Acerca del monoproposicionalismo imperante en Semántica y Pragmática

This paper tries to show that the assumption here called monopropositionalism is taken for granted by most semantic and pragmatic theories of natural language, and that it has decisively conditioned many of the debates in recent philosophy of language. Monopropositionalism claims that, leaving aside implicatures, the utterance of a sentence expresses a unique proposition, which is taken as what is said by the utterance, its content or its truth-conditions. But different and, often, incompatible roles are required from that proposition. We will argue for the convenience of rejecting that assumption and the adoption of a pluripropositionalist theory of utterances, based on Korta and Perry’s (forthcoming) Critical Pragmatics

Tenses, Dates and Times*

This paper presents a theory of utterance content that is neutral with respect to some of the key issues in the debate about the proper semantics of tense. Elaborating on some ideas from Korta & Perry (2011), we defend a proposal according to which utterances of both temporally specific and temporally unspecific sentences have a systematic variety of contents, from utterance-bound to incremental or referential. This analysis will shed some light on the contribution of tense to what is said by an utterance

Comparatives in Context. Vallée on Relative Gradable Adjectives

In “Unarticulated Comparison Classes” 2018 [2009],Richard Vall ́ee adoptsJohn Perry’s (2012 [2001]) reflexive-referential theory of meaning and contentas well ashis concept of unarticulated constituents (Perry 1986) to deal with certain context-sensitiveelements of the truth-conditions of statements containing relative gradable predicates. I amsympathetic both with the general framework and with the assumption that unarticulatedconstituents are involved in the truth-conditions ofbare positivessuch as “Monica istall.” I do not share, however, Vall ́ee’s main conclusions on the examples he provides aspre-theoretical evidence. This leads me to disagree with some details of his proposal for thesemantics and pragmatics of relative gradable adjective

Behin Batean. Peter Kivyren azkena baino gehiago

The late Peter Kivy, author of multiple works in the philosophy of music and literature, and philosophy of art in general, got to know the Donostia and the University of the Basque Country. It was not directly through the Philosophy department, but through the Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language and Information (ILCLI). Kivy left an impact on the Basque research on aesthetics and the philosophy of art. A modest impact but an impact that is called to last. This is a chronicle of Kivy’s story with Donostia.; Musika eta literaturaren eta, oro har, artearen filosofian eta estetikan hainbat lanen egile ezagun izan zen Peter Kivyk izan zuen harremana Donostiarekin eta Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearekin. Ez Filosofia sailarekin zuzenean, ILCLIrekin (Logika, Kognizio, Hizkuntza eta Informaziorako Institutuarekin) baizik. Harreman horrek utzi zuen bere arrastoa artearen filosofia eta estetikako euskal ikerketan; arrasto txikia, baina arrastoa, nolanahi ere; datozen urteetan luzatuko dena, itxura guztien arabera. Honako lan hau harreman horren kronika da

Recanati: esaldiaren testuingurua eta edukiak

In "Literal meaning", Franfois Recanati argues for contextualism on utterance meaning and content, against literalism, indexicalism and syncretic views. A widely held assumption among participants in the debate is the thesis I call 'monopropositionalism,' that is, the view that the utterance of a non-ambiguous sentence is associated with one and only one proposition (implicatures apart).The only position apparently incompatible with monopropositionalism seems to be the syncretic view, a view that Recanati rejects. However, he doesn't embrace monopropositionalism, as it is clear in his later book, "Perspectival thought"

Denbora kontuak. Geroari buruzko esaldiak eta iraganari buruzko ohar bat

In Korta (2015), I compare statements about the contingent future and what speech act theory calls commisive and directive speech acts, which also concer future events. I took their similarities to include a coincidence in direction of fit. Contrary to what speech act theory claims, I ventured that they all have world-to-words or upward (↑) direction of fit. I think now that is not correct. All predictions do not have the same direction of fit. This paper aims at clarifying what different kinds of predictions do and do not have in common.But, it also serves as a brief public statement on my friend Xabier Arrazola, to whose memory this paper, and the entire volume, is devoted

Politika, logika eta maitasuna

An introduction to the special issue offered to Jesus Mari Larrazabal on his 70th birthday.Testu hau hitzaurre bat baino ez da, esku artean duzun Gogoaren ale berezi honen aurkezpena. Alea, osorik, Jesus Mari Larrazabal EHUko Logikako katedradun ohiari eskainia da, esker onez, bere 70. urtebetetzean opari, EHUtik erretiroa hartu eta urtebete pasatxora. Bestela esanda, akademian Festschrift esan ohi zaion hori da. Alearen egitura eta edukiak aurkezten hasi aurretik, hala ere, pertsona aurkeztea komeni da akaso

Frege y sus circunstancias: Una interpretación de la teoría fregeana del significado

We present a novel interpretation of Frege’s theories in Begriffsschrift (1879/2016) and “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (1892a [2016]). We focus on the role of circumstances as the conceptual content of sentences in Begriffsschrift and we argue that none of the reasons Frege gives in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” to establish truth-values as the reference of sentences justifies their elimination. This paper is not mainly historical, but rather of conceptual reconstruction. We look for the roots of a pluralist conception of sentence’s content (Perry, 2001/2012; Korta & Perry, 2011) in Frege.Proponemos una interpretación novedosa de la(s) teoría(s) de Frege en Begriffsschrift (1879/2016) y “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (1892a/2016). Prestamos especial atención al papel de las circunstancias como contenido conceptual de las oraciones en Begriffsschrift y argumentamos que ninguna razón de las que ofrece Frege en “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” para establecer los valores de verdad como referencia de las oraciones justifica su eliminación. Este artículo no es tanto de carácter histórico como de reconstrucción conceptual. Buscamos en Frege las raíces de una concepción pluralista del contenido de la oración (Perry, 2001/2012; Korta & Perry, 2011)