183 research outputs found
Brief of Corporate Law Professors as Amici Curie in Support of Respondents
The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt out” rights or practical ability to avoid subsidizing corporate political expression with which they disagree. Nor do individuals have the practical option to refrain from putting their savings into equity investments, as doing so would impose damaging economic penalties and ignore conventional financial guidance for individual investors
Petition for Rulemaking on Short and Distort
Today, some hedge funds attack public companies for the sole purpose of inducing a short-lived panic which they can exploit for profit. This sort of market manipulation harms average investors who entrust financial markets with their retirement savings. While short selling serves a critical function in the capital markets, some short sellers disseminate negative opinion about a company, inducing a panic and sharp decline in the stock price, and rapidly close that position for a profit prior to the price partially or fully rebounding. We urge the SEC to enact two rules which will discourage manipulative short selling. The petition for rule-making on short and distort has been jointly signed by twelve securities law professors nationwide
Risk-shifting Through Issuer Liability and Corporate Monitoring
This article explores how issuer liability re-allocates fraud risk and how risk allocation may reduce the incidence of fraud. In the US, the apparent absence of individual liability of officeholders and insufficient monitoring by insurers under-mine the potential deterrent effect of securities litigation. The underlying reasons why both mechanisms remain ineffective are collective action problems under the prevailing dispersed ownership structure, which eliminates the incentives to moni-tor set by issuer liability. This article suggests that issuer liability could potentially have a stronger deterrent effect when it shifts risk to individuals or entities holding a larger financial stake. Thus, it would enlist large shareholders in monitoring in much of Europe. The same risk-shifting effect also has implications for the debate about the relationship between securities litigation and creditor interests. Credi-tors’ claims should not be given precedence over claims of defrauded investors (e.g., because of the capital maintenance principle), since bearing some of the fraud risk will more strongly incentivise large creditors, such as banks, to monitor the firm in jurisdictions where corporate debt is relatively concentrated
Law Professor Comment Letter on Harmonization of Private Offering Rules
Comment letter filed on Sept. 24, 2019.
File No. S7-08-19
We are fifteen law professors whose scholarship and teaching focuses on securities regulation. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC” or the “Commission”) Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions (the “Concept Release”)
Supreme Court Amicus Brief of 19 Corporate Law Professors, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, No. 14-915
The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt out” rights or practical ability to avoid subsidizing corporate political expression with which they disagree. Nor do individuals have the practical option to refrain from putting their savings into equity investments, as doing so would impose damaging economic penalties and ignore conventional financial guidance for individual investors
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Shareholder activism in the UK: types of activists, forms of activism, and their impact on a target’s performance
Considering the recent rapid expansion of shareholder activism phenomenon in the United Kingdom (UK) and the vast amount of resources committed to it by corporations, government and investors, its effectiveness has become a crucial subject for investigation. This article analyzes organizational outcomes of shareholder activism in the UK. This research is based on a unique comprehensive database of shareholder activism events during the period of 1998–2008. We provide a detailed account of different types of activists, activism strategies and shareholder demands associated with the events of activism. Our findings show that the effectiveness of shareholder activism in terms of abnormal stock-market returns varies dramatically depending on its form, type of investor and the nature of investor proposals
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An overview on the inconsistencies of approach in regulating the capital position of banks: Will the United Kingdom step out of line with Europe?
After the collapse of a number of banking institutions and bailouts of banks by governments, regulators have taken a different attitude and now appear keen to take regulation seriously when it comes to ensuring that banks have adequate capital and sufficient liquidity. Not only that, but in the United Kingdom, the Independent Commission on Banking Reform has made proposals with regard to the capital position of banks. This article, which is an overview, will look at matters from a UK perspective and at the proposals for reform. This article, after its introduction and summary, will look at a number of areas: first, the reforms made by Basel III; second, the regulation of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (Sifis) and the proposals for dealing with these; third, some matters in relation to lending that relate to capital and liquidity generally; fourth, increased stress testing of banks; fifth, derivatives and risk taking and the new proposed structure of regulation in the United Kingdom; sixth, the war of spin between regulators and banks; seventh, Shadow Banking; and eighth, The Independent Commission on Banking Reform and its proposals for reform. It will also be a theme that the various proposals lack consistency and that this could lead to regulatory arbitrage. It is already clear that there are inconsistencies between the various regulatory organisations, with proposals in the United Kingdom indicating that banks will be required to keep much higher levels of capital than those proposed by Basel and the European Community. The views of those who have pointed out inconsistencies between the United Kingdom and Basel/Europe have been highlighted
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