Democracy and crime: a multilevel analysis of homicide trends in forty-four countries, 1950 to 2000

This work investigates association between crime and democracy drawing on information for 44 countries during the second half of the 20th century. Crime is indicated by national homicide rates, which minimize reliability problems implicated in cross-national and/or longitudinal comparisons of police recorded crime rates. Democracy is measured by the set of indicators included in the Polity data set, University of Maryland, U.S. Multilevel or hierarchical repeated measures models of homicide rates over each democracy indicator are estimated while controlling for time, population profile, economic development and inequality as well as regional idiosyncracies. The multilevel specification allows for country and annual random variations of the predicted values and estimated relationships. Apart from complete lack of any relationship three types of links are plausible between crime and democracy. Democracy may increase crime due to instability and lax state control over its citizens. It may reduce it owing to citizens’ enhanced sense of communal responsibility and trust in their political institutions. Finally democracy and crime may exhibit an inverted-U relationship. The first and last relationships are evidenced in the present -and to the authors’ knowledge only international- study on crime and democracy to date depending on the severity of autocracy democracy is contrasted with

Choosing Where to Fight: Do Social Networks Distinguish American ISIS Foreign Fighters from ISIS-Inspired Terrorists?

Why some did American citizens choose to travel to fight in Syria and Iraq rather than engage in ISIS-inspired terrorism in the United States? We conducted a social network analysis on a sample (n=224) of extremists who either plotted ISIS-inspired attacks within the United States or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq to join the group between 2013-2020. We test how network size, network interconnectedness, and the importance of trusted network members impact the choice of American ISIS offenders to travel or plot terrorist attacks. Our results show that Americans were more likely to choose to travel to fight when they had access to large, dense networks and were embedded with trusted associates. Those without access to similar networks abandoned their preferences for foreign fighting and instead plotted attacks within the United States. The findings provide pertinent policy implications for countering violent extremis

Is Violent Radicalisation Associated with Poverty, Migration, Poor Self-Reported Health and Common Mental Disorders?

BACKGROUND: Doctors, lawyers and criminal justice agencies need methods to assess vulnerability to violent radicalization. In synergy, public health interventions aim to prevent the emergence of risk behaviours as well as prevent and treat new illness events. This paper describes a new method of assessing vulnerability to violent radicalization, and then investigates the role of previously reported causes, including poor self-reported health, anxiety and depression, adverse life events, poverty, and migration and socio-political factors. The aim is to identify foci for preventive intervention. METHODS: A cross-sectional survey of a representative population sample of men and women aged 18-45, of Muslim heritage and recruited by quota sampling by age, gender, working status, in two English cities. The main outcomes include self-reported health, symptoms of anxiety and depression (common mental disorders), and vulnerability to violent radicalization assessed by sympathies for violent protest and terrorist acts. RESULTS: 2.4% of people showed some sympathy for violent protest and terrorist acts. Sympathy was more likely to be articulated by the under 20s, those in full time education rather than employment, those born in the UK, those speaking English at home, and high earners (>£75,000 a year). People with poor self-reported health were less likely to show sympathies for violent protest and terrorism. Anxiety and depressive symptoms, adverse life events and socio-political attitudes showed no associations. CONCLUSIONS: Sympathies for violent protest and terrorism were uncommon among men and women, aged 18-45, of Muslim heritage living in two English cities. Youth, wealth, and being in education rather than employment were risk factors

do non state armed groups influence each other in attack timing and frequency generating analyzing and comparing empirical data and simulation

Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) operate in complex environments, commonly existing as one of the many organizations engaged in one-sided violent attacks against the state and/or the civilian population. When trying to explain the execution and timing of these attacks, most theories look at NSAGs' internal organizational features or how these groups interact with the state or civilian population. In this study, we take a different approach: we use a self-exciting temporal model to ask if the behavior of one NSAG affects the behavior of other groups operating in the same country and if the actions of groups with actual ties (i.e., groups with some recognized relationship) have a larger effect than those with environmental ties (i.e., groups simply operating in the same country). We focus on three cases where multiple NSAGs operated at the same time: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia, from 2001 to 2005. We find mixed results for the notion that the actions of one NSAG influence the actions of others operating in the same conflict. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we find evidence that NSAG actions do influence the timing of attacks by other NSAGs; however, there is no discernible link between NSAG actions and the timing of attacks in Colombia. Nevertheless, we do consistently find that there is no significant difference between the effect that actual or environmental ties could have in these three cases

New Foundations: Pseudo-pacification and special liberty as potential cornerstones of a multi-level theory of homicide and serial murder

Over the past 30 years the industrialized West has witnessed a move towards space, heterogeneity and subjectivity in the criminological study of violence and homicide. Although large-scale quantitative studies of the temporal and spatial distribution of homicide continue to provide a broad empirical context, aetiological explanations tend to be based on analyses of the heterogeneous psychological interactions and experiences of individual subjects at the micro-level. However, mid-range studies of the temporal and spatial distribution of perpetrators and victims of homicide between unrelated adults have provided a useful link between the micro- and macro-levels. Focusing primarily on British homicide and serial murder, this article attempts to strengthen this link by combining contemporary micro-analyses of the subjective motives of perpetrators with mid-range analyses of space, which can therefore be seen as part of the structural tradition of theorizing about homicide and serial murder. Placing these analyses in a broad underlying context constituted by major historical shifts in political economy and the cultural forms of ‘pseudo-pacification’ and ‘special liberty’ will lay the initial cornerstones for an integrated multi-level theory. © The Author(s) 2014

Complaints of rape and the criminal justice system: Fresh evidence on the attrition problem in England and Wales

The UK has one of the lowest conviction rates for rape in Europe. This article presents unique evidence on the factors that influence the attrition of rape allegations in the English criminal justice system. The study is based on a large, representative sample of rape allegations reported to the London Metropolitan Police, the UK’s biggest police force. The dataset contains unprecedented detail on the incident, victim, suspect and police investigation. The results lend support to the influence of some rape myths and stereotypes on attrition. These findings suggest that further central factors include the ethnicity of the suspect as well as what police officers and prosecutors perceive as evidence against the truthfulness of the allegation: the police record noting a previous false allegation by the victim, inconsistencies in the victim’s account of the alleged rape, and evidence or police opinion casting doubt on the allegation

The Great American Crime Decline : Possible Explanations

This chapter examines the most important features of the crime decline in the United States during the 1990s-2010s but also takes a broader look at the violence declines of the last three centuries. The author argues that violent and property crime trends might have diverged in the 1990s, with property crimes increasingly happening in the online sphere and thus traditional property crime statistics not being reflective of the full picture. An important distinction is made between ‘contact crimes’ and crimes that do not require a victim and offender to be present in the same physical space. Contrary to the uncertainties engendered by property crime, the declines in violent (‘contact’) crime are rather general, and have been happening not only across all demographic and geographic categories within the United States but also throughout the developed world. An analysis of research literature on crime trends has identified twenty-four different explanations for the crime drop. Each one of them is briefly outlined and examined in terms of conceptual clarity and empirical support. Nine crime decline explanations are highlighted as the most promising ones. The majority of these promising explanations, being relative newcomers in the crime trends literature, have not been subjected to sufficient empirical scrutiny yet, and thus require further research. One potentially fruitful avenue for future studies is to examine the association of the most promising crime decline explanations with improvements in self-control