No evidence of inequality aversion in the investment game

We report experimental evidence on second-movers’ behavior in the investment game (also known as the trust game) when there exists endowment heterogeneity. Using a within-subject analysis, we investigate whether or not second-movers exhibit some taste for inequality aversion by returning a larger (smaller) share of the available funds to first-movers who are initially endowed with a lesser (larger) endowment, respectively. Our data suggest that second-movers do not take into consideration the level of endowments when making their decisions as their behavior is consistent across distribution of endowments; i.e., they return the same proportion of the available funds regardless of the endowments. We indeed find that some second-movers have a tendency to return what they have received from firstmovers. In our data, there is also a substantial proportion of second-movers who are selfish and return nothing

An experimental study of gender differences in distributive justice

This paper shows that women are more likely than men to employ the fair allocation that most benefits their financial payoff. The experimental evidence is gleaned from a dictator game with production, in which subjects first solve a quiz to accumulate earnings and then divide the surplus by choosing one over five different allocations, some of which represent a fairness ideal. The data also suggest that women are more sensitive to the context as their allocation choices depend on whether they have accumulated more or less money than their counterparts. This is not the case for men’s allocation choices (JEL Codes:C91, D30, D64, J16) Keywords: gender differences, distributive justice, fairness ideals, self-serving choices, experimental economics, dictator game with production

Equity and bargaining power in ultimatum games

This paper studies the extent to which offers and demands in ultimatum games are consistent with equity theory when there is a joint endowment to be distributed. Using a within-subject design, we also investigate the importance of the bargaining power by comparing the subjects' behavior in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game, which differ in the possible cost of responders rejecting the proposers' offer. Our findings suggest that proposers are willing to reward responders for their contribution to the joint endowment in any of the two games. As for responders, their behavior is consistent with equity theory only in the no-veto-cost game (in which a rejection is costless for them) when the game is first played. When the no-veto-cost game is played after the ultimatum game, we observe that the responders' demands usually exceed their contribution to the endowment. Finally, this paper reports evidence that the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game differ in terms of efficiency and rejection rates

Are you a good employee or simply a good guy? influence costs and contract design

We develop a principal–agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent's level of effort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal. These activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task. We show that the agent's ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low-powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result. Interestingly, the fact that manipulation activities entail productivity losses may lead to the design of influence-free contracts that deter manipulation and lead to high-powered incentives. This result implies that the optimal contract (and whether manipulation is tolerated in equilibrium or not) depends on the magnitude of the productivity-based influence costs. We show that it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the agent, even if the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low

Social motives vs social influence: an experiment on interdependent time preferences

We report experimental evidence on the effects of social preferences on intertemporal decisions. To this aim, we design an intertemporal Dictator Game to test whether Dictators modify their discounting behavior when their own decision is imposed on their matched Recipients. We run four different treatments to identify the effect of payoffs externalities from those related to information and beliefs. Our descriptive statistics show that heterogeneous social time preferences and information about others’ time preferences are significant determinants of choices: Dictators display a marked propensity to account for the intertemporal preferences of Recipients, both in the presence of externalities (social motives) and/or when they know about the decisions of their matched partners (social influence). We also perform a structural estimation exercise to control for heterogeneity in risk attitudes. As for individual behavior, our estimates confirm previous studies in that high risk aversion is associated with low discounting. As for social behavior, we find that social motives outweigh social influence, especially when we restrict our sample to pairs of Dictators and Recipients who satisfy minimal consistency conditions

Characterizing the radial oxygen abundance distribution in disk galaxies

We examine the possible dependence of the radial oxygen abundance distribution on non-axisymmetrical structures (bar/spirals) and other macroscopic parameters such as the mass, the optical radius R25, the color g-r, and the surface brightness of the galaxy. A sample of disk galaxies from the CALIFA DR3 is considered. We adopted the Fourier amplitude A2 of the surface brightness as a quantitative characteristic of the strength of non-axisymmetric structures in a galactic disk, in addition to the commonly used morphologic division for A, AB, and B types based on the Hubble classification. To distinguish changes in local oxygen abundance caused by the non-axisymmetrical structures, the multiparametric mass--metallicity relation was constructed as a function of parameters such as the bar/spiral pattern strength, the disk size, color index g-r in the SDSS bands, and central surface brightness of the disk. The gas-phase oxygen abundance gradient is determined by using the R calibration. We find that there is no significant impact of the non-axisymmetric structures such as a bar and/or spiral patterns on the local oxygen abundance and radial oxygen abundance gradient of disk galaxies. Galaxies with higher mass, however, exhibit flatter oxygen abundance gradients in units of dex/kpc, but this effect is significantly less prominent for the oxygen abundance gradients in units of dex/R25 and almost disappears when the inner parts are avoided. We show that the oxygen abundance in the central part of the galaxy depends neither on the optical radius R25 nor on the color g-r or the surface brightness of the galaxy. Instead, outside the central part of the galaxy, the oxygen abundance increases with g-r value and central surface brightness of the disk.Comment: 11 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in A&

Libros grandes, libros pequeños : una nota sobre las lecturas épicas de Alonso Quijano

Nota sobre el capítulo del escrutinio y la censura de la biblioteca de don Quijote. Se propone cómo su división en dos tipos de libros plantea una dicotomía sobre dos formas opuestas de narrar hechos de guerra.Note on the division and censorship of don Quijote's library and how it shows a dicotomy between two ways of writing military deeds

Fama y verdad en la épica quinientista española : el virgilianismo político y la tradición castellana del siglo XV

Este estudio propone una aproximación a la lectura del corpus épico quinientista a la luz de consideraciones históricas y de la propia tradición literaria hispana del Cuatrocientos. En concreto, postula que la épica debe pensarse desde presuposiciones teóricas e indaga la relación del género con la historia para iluminar las diferencias existentes entre la teoría y la práctica épicas en la Península Ibérica e Italia en el siglo XVI. Dicha relación descansa no sólo en la apropiación del modelo virgiliano y en su mitificación de la historia reciente sino que debe buscarse, también, en los distintos usos de la literatura clásica por parte de los humanistas italianos y los intelectuales castellanos del siglo XV. En particular, el artículo considera la pertinencia de atenerse, para la configuración de la idea de la épica en la España del Quinientos, a los dictados de la tradición épica occidental desde una perspectiva específicamente hispana, amparada en un "virgilianismo político" que ya encontramos alumbrado en autores como Enrique de Villena y Juan de Mena, que resulta fundamental para explicar la épica como memoria del presente