Why the EU’s commitment to preventing human rights abuses abroad is more than just rhetoric

Is EU foreign policy genuinely influenced by humanitarian concerns or are such claims merely used to add legitimacy to traditional power politics? Joakim Kreutz uses data on EU foreign policy actions between 1989 and 2008 to assess the extent to which human rights concerns have played a role in decisions to intervene abroad. He finds a correlation between humanitarian atrocities and EU interventions; however this effect is strongly influenced by the geographic region in which atrocities take place. Overall, the EU appears most sensitive to human rights abuses within non-EU countries in Europe, followed by sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia

It Takes Two

Theories of conflict emphasize dyadic interaction, yet existing empirical studies of civil war focus largely on state attributes and pay little attention to nonstate antagonists. We recast civil war in a dyadic perspective, and consider how nonstate actor attributes and their relationship to the state influence conflict dynamics. We argue that strong rebels, who pose a military challenge to the government, are likely to lead to short wars and concessions. Conflicts where rebels seem weak can become prolonged if rebels can operate in the periphery so as to defy a government victory yet are not strong enough to extract concessions. Conflicts should be shorter when potential insurgents can rely on alternative political means to violence. We examine these hypotheses in a dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcomes, using new data on nonstate actors and conflict attributes, finding support for many of our conjectures. </jats:p

Natural resource wars in the shadow of the future: Explaining spatial dynamics of violence during civil war

Previous studies on natural resources and civil wars find that the presence of natural resources increases both civil conflict risk and duration. At the same time, belligerents often cooperate over resource extraction, suggesting a temporal variation in the contest over this subnational space. This study argues that parties fight over natural resources primarily when they expect that the conflict is about to end, as the importance of controlling them increases in the post-conflict setting. In contrast, belligerents that anticipate a long war have incentives to avoid fighting near natural resources since excessive violence will hurt the extraction, trade, and subsequent taxation that provide conflict actors with income from the resource. We test our argument using yearly and monthly grid-cell-level data on African civil conflicts for the period 1989–2008 and find support for our expected spatial variation. Using whether negotiations are underway as an indicator about warring parties’ expectations on conflict duration, we find that areas with natural resources in general experience less intense fighting than other areas, but during negotiations these very areas witness most of the violence. We further find that the spatial shift in violence occurs immediately when negotiations are opened. A series of difference-in-difference estimations show a visible shift of violence towards areas rich in natural resources in the first three months after parties have initiated talks. Our findings are relevant for scholarship on understanding and predicting the trajectories of micro-level civil conflict violence, and for policymakers seeking to prevent peace processes being derailed

State-building, war and violence : evidence from Latin America

In European history, war has played a major role in state‐building and the state monopoly on violence. But war is a very specific form of organized political violence, and it is decreasing on a global scale. Other patterns of armed violence now dominate, ones that seem to undermine state‐building, thus preventing the replication of European experiences. As a consequence, the main focus of the current state‐building debate is on fragility and a lack of violence control inside these states. Evidence from Latin American history shows that the specific patterns of the termination of both war and violence are more important than the specific patterns of their organization. Hence these patterns can be conceptualized as a critical juncture for state‐building. While military victories in war, the subordination of competing armed actors and the prosecution of perpetrators are conducive for state‐building, negotiated settlements, coexistence, and impunity produce instability due to competing patterns of authority, legitimacy, and social cohesion

Replication data for: From Tremors to Talks: Do natural disasters produce ripe moments for resolving separatist conflicts?

This article suggests that natural disasters can produce a ripe moment for conflict resolution because governments faced with the demand for effective disaster relief have incentives to offer concessions to separatist challengers. An analysis of the prevalence of new negotiations, ceasefires, and peace agreements during 12-month periods before and after natural disasters for separatist dyads 1990–2004 reveal some support for this proposition

Dismantling the Conflict Trap : Essays on Civil War Resolution and Relapse

Countries that have experienced civil war suffer a greater risk for new conflict than countries with no prior history of civil war. This empirical finding has been called a conflict trap where the legacy of previous war - unsolved issues, indecisive outcomes, and destruction – leads to renewed fighting. Yet, countries like Cambodia, El Salvador, Indonesia, and Mozambique have managed to overcome decade-long conflicts without relapse. This dissertation addresses this empirical puzzle by seeking to dismantle the conflict trap and look at microlevel explanations for civil war resolution and relapse. It adds to existing scholarship in three ways: first, by using disaggregated empirics on war termination and how fighting resumes; second, by exploring government agency in conflict processes; and third, by disaggregating rebel organizations. Essay I present original data on the start and end dates and means of termination for all armed conflicts, 1946-2005. Contrary to previous work, this data reveal that wars does not always end through victory or peace agreement, but commonly end under unclear circumstances. Essay II addresses how developments exogenous to the conflict influence governments’ decision to engage in a peace process. The results show that after natural disasters when state resources need to be allocated towards disaster relief, governments are more willing to negotiate and conclude ceasefires with insurgents. Essay III focuses on the post-conflict society, and posits that security concerns among former war participants will push them towards remobilizing into rebellion. The findings indicate that if ex-belligerent elite’s security is compromised, the parties of the previous war will resume fighting, while insecurity among former rank-and-file leads to the formation of violent splinter rebel groups. Finally, Essay IV seeks to explain why governments sometimes launch offensives on former rebels in post-conflict countries. The results show that internal power struggles provide leaders with incentives to use force against domestic third parties to strengthen their position against intra-government rivals. Taken together, this dissertation demonstrates that there is analytical leverage to be had by disaggregating the processes of violence in civil war and post-conflict societies, as well as the actors involved – both the government and rebel sides

Replication data for: How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset

This article presents new data on the start and end dates and the means of termination for armed conflicts, 1946-2005

¿Voz, derechos, o dinero en efectivo? ¿Qué factores determinan el éxito de los procesos de DDR?

¿Qué componentes de los procesos de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración (DDR) son claves para asegurar la paz tras unaguerra civil? Aunque prácticamente todos los procesos de paz en el mundo incluyen algún tipo de programa de DDR para ayudara los excombatientes a convertirse en civiles después de una guerra civil, las razones por las cuales son exitosos en unos casos y noen otros son poco conocidas. Centrándose en tres factores abordados habitualmente por estos procesos #oportunidades políticas,judiciales y económicas para los excombatientes más allá de las ofrecidas en la sociedad en general#, este estudio analiza cinco casosen los que la paz prevaleció durante más de una década, y cinco más donde no fue este el caso. El análisis revela la importancia deun equilibrio entre lo ofrecido a los excombatientes y el dividendo de paz para la sociedad en su conjunto, y señala que garantizarel acceso político de los antiguos grupos beligerantes es menos exitoso que permitirles competir en el proceso electoral.Which components in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) are key to ensure the peace after a civil war?Although almost every peace process worldwide includes any sort of DDR programme to help ex fighters to become civilians after a civil war, the reasons why in some cases they succeed and in some other they do not, are quite unknown. Focusing on three factorsusually addressed throughout these processes #political, legal and economic opportunities for ex fighters beyond the ones offered by the general society, this work analyses five cases when the peace prevailed for more than one decade and five cases when it did not. The analysis shows how important is a balance between the offers for ex fighters and the peace gain for the society as a whole. It also indicates that ensuring the political access for those former warring groups is less successful than allow them to compete in the election processes