Antibiotic resistance of airborne viable bacteria and size distribution in neonatal intensive care units

Despite their significant impact on public health, antibiotic resistance and size distributions of airborne viable bacteria in indoor environments in neonatal intensive care units (NICU) remain understudied. Therefore, the objective of this study was to assess the antibiotic resistance of airborne viable bacteria for different sizes (0.65–7 µm) in private-style and public-style neonatal intensive care units (NICU). Airborne bacteria concentrations were assessed by a six-stage Andersen impactor, operating at 28.3 L/min. Public-style NICU revealed higher concentrations of airborne viable bacteria (53.00 to 214.37 CFU/m3) than private-style NICU (151.94–466.43), indicating a possible threat to health. In the public-style NICU, Staphylococcus was the highest bacterial genera identified in the present study, were Staphylococcus saprophyticus and Staphylococcus epidermidis predominated, especially in the second bronchi and alveoli size ranges. Alloiococcus otitidis, Bacillus subtiles, Bacillus thuringiensis, Kocuria rosea, and Pseudomonas pseudoalcaligene, were identified in the alveoli size range. In NICU#2, eight species were identified in the alveoli size range: Bacillus cereus, Bacillus subtilis, Bacillus thuringiensis, Eikenella corrodens, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Staphylococcus aureus, Staphylococcus epidermidis, and Streptococcus gordoni. Multi-drug-resistant organisms (MDROs) were found in both of the NICUs. Bacillus cereus strains were resistant to Ampicillin, Cefoxitin, Ceftaroline, and Penicillin G. Staphylococcus cohnii ssp. cohnii was resistant in parallel to ampicillin and G penicillin. Staphylococcus saprophyticus strains were resistant to Ampicillin, Penicillin G, Oxaxilin, and Erythromycin. Results may indicate a potential threat to human health due to the airborne bacteria concentration and their antibiotic resistance ability. The results may provide evidence for the need of interventions to reduce indoor airborne particle concentrations and their transfer to premature infants with underdeveloped immune systems, even though protocols for visitors and cleaning are well-established

Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically identifies and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including how it could be defined, what influences it, and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identified that influence environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units generated, i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country; the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to define future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the significant risks to environmental integrity. Key policy insights Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time. Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13. The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy-wide targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity. Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk–through eligibility criteria or limits–could complement these approaches.</p

Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically identifies and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including how it could be defined, what influences it, and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identified that influence environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units generated, i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country; the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to define future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the significant risks to environmental integrity. Key policy insights Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time. Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13. The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy-wide targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity. Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk–through eligibility criteria or limits–could complement these approaches.</p

When less is more : limits to international transfers under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

International carbon markets can be an important tool in achieving countries’ mitigation targets under the Paris Agreement, but they are subject to a number of environmental integrity risks. An important risk is that some countries have mitigation targets that correspond to higher levels of emissions than independent projections of their likely emissions. If such ‘hot air’ can be transferred to other countries, it could increase aggregated emissions and create a perverse incentive for countries not to enhance the ambition of future mitigation targets. Limits to international transfers of mitigation outcomes have been proposed to address this risk. This article proposes a typology for such limits, explores key design options, and tests different types of limits in the context of 15 countries. Our analysis indicates that limits to international transfers could, if designed appropriately, prevent most of the hot air contained in current mitigation targets from being transferred, but also involve trade-offs between different policy objectives. Given the risks from international transfer of hot air and the uncertainty over whether other approaches will be effective in ensuring environmental integrity, we recommend that countries take a cautious approach and pursue a portfolio of approaches to ensure environmental integrity, in which case limits could provide for additional safeguards. Key policy insights Limits to international transfers involve trade-offs between different policy objectives, in particular reducing the risk that countries transfer hot air and enabling participation in carbon markets. Under ‘relative’ limits a country may transfer mitigation outcomes to the extent that its actual emissions are below the limit. Relative limits derived from historical emissions data have significant limitations, and none of the tested approaches was found to be effective for all countries. Relative limits based on emission projections could be a more valid approach, although they are also technically and politically challenging. Under ‘absolute’ limits a country could only issue, transfer or acquire a certain amount of mitigation outcomes. Absolute limits set at sufficiently low levels could prevent countries from transferring large amounts of hot air, but are bluntly applicable to all countries, whether or not they have hot air.</p

