Does high workload reduce the quality of healthcare? Evidence from rural Senegal

There is a widely held perception that staff shortages in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) lead to excessive workloads, which in turn worsen the quality of healthcare. Yet there is little evidence supporting these claims. We use data from standardised patient visits in Senegal and determine the effect of workload on the quality of primary care by exploiting quasi-random variation in workload. We find that despite a lack of staff, average levels of workload are low. Even at times when workload is high, there is no evidence that provider effort or quality of care are significantly reduced. Our data indicate that providers operate below their production possibility frontier and have sufficient capacity to attend more patients without compromising quality. This contradicts the prevailing discourse that staff shortages are a key reason for poor quality primary care in LMICs and suggests that the origins likely lie elsewhere

The effect of compulsory face mask policies on community mobility in Germany

There is an ongoing debate about face masks being made compulsory in public spaces to contain COVID-19. A key concern is that such policies could undermine efforts to maintain social distancing and reduce mobility. We provide first evidence on the impact of compulsory face mask policies on community mobility. We exploit the staggered implementation of policies by German states during the first wave of the pandemic and measure mobility using geo-located smartphone data. We find that compulsory face mask policies led to a short-term reduction in community mobility, with no significant medium-term effects. We can rule out even small increases in mobility

Overconfident health workers provide lower quality healthcare

While a growing body of evidence suggests that healthcare workers in low and middle-income countries often provide poor quality of care, the reasons behind such low performance remain unclear. The literature on medical decision-making suggests that cognitive biases, or failures related to the way healthcare providers think, explain many diagnostic errors. This study investigates whether one cognitive bias, overconfidence, defined as the tendency to overestimate one's performance relative to others, is associated with the low quality of care provided in Senegal. We link survey data on the overconfidence of health workers to objective measures of the quality of care they provide to standardised patients – enumerators who pose as real patients and record details of the consultation. We find that about a third of providers are overconfident – meaning that they overestimate their own abilities relative to their peers. We then show that overconfident providers are 26% less likely to manage patients correctly and exert less effort in clinical practice. These results suggest that the low levels of quality of care observed in some settings could be partly explained by the cognitive biases of providers, such as overconfidence. Policies that encourage adequate supervision and feedback to healthcare workers might reduce such failures in clinical decision-making

How are pay-for-performance schemes in healthcare designed in low- and middle-income countries? Typology and systematic literature review.

BACKGROUND: Pay for performance (P4P) schemes provide financial incentives to health workers or facilities based on the achievement of pre-specified performance targets and have been widely implemented in health systems across low and middle-income countries (LMICs). The growing evidence base on P4P highlights that (i) there is substantial variation in the effect of P4P schemes on outcomes and (ii) there appears to be heterogeneity in incentive design. Even though scheme design is likely a key determinant of scheme effectiveness, we currently lack systematic evidence on how P4P schemes are designed in LMICs. METHODS: We develop a typology to classify the design of P4P schemes in LMICs, which highlights different design features that are a priori likely to affect the behaviour of incentivised actors. We then use results from a systematic literature review to classify and describe the design of P4P schemes that have been evaluated in LMICs. To capture academic publications, Medline, Embase, and EconLit databases were searched. To include relevant grey literature, Google Scholar, Emerald Insight, and websites of the World Bank, WHO, Cordaid, Norad, DfID, USAID and PEPFAR were searched. RESULTS: We identify 41 different P4P schemes implemented in 29 LMICs. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the design of P4P schemes in LMICs and pinpoint precisely how scheme design varies across settings. Our results also highlight that incentive design is not adequately being reported on in the literature - with many studies failing to report key design features. CONCLUSIONS: We encourage authors to make a greater effort to report information on P4P scheme design in the future and suggest using the typology laid out in this paper as a starting point

The determinants of trust: findings from large, representative samples in six OECD countries

Trust is key for economic and social development. But why do we trust others? We study the motives behind trust in strangers using an experimental trust game played by 7236 participants, in six samples representative of the general populations of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the UK and the USA. We examine the broadest range of potential determinants of trustor sending to date, including risk tolerance, preferences for redistribution, and conformity. We find that even though self-interest, indicated by expected returns, is relevant for trustor behaviour, the most important correlate of sending is participants' altruism or fairness concerns, as measured by giving in a dictator game. We also find that in our large and representative sample, behaviour in the trust game and responses in a trust survey are significantly correlated, and that similar correlates—altruism in particular—are relevant for both

Evaluation of the anti-ischemic effects of D-ribose during dobutamine stress echocardiography: a pilot study

