U.S. Attitudes toward Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Report to the Resilient Systems Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S Department of Homeland Security

Existing survey data do not provide comprehensive baseline information about U.S. beliefs and attitudes on terrorism and counterterrorism. Improved understanding of public attitudes can inform programs and tools related to managing public risk perception, increasing effectiveness of pre- and post-event communication by Federal, state, and local officials, and building and supporting more resilient social networks within and across communities.In this project, systematic survey data was collected from a sample of Americans in response to a range of newly developed survey questions. The survey was developed by two leading survey methodologists, following consultations with a research team of experts who study the dynamics of terrorism, counterterrorism, and community resilience, as well as with practitioners and officials from throughout the homeland security community. The questions were administered to members of a web panel by the on-line survey firm Knowledge Networks, and a second wave of the survey will be issued approximately six months after the first wave to allow for analysis of attitudes over time.The first wave of the questionnaire was completed, from September 28, 2012 to October 12, 2012, by 1,576 individuals 18 years of age and older. The first section of the questionnaire assessed the salience of terrorism by asking respondents whether they had thought about terrorism in the preceding week, how likely they thought a terrorist attack in the United States was in the next year, and whether they had done anything differently in the past year because of the possibility of such an attack. The second section of the questionnaire posed questions about how likely respondents would be to call the police in response to various actions potentially related to terrorism and how concerned respondents felt the government should be about these actions. Respondents who said they had thought about a terrorist attack in the last week were more likely than other respondents to say they were likely to call the police in response to the various situations described to them. The survey then assessed respondents' awareness and evaluation of government efforts related to terrorism in the United States. A large majority of the respondents said that the U.S. government has been very effective (33 percent) or somewhat effective (54 percent) at preventing terrorism; less than 13 percent characterized the government as not too effective or not effective at all.In a final section of the survey, we asked respondents about two specific programs focused on increasing communication between members of the public and the government on topics related to terrorism

Democracy and crime: a multilevel analysis of homicide trends in forty-four countries, 1950 to 2000

This work investigates association between crime and democracy drawing on information for 44 countries during the second half of the 20th century. Crime is indicated by national homicide rates, which minimize reliability problems implicated in cross-national and/or longitudinal comparisons of police recorded crime rates. Democracy is measured by the set of indicators included in the Polity data set, University of Maryland, U.S. Multilevel or hierarchical repeated measures models of homicide rates over each democracy indicator are estimated while controlling for time, population profile, economic development and inequality as well as regional idiosyncracies. The multilevel specification allows for country and annual random variations of the predicted values and estimated relationships. Apart from complete lack of any relationship three types of links are plausible between crime and democracy. Democracy may increase crime due to instability and lax state control over its citizens. It may reduce it owing to citizens’ enhanced sense of communal responsibility and trust in their political institutions. Finally democracy and crime may exhibit an inverted-U relationship. The first and last relationships are evidenced in the present -and to the authors’ knowledge only international- study on crime and democracy to date depending on the severity of autocracy democracy is contrasted with

Quest for significance and violent extremism : the case of domestic radicalization

In the present study, we applied the quest for significance model of radicalization to explain the use of politicalviolence. According to the model, when people experience loss of personal significance (e.g., due to socialrejection, achievement failures, or abuse) the motivation to restore significance may push them toward the useof extreme means. We tested this prediction in a sample of individuals who have committed ideologicallymotivated crimes in the United States (n 5 1496). We found that experiences of economic and social loss ofsignificance were separate and positive predictors related to the use of violence by perpetrators ofideologically motivated crimes. We also found evidence that the presence of radicalized others (friends but notfamily members) in the individuals’ social network increased their likelihood of using violence

A comparison of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and the world

Although political violence has been perpetrated on behalf of a wide range of political ideologies it is unclear whether there are systematic differences between ideologies in the use of violence to pursue a political cause. Prior research on this topic is scarce and mostly restricted to self- reported measures or less extreme forms of political aggression. Moreover, it has generally focused on respondents in western countries and has been limited to either comparisons of the supporters of left-wing and right-wing causes or examinations of only Islamist extremism. In this research we address these gaps by comparing the use of political violence by left-wing, right- wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and worldwide using two unique datasets that cover real-world examples of politically motivated, violent behaviors. Across both datasets, we find that radical acts perpetrated by individuals associated with left-wing causes are less likely to be violent. In the United States we found no difference between the level of violence perpetrated by right-wing and Islamist extremists. However, differences in violence emerged on the global level with Islamist extremists being more likely than right-wing extremists to engage in more violent acts

Editorial: Letter from the Editors

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Editorial: Letter from the Editors

- no abstract

Editorial: Letter from the Editors

- no abstract