1,493 research outputs found
How Do Political Changes Influence U.S. Bilateral Aid Allocations? Evidence from Panel Data
This paper examines the role of U.S. domestic politics in the allocation of foreign aid using panel data on aid to 119 countries from 1960 to 1997. Employing proxies for four aid allocation criteria (development concerns, strategic importance, commercial importance, and the degree of democratization), we find evidence that each influences aid allocation, although the evidence is stronger for some criteria (development concerns, commercial importance) than for others (strategic importance, degree of democratization). Furthermore, the allocation pattern depends on the composition of the U.S. government. When the president and Congress are liberal, development concerns receive more weight in the allocation process than when the president and/or Congress are more conservative. When the Congress is more conservative, commercial concerns have more weight than when the Congress is liberal. These findings have practical importance in light of current attempts to overhaul the allocation of both bilateral and multilateral aid.
World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of U.S. Influence
This paper develops a model to test whether World Bank lending caters to U.S. interests. We use country-level panel data to examine the geographic distribution of World Bank lending to 110 countries from 1968 to 2002. After controlling for country characteristics expected to influence the distribution of lending in a manner consistent with the World Bankâs charter and stated allocation mechanisms, we introduce variables reflecting U.S. interests. The empirical results are consistent with a significant U.S. influence, but one which varies across presidential administrations. These findings have important implications because donor influence may reduce the credibility, and hence the development effectiveness, of multilateral aid organizations.
Extracting temporal and spectral parameters from surface electromyography signals during a fatigue contraction
This paper presents findings from a study of five healthy subjects performing 50% maximum voluntary contraction until complete fatigue of the muscle. An overlapping window technique was used to find the values for mean frequency (MNF), median frequency (MDF) of the power spectrum, root mean square (RMS) and muscle fibre conduction velocity (MFCV). The surface electromyography signal (sEMG) was collected from the vastus lateralis muscle using a three channel Laplacian electrode. The results show the MNF and MDF values showed a consistent trend with each other where they remained at steady values between 20-30% and 75-80% of the signal after which they fell 15-30% of this value. The RMS showed a linear increase in value. The MFCV showed a similar trend to that found in the MNF and MDF values
World Bank independence: A model and statistical analysis of U.S. influence
This paper develops a model to test whether World Bank lending caters to U.S. interests. We use country-level panel data to examine the geographic distribution of World Bank lending to 110 countries from 1968 to 2002. After controlling for country characteristics expected to influence the distribution of lending in a manner consistent with the World Bankâs charter and stated allocation mechanisms, we introduce variables reflecting U.S. interests. The empirical results are consistent with a significant U.S. influence, but one which varies across presidential administrations. These findings have important implications because donor influence may reduce the credibility, and hence the development effectiveness, of multilateral aid organizations
How do political changes influence U.S. bilateral aid allocations? Evidence from panel data
This paper examines the role of U.S. domestic politics in the allocation of foreign aid using panel data on aid to 119 countries from 1960 to 1997. Employing proxies for four aid allocation criteria (development concerns, strategic importance, commercial importance, and the degree of democratization), we find evidence that each influences aid allocation, although the evidence is stronger for some criteria (development concerns, commercial importance) than for others (strategic importance, degree of democratization). Furthermore, the allocation pattern depends on the composition of the U.S. government. When the president and Congress are liberal, development concerns receive more weight in the allocation process than when the president and/or Congress are more conservative. When the Congress is more conservative, commercial concerns have more weight than when the Congress is liberal. These findings have practical importance in light of current attempts to overhaul the allocation of both bilateral and multilateral aid
The Single-Angle Plane-Wave Spectral Response of One-Dimensional Photonic Crystal Structures
The multiple-incident-angle transmittances or reflectances of fabricated 1-D photonic crystal (PC) structures are measured. Regularization methods are applied to these measurements to determine the single-angle plane-wave spectral response of the structure
Are 'New' Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between Non-DAC and DAC Donor Countries
The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council
This is the author's accepted manuscript. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0096-4.The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perksâelection to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. We also find evidence that richer countries from the developing world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability. By contrast, development aid does not predict election
- âŠ