Critique of Industrialization and Non-Institutional Architecture: Architectural Exhibition by the Tallinn School in 1978

The article looks at the relationship between the Soviet architectural discourse and art discourse from the late 1950s onwards. In architecture modernism and industrialization became the official dictum; Stalinist decorativeness and the Beaux-Arts tradition, prevalent earlier in the decade, was condemned and a new technocratic approach to the built environment was embraced. In art, however, the Stalinist-Zhdanovist canon of Socialist Realism was the official model until almost the end of the Soviet Union and the oppositional modernist/abstract art was forced to remain unofficial. My focus is on a group of architects and designers in Estonia in the 1970s (Jüri Okas, Leonhard Lapin, Vilen Künnapu, and others) who operated simultaneously in the sphere of art and architecture. Thus we can look at the exchange between critical art practice and architectural production of this period, leading initially to an exhibition in 1978 in the Academy of Sciences library in Tallinn and the works of the Tallinn School in architecture in the early 1980s. Also, this practice could be seen as an attempt to displace the realism-abstractionism opposition in art as well as the art-technology debate (focused on the synthesis of arts) in architecture

Structure-function relationship of the bovine papillomavirus E2 protein

http://www.ester.ee/record=b4331478~S1*es

Seeing-in as three-fold experience

It is generally agreed that Edmund Husserl’s theory of depiction describes a three-fold experience of seeing something in pictures, whereas Richard Wollheim’s theory is a two-fold experience of seeingin. The aim of this article is to show that Wollheim’s theory can be interpreted as a three-fold experience of seeing-in. I will first give an overview of Wollheim and Husserl’s theories of seeing-in, and will then show how the concept of figuration in Wollheim’s theory is analogous to the concept of the image subject as the depicted object in Husserl’s theory. I will claim that our experience of non-figurative pictures is a two-fold seeing-in, while that of figurative pictures is a three-fold seeing-in

Entweltlichung – paavst Benedictus XVI hingetõmbepaus

Entweltlichung - Period of Respite for the Pope Benedict XVIVatican II (1962-1965) issued the keyword aggiornamento - modernization - when the Roman Catholic Church was a policymaker in a situation where the Church looked forward to renewing its contacts with the meanwhile modernized world that had gone lost for the Church. During the last years of his pontificate Pope Benedict XVI sent a radical message to Church and world, wishing to consolidate the Church for a better missionary capability -thus there appeared a message for Church entitled Entweltlichung that incited after his so-called Freiburg speech (25.09.2011) a large number of public speeches. Entweltlichung (Unworlding) as the pope formulated it, was not a sociological, pol it ical nor legal but the ological category, a nd more spec ideally, missiological one. The actual intention of the Pope’s speech was the mission of the Church, the participation of the Church in the mission of God as a tool of the gospel. Hie requirements to the Church are to be understood on the basis of the mission: on the one hand, keeping the distance with the world, in order to keep the message of the gospel acute, and, on the other hand, to be open to the world, in order to fully contribute to the mission of God

Tensile properties of AZ11A-0 magnesium-alloy sheet under rapid-heating and constant temperature

Specimens of AZ31A-0 magnesium alloy sheet were heated to rupture at nominal rates of 0.2 F to 100 F per second under constant tensile load conditions. The data are presented and compared with the results of conventional tensile stress-strain tests at elevated temperatures after 1.2-hour exposure. A temperature-rate parameter was used to construct master curves from which stresses and temperatures for yield and rupture can be predicted under rapid-heating conditions. A comparison of the elevated-temperature tensile properties of AZ31A-0 and HK31XA-H24 magnesium-alloy sheet under both constant-temperature and rapid-heating conditions is included