D-Ribose, a pentose sugar, has shown to improve myocardial high-energy phosphate stores depleted by ischemia. This study investigated the ability of D-Ribose with low dose dobutamine to improve the contractile response of viable myocardium to dobutamine and to assess the efficacy of D-ribose in reducing stress-induced ischemia. Twenty-six patients with ischemic cardiomyopathy completed a two-day, randomized, double blind crossover trial comparing the effects of D-Ribose and placebo on regional wall motion. On the first study day, either D-Ribose or placebo was infused for 4.5 hours. Low (5 and 10 μ/kg/min) and subsequently, high (up to 50 μ/kg/min) dose dobutamine echocardiography was then performed. On the second study day, patients crossed over to the alternative article for a similar 4.5 hours infusion time period and underwent a similar evaluation. The wall motion response during low dose dobutamine was the same with D-Ribose and placebo in 77% of segments (203/263, Kappa = 0.37). In segments with discordant responses, more segments improved with D-Ribose than with placebo (41 vs. 19 segments, p = 0.006). With high dose dobutamine infusion, the wall motion response (ischemia vs. no ischemia) was the same with D-Ribose and placebo in 83% of interpretable segments (301/363, kappa = 0.244). In segments with discordant responses, there were more ischemic segments with placebo compared to D-Ribose (36 vs. 26, p = 0.253). Nineteen patients developed ischemia during the dobutamine and placebo infusion and 13 patients had ischemia during dobutamine and D-ribose infusion (p = 0.109). D-Ribose improved contractile responses to dobutamine in viable myocardium with resting dysfunction but had no significant effect in reducing the frequency of stress-induced wall motion abnormalities

Pay for performance at a crossroads:Lessons from taking a global perspective

Purpose: The use of pay for performance (P4P) as an instrument to incentivise quality improvements in health care is at a crossroads in high-income countries but has remained a commonly used tool in low- and middle-income countries. The authors aimed to take stock of the evidence on effectiveness and design from across income settings to reveal insights for the future design of performance payment across income contexts. Design/methodology/approach: The authors identified Cochrane literature reviews of the use of P4P in health care in any income setting, tracked the development in the quantity and quality of evidence over time, and compared the incentive design features used across high-income countries compared to low- and middle-income countries. Findings: The quantity and quality of the evidence base have grown over time but can still be improved. Scheme design varies across income settings, and although some design choices may reflect differences in context, the authors find that incentive designers in both income settings can learn from practices used in the other setting. Originality/value: The research and literature on P4P in high-, low- and middle-income countries largely operate in silos. By taking stock of the evidence on P4P from across income settings, the authors are able to draw out key insights between these settings, which remain underexplored in the literature

A realist review to assess for whom, under what conditions and how pay for performance programmes work in low- and middle-income countries.

Pay for performance (P4P) programmes are popular health system-focused interventions aiming to improve health outcomes in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs). This realist review aims to understand how, why and under what circumstance P4P works in LMICs.We systematically searched peer-reviewed and grey literature databases, and examined the mechanisms underpinning P4P effects on: utilisation of services, patient satisfaction, provider productivity and broader health system, and contextual factors moderating these. This evidence was then used to construct a causal loop diagram.We included 112 records (19 grey literature; 93 peer-reviewed articles) assessing P4P schemes in 36 countries. Although we found mixed evidence of P4P's effects on identified outcomes, common pathways to improved outcomes include: community outreach; adherence to clinical guidelines, patient-provider interactions, patient trust, facility improvements, access to drugs and equipment, facility autonomy, and lower user fees. Contextual factors shaping the system response to P4P include: degree of facility autonomy, efficiency of banking, role of user charges in financing public services; staffing levels; staff training and motivation, quality of facility infrastructure and community social norms. Programme design features supporting or impeding health system effects of P4P included: scope of incentivised indicators, fairness and reach of incentives, timely payments and a supportive, robust verification system that does not overburden staff. Facility bonuses are a key element of P4P, but rely on provider autonomy for maximum effect. If health system inputs are vastly underperforming pre-P4P, they are unlikely to improve only due to P4P. This is the first realist review describing how and why P4P initiatives work (or fail) in different LMIC contexts by exploring the underlying mechanisms and contextual and programme design moderators. Future studies should systematically examine health system pathways to outcomes for P4P and other health system strengthening initiatives, and offer more understanding of how programme design shapes mechanisms and effects

Pay for performance at a crossroads: lessons from taking a global perspective

Purpose: The use of pay for performance (P4P) as an instrument to incentivise quality improvements in health care is at a crossroads in high-income countries but has remained a commonly used tool in low- and middle-income countries. The authors aimed to take stock of the evidence on effectiveness and design from across income settings to reveal insights for the future design of performance payment across income contexts. Design/methodology/approach: The authors identified Cochrane literature reviews of the use of P4P in health care in any income setting, tracked the development in the quantity and quality of evidence over time, and compared the incentive design features used across high-income countries compared to low- and middle-income countries. Findings: The quantity and quality of the evidence base have grown over time but can still be improved. Scheme design varies across income settings, and although some design choices may reflect differences in context, the authors find that incentive designers in both income settings can learn from practices used in the other setting. Originality/value: The research and literature on P4P in high-, low- and middle-income countries largely operate in silos. By taking stock of the evidence on P4P from across income settings, the authors are able to draw out key insights between these settings, which remain underexplored in the literature