40 research outputs found

    Causal superseding

    Get PDF
    When agents violate norms, they are typically judged to be more of a cause of resulting outcomes. In this paper, we suggest that norm violations also affect the causality attributed to other agents, a phenomenon we refer to as ‘‘causal superseding.’’ We propose and test a counterfactual reasoning model of this phenomenon in four experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 provide an initial demonstration of the causal superseding effect and distinguish it from previously studied effects. Experiment 3 shows that this causal superseding effect is dependent on a particular event structure, following a prediction of our counterfactual model. Experiment 4 demonstrates that causal superseding can occur with violations of non-moral norms. We propose a model of the superseding effect based on the idea of counterfactual sufficiency

    Quantifying sources of variability in infancy research using the infant-directed-speech preference

    Get PDF
    Psychological scientists have become increasingly concerned with issues related to methodology and replicability, and infancy researchers in particular face specific challenges related to replicability: For example, high-powered studies are difficult to conduct, testing conditions vary across labs, and different labs have access to different infant populations. Addressing these concerns, we report on a large-scale, multisite study aimed at (a) assessing the overall replicability of a single theoretically important phenomenon and (b) examining methodological, cultural, and developmental moderators. We focus on infants’ preference for infant-directed speech (IDS) over adult-directed speech (ADS). Stimuli of mothers speaking to their infants and to an adult in North American English were created using seminaturalistic laboratory-based audio recordings. Infants’ relative preference for IDS and ADS was assessed across 67 laboratories in North America, Europe, Australia, and Asia using the three common methods for measuring infants’ discrimination (head-turn preference, central fixation, and eye tracking). The overall meta-analytic effect size (Cohen’s d) was 0.35, 95% confidence interval = [0.29, 0.42], which was reliably above zero but smaller than the meta-analytic mean computed from previous literature (0.67). The IDS preference was significantly stronger in older children, in those children for whom the stimuli matched their native language and dialect, and in data from labs using the head-turn preference procedure. Together, these findings replicate the IDS preference but suggest that its magnitude is modulated by development, native-language experience, and testing procedure. (This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie SkƂodowska-Curie grant agreement No 798658.

    Experiments 1a and 1b

    No full text
    How well do children engage in predictive and counterfactual reasoning about physical events, rather than narratives

    Categories and Constraints in Causal Perception

    No full text
    Data and materials provided for the paper of the same title in Psychological Science

    Immoral professors and malfunctioning tools: Counterfactual relevance accounts explain the effect of norm violations on causal selection

    No full text
    This repository contains the supporting materials for the manuscript: Jonathan Kominsky & Jonathan Phillips, (submitted). Immoral professors and malfunctioning tools: Counterfactual relevance accounts explain the effect of norm violations on causal selection

    Causation and norms of proper functioning: Counterfactuals are (still) relevant

    No full text
    Causal judgments are well-known to be sensitive to violations of moral and statistical norms. There is ongoing discussion as to whether these effects are both best explained through changes in the relevance of counterfactual possibilities, or if moral norm violations should be independently explained through a potential polysemy of the term ‘cause’. In support of the latter view, recent work has pointed out that moral norm violations affect judgments of agents, but not inanimate objects, and that their effects are moderated by agents’ knowledge states. We advance this debate by demonstrating that judgments of counterfactual relevance exhibit precisely the same patterns, and that judgments of inanimate objects are actually highly sensitive to whether the object violated a prescriptive norm by malfunctioning. The latter finding is difficult to account for through polysemy, but is predicted by changes in the relevance of counterfactual alternatives
    corecore