Edmund Husserl's theory of image consciousness, aesthetic consciousness, and art

The central theme of my dissertation is Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of how we experience images. The aim of my dissertation is twofold: 1) to offer a contribution to the understanding of Husserl’s theory of image consciousness, aesthetic consciousness and art, and 2) to find out whether Husserl’s theory of the experience of images is applicable to modern and contemporary art, particularly to strongly site-specific art, unaided ready-mades, and contemporary films and theatre plays in which actors play themselves. Husserl’s commentators and followers interested in his theory of the experience of images have mostly focused on the concept of “phantasy” [Phantasie] or “imagination.” Accordingly, the main interest is in the notion of the “image object” [Bildobjekt] and in the question of how something absent can appear in an image. In my dissertation, the central concept is “image consciousness” [Bildbewusstsein] which is a unique kind of experience: it involves both perception and imaging. I want to show that Husserl’s early theory of depictive image consciousness (or pictorial consciousness) and his later theory of the experience of images (called immanent imagination or perceptual phantasy) can both be subsumed under the term “image consciousness”. I want to point out that Husserl’s revision of his earlier theory of image consciousness results in the distinction between depictive and non-depictive image consciousness, and that revision did not amount to an abandoning of the theory of “image consciousness.” In addition, Husserl divides depictive consciousness into positing and non-positing depictive consciousness. In my dissertation, I take the theory of image consciousness as the basis for explaining the experience of images, including the experience of visual works of art. In Husserl’s definition of art: “Without an image, there is no fine art” (Phantasy, 44; Hua XXIII, 41). The theory of image consciousness also plays an important role in explaining aesthetic consciousness since the focus is on “the How of the image object’s depicting” (Phantasy, 39; Hua XXIII, 36). My aim is to accentuate the subject in image consciousness, rather than the image object. I want to show that whether the subject is involved in image consciousness or not makes the difference if we have a two-fold or three-fold experience of seeing-in. In this way, I can also compare Husserl and Wollheim’s theories of seeing-in: a comparison that has received minimal attention in the literature of pictorial experience until now. In addition, I aim to show that according to Husserl’s theory, the image subject is involved only in depictive (and not in non-depictive) image consciousness. Moreover, I try to show that it is more difficult to define the image subject than the image object for the subject cannot be equated with the referent. Lastly, I will point out that Husserl mentions the possibility that it is the appearance of the subject rather than the image object appearance that we are focused on in aesthetic consciousness. Another topic that has received minimal attention until now is Husserl’s idea that depiction is involved in the experience of theatrical performance. The latter is primarily used by Husserl as an example of non-depictive image consciousness. I will examine how depiction can be involved in the experience of a theatre play in the case of actors playing themselves onstage. I will show that, in light of this example, either Husserl’s theory of depiction need to be revised or we cannot say that depiction is involved when an actor plays a real life person. Again, the key issue is how the subject (and not how the image object) appears. Thus, I will try to apply Husserl’s theory of depiction in explaining our experience of theatrical performances (and films). I will also try to use his theory of aesthetic consciousness in describing the experience of strongly site-specific art and point out what the difficulties are of using the idea of the limited synthetic unity of the aesthetic object in the case of strongly site-specific art which seems to have no prescribed margins that could correspond to the limitedness. In addition, I will show how Husserl’s phenomenology, especially the notion of horizon, can be used to define visual art. I will defend the view that an object of art can be defined as art through an external co-determining horizon – the artworld. My dissertation is divided into four parts. In the first part, I give an overview of the development of Husserl’s philosophy from the period 1989 – 1920s with a special focus on the development of the theory of image consciousness. In that part, I introduce the notions of depictive and non-depictive image consciousness. In the second part, special focus is on the depictive image consciousness or the theory of depiction. I will first explain the phenomenological approach to the experience of images and what the difference and similarities are between Husserl and Wollheim’s theory of seeing-in. Then I give more detailed description of the three objects or objectivities in image consciousness with the emphases on the image subject. Also, how the objects are related to each other: the necessary conflicts and a resemblance in image consciousness. Lastly, I will analyse Husserl’s claim that depiction might be involved in the experience of theatrical performances and I will show what the difficulties are of applying this idea in the case of a theatre play in which actors play themselves. In the third part, I examine Husserl’s theory of aesthetic consciousness. I will first point out how the notion of “aesthetic object” is equated with that of “work of art” by Husserl. Then I will show the similarities between the aesthetic attitude and phenomenological attitude in general, and how aesthetic consciousness differs from image consciousness according to Husserl. In this vein, I will point out the difficulty of defining whether, following Husserl’s texts, we are directed to image object appearance or the appearance of the image subject in aesthetic consciousness. Lastly, I will analyse Husserl’s idea of the limited synthetic unity of the aesthetic object and whether this theory holds in the case of the experience of strongly site-specific art. In the fourth part, I will give an overview of Husserl’s notes on art and his attempt to define art. The question whether every visual work of art must be an image is also addressed. The fourth part is divided into two sections. Firstly, I will show how some of Husserl’s commentators analyse artworks as analogues to or illustrations for Husserl’s phenomenology: how some works of art are doing phenomenology. Secondly, how Husserl’s phenomenology can be used to analyse our experience of artworks. In this section, I will examine Husserl’s claim that all works of visual art are images. Also, I will show how Husserl’s notion of the external co-determining horizon can be used to define art. Some material used in my dissertation has been published in the following journals: Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics (Vol. 5, 2013), South African Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 34(4), 2013), Kunstiteaduslikke Uurimusi (Studies on Art and Architecture) (Vol. 23(1/2), 2014), Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics (Vol. 11(1) Spring 2014)