Outside in? Using international carbon markets for mitigation not covered by nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve nationally determined contribution (NDCs). In international negotiations on the rules governing the Agreement, an important question is whether and under which conditions mitigation outcomes that are not covered by the scope of NDCs should be eligible for international transfer and use by another country to achieve its NDC. Allowing the transfer and use of outside-scope mitigation could facilitate the identification of mitigation potential and reduce the costs of achieving NDCs. It could, however, also provide disincentives for countries to enhance the scope of their NDCs, be perceived as unfair towards countries with similar circumstances and economy-wide targets, reduce countries’ incentives to ensure the quality of carbon market units generated, and lead to double counting. To address these concerns, international rules could: require transferring countries to account for such transfers by applying ‘corresponding adjustments’ even though the emission reductions occur outside the scope of NDCs, or to bring relevant sectors and greenhouse gases into the scope of their next NDCs; adopt safeguards for unit quality, e.g. through international oversight or strict additionality tests; impose other restrictions; and/or require countries to quantify and specify the scope of their NDC in terms of sectors and greenhouses gases covered. Key policy insights: Not allowing the transfer of outside-scope mitigation outcomes, or allowing such transfers without a corresponding adjustment by the transferring country, would both require determining whether a mitigation outcome occurs within or outside the scope of NDCs, which can be difficult in some instances. Requiring corresponding adjustments for outside-scope mitigation is more easily implemented than other options seeking to address possible disincentives for broadening the scope of NDCs but could discourage countries from engaging in outside-scope transfers. Providing temporary exemptions, accompanied by other safeguards such as international oversight and strict additionality tests, may therefore be an appropriate means of giving countries time to build capacity and gather data and to expand their NDCs in the future. Which exemptions apply, and for how long, are important policy choices when balancing different goals, perspectives and practical implementation challenges.</p

Robust eligibility criteria essential for new global scheme to offset aviation emissions

Aviation may have contributed as much as 4.9% to global radiative forcing in 2005 and its carbon dioxide emissions could grow by up to 360% between 2000 and 2050 1 . In 2016, the International Civil Aviation Organization adopted a global scheme requiring airline operators to offset increases in carbon dioxide emissions from international flights above 2020 levels 2,3 . Here we show that the scheme will only compensate for the emissions increase if robust criteria for the eligibility of offset credits are adopted. Offset supply from already implemented greenhouse gas abatement projects registered under the Clean Development Mechanism alone could exceed demand from International Civil Aviation Organization’s scheme. Most of these projects continue abatement even if they cannot sell offset credits. If the scheme allows airline operators the unlimited use of offset credits from already implemented projects, it will result in no notable emissions reductions beyond those that would occur anyway and neither offer incentives for new investments nor reward previous investments in offset projects. We recommend limiting the eligibility to new projects or projects that are at risk of discontinuing greenhouse gas abatement without further support. The findings are critical for negotiations under both the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Paris Agreement. </p

Outside in? Using international carbon markets for mitigation not covered by nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve nationally determined contribution (NDCs). In international negotiations on the rules governing the Agreement, an important question is whether and under which conditions mitigation outcomes that are not covered by the scope of NDCs should be eligible for international transfer and use by another country to achieve its NDC. Allowing the transfer and use of outside-scope mitigation could facilitate the identification of mitigation potential and reduce the costs of achieving NDCs. It could, however, also provide disincentives for countries to enhance the scope of their NDCs, be perceived as unfair towards countries with similar circumstances and economy-wide targets, reduce countries’ incentives to ensure the quality of carbon market units generated, and lead to double counting. To address these concerns, international rules could: require transferring countries to account for such transfers by applying ‘corresponding adjustments’ even though the emission reductions occur outside the scope of NDCs, or to bring relevant sectors and greenhouse gases into the scope of their next NDCs; adopt safeguards for unit quality, e.g. through international oversight or strict additionality tests; impose other restrictions; and/or require countries to quantify and specify the scope of their NDC in terms of sectors and greenhouses gases covered. Key policy insights: Not allowing the transfer of outside-scope mitigation outcomes, or allowing such transfers without a corresponding adjustment by the transferring country, would both require determining whether a mitigation outcome occurs within or outside the scope of NDCs, which can be difficult in some instances. Requiring corresponding adjustments for outside-scope mitigation is more easily implemented than other options seeking to address possible disincentives for broadening the scope of NDCs but could discourage countries from engaging in outside-scope transfers. Providing temporary exemptions, accompanied by other safeguards such as international oversight and strict additionality tests, may therefore be an appropriate means of giving countries time to build capacity and gather data and to expand their NDCs in the future. Which exemptions apply, and for how long, are important policy choices when balancing different goals, perspectives and practical implementation challenges.</p

Promises and risks of nonstate action in climate and sustainability governance

Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement stand as milestone diplomatic achievements. However, immense discrepancies between political commitments and governmental action remain. Combined national climate commitments fall far short of the Paris Agreement's 1.5/2°C targets. Similar political ambition gaps persist across various areas of sustainable development. Many therefore argue that actions by nonstate actors, such as businesses and investors, cities and regions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are crucial. These voices have resonated across the United Nations (UN) system, leading to growing recognition, promotion, and mobilization of such actions in ever greater numbers. This article investigates optimistic arguments about nonstate engagement, namely: (a) "the more the better"; (b) "everybody wins"; (c) "everyone does their part"; and (d) "more brings more." However, these optimistic arguments may not be matched in practice due to governance risks. The current emphasis on quantifiable impacts may lead to the under-appreciation of variegated social, economic, and environmental impacts. Claims that everybody stands to benefit may easily be contradicted by outcomes that are not in line with priorities and needs in developing countries. Despite the seeming depoliticization of the role of nonstate actors in implementation, actions may still lead to politically contentious outcomes. Finally, nonstate climate and sustainability actions may not be self-reinforcing but may heavily depend on supporting mechanisms. The article concludes with governance risk-reduction strategies that can be combined to maximize nonstate potential in sustainable and climate-resilient transformations