Potere di Dio e poteri sugli uomini. Forza e limiti di un'analogia nella tradizione francescana tra XIII e XIV secolo

Lo scopo del saggio \ue8 di mettere a confronto alcuni autori appartenenti all'Ordine dei Minori che hanno assuntoposizioni significative in campo ecclesiologico-politico, chiedendosi se e in che como le hanno poste in relazione con le loro tesi relative alla potentia Dei. Questo numero monografico \ue8 stato curato da A. Sch\ufctz e M. Traversino

"Parisius, Parisius, ipse destruis Ordinem sancti Francisci". Riflessioni su identit\ue0 francescana e cultura universitaria

Una significativa tendenza storiografica, che trova ispirazioni anche da fonti francescane medievali, individua nell'impegno nelle istituzione di formazione superiore (universit\ue0, studia conventuali) l'origine dell'allontamento dell'Ordine dei Minori dalla sua originari e autentica "vocazione". A partire da un suggerimento di Ovidio Capitani, il saggio evidenzia invece anche gli elementi di continuit\ue0 tra "Assisi e Parigi", per utilizzare la contrapposizione cara a Jacopone da Todi. M. C. De Matteis e B. Pio sono i curatori dell'oper

Tota Familia Aristotelis: sobre algunas fuentes de la contribución de Bacon al discurso político medieval.

Writing his Moralis philosophia, Roger Bacon discussed issues relevant to medieval political discourse. He felt the need to appeal to the authority of Aristotle, but having no access to Aristotle’s Politica, he tried to reconstruct its main tenets through the writings of other thinkers, such as Avicenna and Alfarabi. The result of this attempt is a sketch of a political theory that goes mainly under the name of Aristotle but has little to do with the actual contents of the Politica. In the following years, Bacon remained faithful to his first reconstruction. The author suggests that, with all probability, Bacon, never read the actual text of the Politica. the result is that Bacon’s contribution in this field was not influenced by Aristotle’s political masterpiece, but by other texts, in particular by Avicenna’s Philosophia prima. Such an assessment should not imply a negative judgement on Bacon. Rather, we should consider him among those authors who contributed to the rich diversity of medieval political thought independent of Aristotle’s Politica.Al escribir su Moralis philosophia, Roger Bacon trató temas relevantes para el discurso político medieval. Sintió la necesidad de apelar a la autoridad de Aristóteles, pero al no tener acceso a la Política de Aristóteles, intentó reconstruir sus principios fundamentales a través de los escritos de otros pensadores, como Avicena y Alfarabi. El resultado de esta tentativa fue un esbozo de teoría política que se presenta principalmente bajo el nombre de Aristóteles, pero que tiene poco que ver con el contenido real de la Política. En los años siguientes, Bacon se mantuvo fiel a su primera reconstrucción. El autor sugiere que, con toda probabilidad, Bacon nunca leyó el texto real de la Política. El resultado fue que la contribución de Bacon a este campo no estuvo influida por la obra maestra de la política de Aristóteles, sino por otros textos, en particular por la Philosophia prima de Avicena. Esta valoración no debe implicar un juicio negativo sobre Bacon. Por el contrario, debemos considerarlo entre los autores que contribuyeron a la rica diversidad del pensamiento político medieval independientemente de la Politica de Aristóteles

Est autem et politica et prudencia, idem quidem habitus: appunti sul rapporto tra prudentia e politica in alcuni interpreti medievali del VI libro dell’Etica nicomachea (da Alberto Magno a Buridano)

The overview hereafter presented offers the development of the scholastic interpretations of the passage from Book VI of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics where the Greek philosopher sets an "imperfect identity" between prudentia and politics. From this study two interesting conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, a linear development can not be easily traced: the medieval authors have given different interpretations of the Aristotelian passage, thus trying to solve the problematic relationship between the individual's moral life and his political one. The two possible solutions are equally represented: both the conception which favours the existence of one single virtue responsible for both ambits, and the one which instead holds that the differences between private morality and politics are so relevant that different virtues for each of these ambits are necessary. This first result clearly demonstrates the lack of a communis opinio. There is an evident tension between the two poles variously interpreted by the different authors, anyway in opposition to the thesis of the divisibility of prudentia in species. Thus the second conclusion: the authors taken into consideration do not seem eager to renounce to the idea of the unity of practical reason, and have rather searched with great force for other ways of conceiving this unity. In order to gain a complete image of the problem a wider research would be needed, thus connecting the a. m. reflections to some considerations on the nature of prudentia as a virtue, and on the existing relations between bonum commune and individual good. A general result is however achieved: the medieval thinkers would not even take into consideration an individual prudentia disconnected from politics, nor a political prudentia disconnected from moral life

Managerial incentive and the firms’ propensity to invest in product and process innovation

We study the product and process innovation choice of firms in which a managerial incentive à la Vickers (1985) is present. Taking a two-stage dynamic game approach, we show that managerial firms are led to over-invest in process innovation, as compared to standard profit-maximising firms, while they under-invest in product innovation. The reason is that process innovation allows to decrease cost, and this is consistent with a convenient increase in the production level. On the opposite, product innovation allows increasing price, which is in contrast with the taste for output expansion embodied in the objective function of firms run by managers. Preliminary empirical evidence on Italian companies suggests that in fact the managerial nature of firm associates with significantly smaller efforts in product innovation while the effect on process innovation is positive but non-significant.Process innovation; Product innovation; R&D; Managerial incentive

Dynamic Oligopoly with Sticky Prices: Closed-Loop, Feedback and Open-Loop Solutions

We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game with price adjustments. We show that the subgame perfect equilibria are characterised by larger output and lower price levels then the open-loop solution. The individual (and industry) output at the closed-loop equilibrium is larger than its counterpart at the feedback equilibrium. Therefore, firms prefer the open-loop equilibrium to the feedback equilibrium, and the latter to the closed-loop equilibrium. The opposite applies to consumers

R&D incentives and market structure: a dynamic analysis

We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost-reducing activities. We focus on the relationship between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment monotonically increases in the number of firms. This Arrowian result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic

Non-Linear Market Demand and Capital Accumulation in A Differential Oligopoly Game

We investigate a differential oligopoly game where firms compete in account Market whose demand function is always downward sloping but can take any degree of curvature. There exist two economically meaningful saddle points, one dictated by demand conditions, the other by the Ramsey rule. In steady state, optimal capital is non-decreasing in market size. Then we show that the socially efficient output is independent of the curvature of market demand. This entails that the welfare loss associated to the Cournot equilibrium decreases as market size increases

The make-or-buy choice in a mixed oligopoly: a theoretical investigation

We take a game theory approach to study the make-or-buy decisions of firms in a mixed duopoly. We assume that a managerial firm and a profit-oriented firm compete in a duopoly market for a final good, and they can choose whether making an intermediate input or buying it from a monopolistic upstream firm. We find that different equilibria may arise, depending on parameter constellations. In particular, if the technology used for the production of the intermediate input is too costly, then the internal organization of firms at equilibrium is mixed, creating a conflict with social preferences that would always privilege vertical integration to outsourcing