will look at estimating the Loss of Mission (LOM) probability using historical data, reliability growth, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment technique

Challenges of Sustaining the International Space Station through 2020 and Beyond: Including Epistemic Uncertainty in Reassessing Confidence Targets

This paper introduces an analytical approach, Probability and Confidence Trade-space (PACT), which can be used to assess uncertainty in International Space Station (ISS) hardware sparing necessary to extend the life of the vehicle. There are several key areas under consideration in this research. We investigate what sparing confidence targets may be reasonable to ensure vehicle survivability and for completion of science on the ISS. The results of the analysis will provide a methodological basis for reassessing vehicle subsystem confidence targets. An ongoing annual analysis currently compares the probability of existing spares exceeding the total expected unit demand of the Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) in functional hierarchies approximating the vehicle subsystems. In cases where the functional hierarchies availability does not meet subsystem confidence targets, the current sparing analysis further identifies which ORUs may require additional spares to extend the life of the ISS. The resulting probability is dependent upon hardware reliability estimates. However, the ISS hardware fleet carries considerable epistemic uncertainty (uncertainty in the knowledge of the true hardware failure rate), which does not currently factor into the annual sparing analysis. The existing confidence targets may be conservative. This paper will also discuss how confidence targets may be relaxed based on the inclusion of epistemic uncertainty for each ORU. The paper will conclude with strengths and limitations for implementing the analytical approach in sustaining the ISS through end of life, 2020 and beyond

Challenges of Sustaining the International Space Station Through 2020 and Beyond: Reassessing Confidence Targets for System Availability

The International Space Station (ISS) was originally designed to operate until 2015 with a plan for deorbiting the ISS in 2016. Currently, the international partnership has agreed to extend the operations until 2020 and discussions are underway to extend the life even further to 2028. Each partner is responsible for the sustaining engineering, sparing, and maintenance of their own segments. National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) challenge is to purchase the needed number of spares to maintain the functional availability of the ISS systems necessary for the United States On-Orbit Segment s contribution. This presentation introduces an analytical approach to assessing uncertainty in ISS hardware necessary to extend the life of the vehicle. Some key areas for consideration are: establishing what confidence targets are required to ensure science can be continuously carried out on the ISS, defining what confidence targets are reasonable to ensure vehicle survivability, considering what is required to determine if the confidence targets are too high, and whether sufficient number of spares are purchased. The results of the analysis will provide a methodological basis for reassessing vehicle subsystem confidence targets. This analysis compares the probability of existing spares exceeding the total expected unit demand of the Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) in functional hierarchies approximating the vehicle subsystems. In cases where the functional hierarchies' availability does not meet subsystem confidence targets, the analysis will further identify which ORUs may require additional spares to extend the life of the ISS. The resulting probability is dependent upon hardware reliability estimates. However, the ISS hardware fleet carries considerable epistemic uncertainty which must be factored into the development and execution of sparing risk postures. In addition, it is also recognized that uncertainty in the assessment is due to disconnects between modeled functions and actual subsystem operations. Perhaps most importantly, it is acknowledged that conservative confidence targets per subsystem are currently accepted. This presentation will also discuss how subsystem confidence targets may be relaxed based on calculating the level of uncertainty for each corresponding ORU-function. The presentation will conclude with the various strengths and limitations for implementing the analytical approach in sustaining the ISS through end of life; 2020 and beyond

Probability and Confidence Trade-Space (PACT) Evaluation: Accounting for Uncertainty in Sparing Assessments

Purpose of presentation: (1) Status update on the developing methodology to revise sub-system sparing targets. (2) To describe how to incorporate uncertainty into spare assessments and why it is important to do so (3) Demonstrate hardware risk postures through PACT evaluatio

Biogenesis of a novel compartment for autophagosome-mediated unconventional protein secretion

A novel membrane structure called CUPS is assembled during the secretion of unconventional cargo such as Acb1