Density modification based reliability sensitivity analysis

Sensitivity analysis of a numerical model, for instance simulating physical phenomena, is useful to quantify the influence of the inputs on the model responses. This paper proposes a new sensitivity index, based upon the modification of the probability density function (pdf) of the random inputs, when the quantity of interest is a failure probability (probability that a model output exceeds a given threshold). An input is considered influential if the input pdf modification leads to a broad change in the failure probability. These sensitivity indices can be computed using the sole set of simulations that has already been used to estimate the failure probability, thus limiting the number of calls to the numerical model. In the case of a Monte Carlo sample, asymptotical properties of the indices are derived. Based on Kullback-Leibler divergence, several types of input perturbations are introduced. The relevance of this new sensitivity analysis method is analysed through three case studies

Efficiency, Sequenceability and Deal-Optimality in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods

National audienceIn fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain. Another intuitive way to obtain an allocation is to give objects to agents in the rst place, and to let agents exchange them as long as such "deals" are bene cial. This paper investigates these notions, when agents have additive preferences over objects, and unveils surprising connections between them, and with other e ciency and fairness notions. In particular, we show that an allocation is sequenceable if and only if it is optimal for a certain type of deals, namely cycle deals involving a single object. Furthermore, any Pareto-optimal allocation is sequenceable, but not the converse. Regarding fairness, we show that an allocation can be envy-free and non-sequenceable, but that every competitive equilibrium with equal incomes is sequenceable. To complete the picture, we show how some domain restrictions may a ect the relations between these notions. Finally, we experimentally explore the links between the scales of e ciency and fairness