Strong Evaluations and Personal Identity

Charles Taylor draws a distinction between weak and strong evaluations. They are two kinds of evaluative attitudes persons can have towards a variety of objects of evaluation. The possible objects can vary from individual desires, emotions and acts to whole ways of life. Strong evaluations are stable preferences based on qualitative distinctions concerning the worth of the options. Strong evaluations are responses to the non-instrumental value of the options, and they can be mistaken, because the value of the options is not based on the response. By contrast, what Taylor calls "weak evaluations" cannot be mistaken. Weak evaluations make any of their objects weakly valued. This means that strong evaluations are value-based, and weak evaluations desirebased preferences. Taylor also says that strong evaluations, unlike weak evaluations, are central to one's identity. One's identity is constituted through a strong adherence, a strong identification with and commitment to the values. Thus strong evaluations are stable preferences that are strongly adhered to, and which are based on strong values

Tulkoon instituutio! Puheteot Searlen sosiaalisen ontologian perustassa

John R. Searle (s. 1932) on tunnetuimpia sosiaalista tai institutionaalista ontologiaa tutkineita nykyfilosofeja. Hän on ehtimiseen korostanut kielen ja puhetekojen keskeistä merkitystä institutionaalisen tai sosiaalisen todellisuuden rakentumisessa. Siihen nähden on yllättävän vaikeaa selvittää, mitä hän tästä kielellisestä perustasta tarkkaan ottaen ajattelee ja miten sosiaalisen maailman pitäisi sen päällä maata. Searlen perusajatus puheteoille rakentuvasta institutionaalisesta todellisuudesta tuntuu johtavan umpikujaan

Stærk vurdering og filosofisk antropologi

Arto Laitinen undersøger et hovedbegreb hos Charles Taylor, nemlig be¬grebet om stærk vurdering. Der er – enkelt formuleret – tale om ’stærk vurdering’, når vi vurderer vore ønsker i sig selv, til forskel fra ’svag vurde¬ring’, hvor et givet ønskes iboende værdi ikke drages i tvivl. Laitinen viser, hvordan og hvorfor menneskelivet og erfaringen for Taylor forudsætter et betydningsfelt af stærke værdivurderinger, foruden hvilke mennesket ville befinde sig i en ’patologisk tilstand’ langt hinsides det i mere almindelig forstand blot åndsforladte. Endvidere indkredses fem hinanden delvist overlappende begreber, som Taylor skiftevis anvender i sin argumentation for de stærke vurderingers uundgåelighed: menneskelig virksomhed, per¬son-væren, subjektivitet, selv-væren og identitet. Endelig giver Laitinen i sin afsluttende diskussion af det patologiske i Taylors forståelse nogle illustra¬tive eksempler på den ’identitetskrise’, som fraværet af stærke vurderinger kan resultere i

Kant and Hegel on Purposive Action

This essay discusses Kant and Hegel’s philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow, we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section 2 discusses some central Kantian concepts (Freedom, Willkür, Wille, and Moral Law). In Section 3, we take a closer look at the distinction between internal and external action, as found in Kant’s philosophy of morality and legality. In Section 4, we turn to Hegel and his distinctions between abstract right (legality), morality, and ethical life, as well as the location of his account of action within his overall theory of morality. We discuss the distinction between Handlung and Tat, and non-imputable consequences. The overall aims of our essay are to shed light on some puzzles in Kant and Hegel’s conceptions and to examine where their exact disputes lie without taking a stand on which philosophy is ultimately the most satisfactory.Peer reviewe

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Ajatus 73:n esipuhe

In memoriam: Reijo Wilenius (1930–2019)

Jyväskylän yliopiston filosofian emeritusprofessori Reijo Wilenius kuoli Helsingissä 89-vuotiaana 26. lokakuuta 2019. Hän oli syntynyt Helsingissä 22. huhtikuuta 1930