Has the regulation of non-GAAP disclosures influenced managers' use of aggressive earnings exclusions?

The frequency of non-GAAP (“pro forma”) reporting has continued to increase in the U.S. over the last decade despite preliminary evidence that regulatory intervention led to a decline in non-GAAP disclosures. In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and Regulation G (2003) impose strict requirements related to the reporting of non-GAAP numbers. More recently, the SEC has renewed its emphasis on non-GAAP reporting and declared it a “fraud risk factor.” Given the SEC’s renewed emphasis on non-GAAP disclosures, we explore the extent to which regulation has curbed potentially misleading disclosures by investigating two measures of aggressive non-GAAP reporting. Consistent with the intent of Congress and the SEC, we find some evidence that managers report adjusted earnings metrics more cautiously in the post-SOX regulatory environment. Specifically, the results suggest that firms reporting non-GAAP earnings in the post-SOX period are less likely to (1) exclude recurring items incremental to those excluded by analysts and (2) use non-GAAP exclusions to meet strategic earnings targets on a non-GAAP basis that they miss based on I/B/E/S actual earnings. However, we also find that some firms exclude specific recurring items aggressively. Overall, the results suggest that while regulation has generally reduced aggressive non-GAAP reporting, some firms continue to disclose non-GAAP earnings numbers that could be misleading in the post-SOX regulatory environment

Should repurchase transactions be accounted for as sales or loans?

In this paper, we discuss the accounting for repurchase transactions, drawing on how repurchase agreements are characterized under U.S. bankruptcy law, and in light of the recent developments in the U.S. repo market. We conclude that the current accounting rules, which require the recording of most such transactions as collateralized loans, can give rise to opaqueness in a firm's financial statements because they incorrectly characterize the economic substance of repurchase agreements. Accounting for repurchase transactions as sales and the concurrent recognition of a forward, as “Repo 105” transactions were accounted for by Lehman Brothers, has furthermore overlooked merits. In particular, such a method provides a more comprehensive and transparent picture of the economic substance of such transactions

Pension deficits and corporate financial policy: does accounting transparency matter?

We study changes in financial policies following a regulatory shock to the accounting transparency of defined benefit pension plans. We estimate the hidden pension deficits of French companies subject to mandatory IAS 19 adoption in 2005 using disclosures of early adopters of IAS 19. We find that financially risky companies reporting unexpectedly high pension deficits on first-time IAS 19 adoption subsequently reduce leverage and incur higher cost of debt. Our results suggest that in the absence of transparency the credit market anticipates off-balance sheet pension deficits. However, the introduction of the more transparent IAS 19 regime allows the credit market to correct estimation errors. Our study is one of the first to show that the greater transparency offered by IFRS has negative economic consequences for some companies