21,415 research outputs found

    Bifurcation analysis in a frustrated nematic cell

    Full text link
    Using Landau-de Gennes theory to describe nematic order, we study a frustrated cell consisting of nematic liquid crystal confined between two parallel plates. We prove the uniqueness of equilibrium states for a small cell width. Letting the cell width grow, we study the behaviour of this unique solution. Restricting ourselves to a certain interval of temperature, we prove that this solution becomes unstable at a critical value of the cell width. Moreover, we show that this loss of stability comes with the appearance of two new solutions: there is a symmetric pitchfork bifurcation. This picture agrees with numerical simulations performed by P. Palffy-Muhorray, E.C. Gartland and J.R. Kelly. Some of the methods that we use in the present paper apply to other situations, and we present the proofs in a general setting. More precisely, the paper contains the proof of a general uniqueness result for a class of perturbed quasilinear elliptic systems, and general considerations about symmetric solutions and their stability, in the spirit of Palais' Principle of Symmetric Criticality

    Uniaxial symmetry in nematic liquid crystals

    Full text link
    Within the Landau-de Gennes theory of liquid crystals, we study theoretically the equilibrium configurations with uniaxial symmetry. We show that the uniaxial symmetry constraint is very restrictive and can in general not be satisfied, except in very symmetric situations. For one- and two-dimensional configurations, we characterize completely the uniaxial equilibria: they must have constant director. In the three dimensional case we focus on the model problem of a spherical droplet with radial anchoring, and show that any uniaxial equilibrium must be spherically symmetric. It was known before that uniaxiality can sometimes be broken by energy minimizers. Our results shed a new light on this phenomenon: we prove here that in one or two dimensions uniaxial symmetry is always broken, unless the director is constant. Moreover, our results concern all equilibrium configurations, and not merely energy minimizers.Comment: contains a new presentation of results in arXiv:1307.0295, and new result

    The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders

    Get PDF
    We consider standard auction models when bidders' identities are not observed by the econometrician. First, we adapt the definition of identifiability to a framework with anonymous bids and we explore the extent to which anonymity reduces the possibility to identify private value auction models. Second, in the asymmetric independent private value model which is nonparametrically identified, we generalize Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong's estimation procedure [Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions, Econometrica 68 (2000) 525-574] and study the asymptotic properties of our multi-step kernel-based estimator. Third a test for symmetry is proposed. Monte Carlo simulations illustrate the practical relevance of our estimation and testing procedures for small data sets.auctions ; nonparametric identification ; nonparametric estimation ; tests for symmetry ; unobserved heterogeneity ; anonymous bids ; uniform convergence rate

    The future of the multilateral trading system

    Get PDF
    This 12-page transcript of the Australian lecture discussing the future of the multilateral trading system in the present era of global economic uncertainty

    Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions

    Get PDF
    Brendstrup (2007) and Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006) claim that sequential English auction models with multi-unit demand can be identified from the distribution of the last stage winning price and without any assumption on bidding behavior in the earliest stages. We show that their identification strategy is not correct and that non-identification occurs even if equilibrium behavior is assumed in the earliest stages. For two-stage sequential auctions, an estimation procedure that has an equilibrium foundation and that uses the winning price at both stages is developed and supported by Monte Carlo experiments. Identification under general affiliated multi-unit demand schemes is also investigated.sequential auctions ; nonparametric identification ; nonparametric estimation

    Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games

    Get PDF
    This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the strategic and informational details of the participation game are partially-specified. This means that full participation is required to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium for a large variety of extensive modifications of the simultaneous-move participation game in the same vein as Kalai [Large Robust Games, Econometrica 72 (2004) 1631-1665].mechanism design ; robust implementation ; strong Nash equilibrium ; partial subgame perfection ; collusion on participation
    corecore