A Theory of Dispersion Strengthening

Theory of dispersion strengthenin

Creep of a Recrystallized Aluminum SAP-Type Alloy

Creep of a recrystallized aluminum sap-type allo

Criteria for Yielding of Dispersion-Strengthened Alloys

A dislocation model is presented in order to account for the yield behavior of alloys with a finely dispersed second-phase. The criteria for yielding used in the model, is that appreciable yielding occurs in these alloys when the shear stress due to piled-up groups of dislocations is sufficient to fracture or plastically deform the dispersed second-phase particles, relieving the back stress on the dislocation sources. Equations derived on the basis of this model, predict that the yield stress of the alloys varies as the reciprocal square root of the mean free path between dispersed particles. Experimental data is presented for several SAP-Type alloys, precipitation-hardened alloys and steels which are in good agreement with the yield strength variation as a function of dispersion spacing predicted by this theoretical treatment

Data for: Insurance and Solidarity. Experimental Evidence from Cambodia

We conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural villages in Northwestern Cambodia, complemented by a detailed household survey, in order to study whether solidarity is conditioned on the availability of insurance. The game played in the experiment is a modified version of the dictator game. It is one-shot and is played anonymously. In the experiment, subjects are randomly assigned the role of provider or recipient. All receive the same endowment. Recipients can lose a large proportion of their endowment due to a random idiosyncratic shock. Each provider is anonymously matched with one recipient who she can transfer to in case the recipient experiences a loss. We apply a 2x2 design. First, we vary whether recipients have the option to purchase insurance that covers the loss from the shock and thus renders a transfer from the provider unnecessary. This allows us to test whether providers transfer less to a recipient who had the option to purchase insurance. Second, we vary whether recipients are informed that they are matched with a provider who can transfer to them in case of a loss. We can thereby test whether providers reduce their transfers by less when the decision against insurance was made by recipients who were uninformed about the provider compared to when the decision was made by recipients who were informed. The design of our study allows us to relate the subjects' behavior in the experiment to their real-life experience, both in terms of informal support and exposure to insurance. We elicited a rich set of support network characteristics as part of the household survey that preceded the experiment. This allows us to test whether conditional solidarity is more pronounced among subjects who are more engaged in informal support.Furthermore, we selected our sample such that around half of the subjects had access to health insurance, due to their place of residence, while for the other half health insurance was unavailable. We can thereby relate insurance familiarity to a subject's propensity to condition support on the insurance option in the experiment

Data for: Insurance and Solidarity. Experimental Evidence from Cambodia

We conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural villages in Northwestern Cambodia, complemented by a detailed household survey, in order to study whether solidarity is conditioned on the availability of insurance. The game played in the experiment is a modified version of the dictator game. It is one-shot and is played anonymously. In the experiment, subjects are randomly assigned the role of provider or recipient. All receive the same endowment. Recipients can lose a large proportion of their endowment due to a random idiosyncratic shock. Each provider is anonymously matched with one recipient who she can transfer to in case the recipient experiences a loss. We apply a 2x2 design. First, we vary whether recipients have the option to purchase insurance that covers the loss from the shock and thus renders a transfer from the provider unnecessary. This allows us to test whether providers transfer less to a recipient who had the option to purchase insurance. Second, we vary whether recipients are informed that they are matched with a provider who can transfer to them in case of a loss. We can thereby test whether providers reduce their transfers by less when the decision against insurance was made by recipients who were uninformed about the provider compared to when the decision was made by recipients who were informed. The design of our study allows us to relate the subjects' behavior in the experiment to their real-life experience, both in terms of informal support and exposure to insurance. We elicited a rich set of support network characteristics as part of the household survey that preceded the experiment. This allows us to test whether conditional solidarity is more pronounced among subjects who are more engaged in informal support.Furthermore, we selected our sample such that around half of the subjects had access to health insurance, due to their place of residence, while for the other half health insurance was unavailable. We can thereby relate insurance familiarity to a subject's propensity to condition support on the insurance option in the experiment.THIS DATASET IS ARCHIVED AT DANS/EASY, BUT NOT ACCESSIBLE HERE. TO VIEW A LIST OF FILES AND ACCESS THE FILES IN THIS DATASET CLICK ON THE DOI-LINK ABOV