Dilution and confirmation of probability judgments based on nondiagnostic evidence

Previous research has shown that probability judgments based on a mix of diagnostic and nondiagnostic information are less extreme than judgments based on the diagnostic information alone. Results of the present experiments suggest that this dilution effect holds only under a limited set of conditions. When judgments based on a mix of diagnostic and nondiagnostic information are compared with separately elicited judgments based on the diagnostic information alone, the dilution effect is consistently observed. When judgments based on the diagnostic evidence are revised in light of additional, nondiagnostic evidence, by contrast, the dilution effect is eliminated or even reversed (yielding a confirmation effect) depending on the type of nondiagnostic evidence under evaluation

Belief bias during reasoning among religious believers and skeptics

We provide evidence that religious skeptics, as compared to believers, are both more reflective and effective in logical reasoning tasks. While recent studies have reported a negative association between an analytic cognitive style and religiosity, they focused exclusively on accuracy, making it difficult to specify potential underlying cognitive mechanisms. The present study extends the previous research by assessing both performance and response times on quintessential logical reasoning problems (syllogisms). Those reporting more religious skepticism made fewer reasoning errors than did believers. This finding remained significant after controlling for general cognitive ability, time spent on the problems, and various demographic variables. Crucial for the purpose of exploring underlying mechanisms, response times indicated that skeptics also spent more time reasoning than did believers. This novel finding suggests a possible role of response slowing during analytic problem solving as a component of cognitive style that promotes overriding intuitive first impressions. Implications for using additional processing measures, such as response time, to investigate individual differences in cognitive style are discussed

It’s Still Bullshit: Reply to Dalton (2016)

In reply to Dalton (2016), the authors argue that bullshit is defined in terms of how it is produced, not how it is interpreted. They agree that it can be interpreted as profound by some readers (and assumed as much in the original paper). Nonetheless, they present additional evidence against the possibility that more reflective thinkers are more inclined to interpret bullshit statements as profound

On the Reception and Detection of Pseudo-profound Bullshit

Although bullshit is common in everyday life and has attracted attention from philosophers, its reception (critical or ingenuous) has not, to our knowledge, been subject to empirical investigation. Here we focus on pseudo-profound bullshit, which consists of seemingly impressive assertions that are presented as true and meaningful but are actually vacuous. We presented participants with bullshit statements consisting of buzzwords randomly organized into statements with syntactic structure but no discernible meaning (e.g., “Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena”). Across multiple studies, the propensity to judge bullshit statements as profound was associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style, supernatural belief). Parallel associations were less evident among profundity judgments for more conventionally profound (e.g., “A wet person does not fear the rain”) or mundane (e.g., “Newborn babies require constant attention”) statements. These results support the idea that some people are more receptive to this type of bullshit and that detecting it is not merely a matter of indiscriminate skepticism but rather a discernment of deceptive vagueness in otherwise impressive sounding claims. Our results also suggest that a bias toward accepting statements as true may be an important component of pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity

On the psychology of self-prediction: Consideration of situational barriers to intended actions

When people predict their future behavior, they tend to place too much weight on their current intentions, which produces an optimistic bias for behaviors associated with currently strong intentions. More realistic self-predictions require greater sensitivity to situational barriers, such as obstacles or competing demands, that may interfere with the translation of current intentions into future behavior. We consider three reasons why people may not adjust sufficiently for such barriers. First, self-predictions may focus exclusively on current intentions, ignoring potential barriers altogether. We test this possibility, in three studies, with manipulations that draw greater attention to barriers. Second, barriers may be discounted in the self-prediction process. We test this possibility by comparing prospective and retrospective ratings of the impact of barriers on the target behavior. Neither possibility was supported in these tests, or in a further test examining whether an optimally weighted statistical model could improve on the accuracy of self-predictions by placing greater weight on anticipated situational barriers. Instead, the evidence supports a third possibility: Even when they acknowledge that situational factors can affect the likelihood of carrying out an intended behavior, people do not adequately moderate the weight placed on their current intentions when predicting their future behavior

Unclaimed Prize Information Increases the Appeal of Scratch Card Games

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Gambling Studies on 03 Nov 2020, available online:https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14459795.2020.1826558.Previous research suggests that intuitively appealing, yet uninformative unclaimed prize information is capable of biasing gambling-related judgments when people compare scratch cards that vary in the number of unclaimed prizes. However, it is unknown if the mere presence of unclaimed prize information alters a game’s attractiveness. Using an online crowdsourcing platform, we recruited 402 U.S. residents to participate in an online study. In a within-subjects design, participants made four gambling-related judgments (likelihood of winning, excitement to play, urge to gamble, and hypothetical card purchasing) for scratch cards presented with and without unclaimed prize information. Compared to cards presented without unclaimed prize information, those with unclaimed prize information were judged as more likely to win, produced more excitement to play, a greater urge to gamble, and were chosen more often during a hypothetical purchasing task. Therefore, unclaimed prize information increases the appeal of scratch card games, and may be an important aspect of the scratch card gambling environment to consider from a harm reduction perspective.Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC

