Repeated Games Played in a Network

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. Due to this and the bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network’s diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.Repeated Game, Delayed Perfect Monitoring, Network, Communication

Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games

Delayed perfect monitoring in an in�nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced under certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players-reaction to it.Repeated Game, Delayed Perfect Monitoring, Folk Theorem

The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network

Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truth-telling extend to strategic communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are equilibria in which a player lies. The flow of information is related with network centrality measures.Repeated Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Imperfect Private Monitoring, Network, Strategic Communication, Centrality

Repeated Games Played in a Network

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.Repeated Game, Network, Delayed Perfect Monitoring, Communication

Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games.

Delayed perfect monitoring in an in�nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced under certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players-reaction to it

Augmented reality for pedestrian evacuation research: Promises and limitations

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Sequential decisions in the Diamond-Dybvig banking model

Abstract We study the Diamond-Dybvig model of financial intermediation (Diamond, D., Dybvig, P., 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91 (3), 401–419.) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history of all previous decisions, we show that there are no bank runs in equilibrium independently of whether the realized type vector selected by nature is of perfect or imperfect information. Our result is robust to several extensions

DRIVERS OF ILLIQUIDITY IN THE ASEAN SOVEREIGN BOND MARKET

We study illiquidity in ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets from 2008 to 2019 by using an illiquidity measure, which is based on a proxy of the amount of arbitrage capital available in sovereign bond markets. Our analysis identifies three drivers of illiquidity in Singapore, namely economic policy uncertainty, the default spread and the GDP growth rate. In contrast, liquidity of all other markets is mostly not characterized by economic drivers. It appears that overall liquidity is lower in the markets outside Singapore and therefore deviations in these yield curves are higher on average and arbitrage eliminates larger deviations not immediately but in a delayed manner.We study illiquidity in ASEAN-5 sovereign bond markets from 2008 to 2019 by using an illiquidity measure, which is based on a proxy of the amount of arbitrage capital available in sovereign bond markets. Our analysis identifies three drivers of illiquidity in Singapore, namely economic policy uncertainty, the default spread and the GDP growth rate. In contrast, liquidity of all other markets is mostly not characterized by economic drivers. It appears that overall liquidity is lower in the markets outside Singapore and therefore deviations in these yield curves are higher on average and arbitrage eliminates larger deviations not immediately but in a delayed manner

Would depositors like to show others that they do not withdraw? Theory and experiment

There is an asymmetry regarding what previous decisions depositors may observe when choosing whether to withdraw or keep the money deposited: it is more likely that withdrawals are observed. We study how decision-making changes if depositors are able to make their decision to keep their funds in the bank visible to subsequent depositors at a cost. We show theoretically in a Diamond-Dybvig setup that without this signaling option multiple equilibria are possible, while signaling makes the no-run outcome the unique equilibrium. We test if the theoretical predicitions hold in a lab experiment. We find that indeed when signaling is available, bank runs are less likely to arise and signaling is extensively used

Would depositors pay to show that they do not withdraw? Theory and experiment

In a Diamond–Dybvig type model of fnancial intermediation, we allow depositors to announce at a positive cost to subsequent depositors that they keep their funds deposited in the bank. Theoretically, the mere availability of public announcements (and not its use) ensures that no bank run is the unique equilibrium outcome. Multiple equilibria—including bank run—exist without such public announcements. We test the theoretical results in the lab and fnd a widespread use of announcements, which we interpret as an attempt to coordinate on the no bank run outcome. Withdrawal rates in general are lower in information sets that contain announcement