Exploring relationships between problem gambling, scratch card gambling, and individual differences in thinking style

Background and aims: Scratch cards are a popular form of lottery gambling available in many jurisdictions. However, there is a paucity of research that examines associations between individual differences in thinking style, participation in scratch card gambling, and problem gambling severity. Methods: In three studies, we sought to examine the relationships among these variables in large, online samples of participants. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI), the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale, and self-reported their frequency of scratch card gambling. Results: Throughout all three studies, specific associations were reliably established. Specifically, negative associations were observed between participants’ CRT and PGSI scores, as well as between participants’ CRT scores and scratch card gambling frequency. In addition, we found a positive association between problem gambling severity and scratch card gambling frequency. Finally, problem gambling severity was shown to correlate positively with participants’ willingness to pay for irrelevant information in a scratch card gambling scenario. Discussion and conclusions: Overall, we observed that problem gambling severity is associated with an individuals’ thinking style and scratch card gambling behavior. This study adds to the existing literature examining problem gambling, and highlights the role of thinking style in understanding gambling behavior and problematic gambling

Cover crop planting practices determine their performance in the U.S. Corn Belt

Cover crop growing periods in the western U.S. Corn Belt could be extended by planting earlier. We evaluated both pre-harvest broadcast interseeding and post-harvest drilling of the following cover crops: (a) cereal rye (Secale cereale L.) [RYE]; (b) a mix of rye + legumes + brassicas [MIX1], (c) a mix of rye + oat [Avena sativa L.] + legumes + brassicas (MIX2), (d) legumes [LEGU]) and (e) a no cover crop control. These were tested in continuous corn (Zea mays L.) [corn–corn] and soybean [Glycine max (L.) Merr.]–corn systems [soybean–corn] at three sites in Nebraska for their effect on cover crop productivity, soil nutrients, and subsequent corn performance. At the sites with wet fall weather, pre-harvest broadcasting increased cover crop biomass by 90%, to 1.29 Mg ha−1 for RYE and 0.87 Mg ha−1 for MIX1 in soybean–corn, and to 0.56 Mg ha−1 and 0.39 Mg ha−1 in corn–corn, respectively. At the drier site, post-harvest drilling increased biomass of RYE and MIX1 by 95% to 0.80 Mg ha−1 in soybean–corn. Biomass N uptake was highest in pre-harvest RYE and MIX1 at two sites in soybean–corn (35 kg ha−1). RYE and sometimes mixes reduced soil N, but effects on P, K, and soil organic C were inconsistent. In soybean–corn, corn yields decreased by 4% after RYE, and in corn–corn, by 4% after pre-harvest cover crops. Site-specific selection of cover crops and planting practices can increase their performance while minimizing impacts on corn

Cover crop productivity and subsequent soybean yield in the western Corn Belt

Cover crops (CC) in corn (Zea mays L.) and soybean [Glycine max (L.) Merr.] rotations may prevent N loss and provide other ecosystem services but CC productivity in the western Corn Belt is limited by the short growing season. Our objective was to assess CC treatment and planting practice effects on CC biomass, spring soil nitrate concentrations, and soybean yield at two rainfed sites in eastern and one irrigated site in south-central Nebraska over 4 yr. Cover crop treatments (cereal rye [Secale cereale L.] [RYE] and a mix of rye, legume, and brassica species [MIX]) were planted by broadcast interseeding into corn stands in September (pre-harvest broadcast) or drilling after corn harvest (post-harvest drilled) and terminated 2 wk before planting soybean. Cover crop biomass and N uptake varied between years, but generally at the eastern sites, pre-harvest broadcasting produced more biomass than post-harvest drilling (1.64 and 0.79 Mg ha−1, respectively) and had greater N uptake (37 and 24 kg ha−1, respectively). At the south-central site, post-harvest drilling produced more than pre-harvest broadcasting (1.44 and 1.20 Mg ha−1, respectively). RYE had more biomass than MIX (1.41 and 1.09 Mg ha−1, respectively), but the same N uptake. Soil nitrate reductions after CC were small. In 3 of 12 site-years, soybean yielded less after pre-harvest CC. Yield reductions were not correlated to CC biomass, but were likely due to greater weed pressure. High CC productivity is necessary for high N uptake, and requires site-specific selection of planting practice and CC treatments