Social Transmission of Experience of Agency: An Experimental Study

The sense of controlling one’s own actions is fundamental to normal human mental function, and also underlies concepts of social responsibility for action. However, it remains unclear how the wider social context of human action influences sense of agency. Using a simple experimental design, we investigated, for the first time, how observing the action of another person or a robot could potentially influence one’s own sense of agency. We assessed how observing another’s action might change the perceived temporal relationship between one’s own voluntary actions and their outcomes, which has been proposed as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Working in pairs, participants chose between two action alternatives, one rewarded more frequently than the other, while watching a rotating clock hand. They judged, in separate blocks, either the time of their own action, or the time of a tone that followed the action. These were compared to baseline judgements of actions alone, or tones alone, to calculate the perceptual shift of action toward outcome and vice versa. Our design focused on how these two dependent variables, which jointly provide an implicit measure of sense of agency, might be influenced by observing another’s action. In the observational group, each participant could see the other’s actions. Multivariate analysis showed that the perceived time of action and tone shifted progressively toward the actual time of outcome with repeated experience of this social situation. No such progressive change occurred in other groups for whom a barrier hid participants’ actions from each other. However, a similar effect was observed in the group that viewed movements of a human-like robotic hand, rather than actions of another person. This finding suggests that observing the actions of others increases the salience of the external outcomes of action and this effect is not unique to observing human agents. Social contexts in which we see others controlling external events may play an important role in mentally representing the impact of our own actions on the external world

Non-hexagonal neural dynamics in vowel space

Are the grid cells discovered in rodents relevant to human cognition? Following up on two seminal studies by others, we aimed to check whether an approximate 6-fold, grid-like symmetry shows up in the cortical activity of humans who "navigate" between vowels, given that vowel space can be approximated with a continuous trapezoidal 2D manifold, spanned by the first and second formant frequencies. We created 30 vowel trajectories in the assumedly flat central portion of the trapezoid. Each of these trajectories had a duration of 240 milliseconds, with a steady start and end point on the perimeter of a "wheel". We hypothesized that if the neural representation of this "box" is similar to that of rodent grid units, there should be an at least partial hexagonal (6-fold) symmetry in the EEG response of participants who navigate it. We have not found any dominant n-fold symmetry, however, but instead, using PCAs, we find indications that the vowel representation may reflect phonetic features, as positioned on the vowel manifold. The suggestion, therefore, is that vowels are encoded in relation to their salient sensory-perceptual variables, and are not assigned to arbitrary gridlike abstract maps. Finally, we explored the relationship between the first PCA eigenvector and putative vowel attractors for native Italian speakers, who served as the subjects in our study

Sense of agency in the human brain

In adult life, people normally know what they are doing. This experience of controlling one's own actions and, through them, the course of events in the outside world is called 'sense of agency'. It forms a central feature of human experience; however, the brain mechanisms that produce the sense of agency have only recently begun to be investigated systematically. This recent progress has been driven by the development of better measures of the experience of agency, improved design of cognitive and behavioural experiments, and a growing understanding of the brain circuits that generate this distinctive but elusive experience. The sense of agency is a mental and neural state of cardinal importance in human civilization, because it is frequently altered in psychopathology and because it underpins the concept of responsibility in human societies

Can BCI paradigms induce feelings of agency and responsibility over movements?

The sense of agency is the attribution of an action to ourselves, which allows us to distinguish our own actions from those of other people and gives us a feeling of control and responsibility for their outcomes. Under physiological conditions, the sense of agency typically accompanies all our actions. Further, it can even be experienced over an illusory owned body—that is, a surrogate body perceived as if it were our own. However, the extent to which actions controlled through a brain–computer interface (BCI) also induce feelings of agency and responsibility is not well known. In the following chapter, we will review the relevant literature on body ownership and agency in virtual reality (VR) embodiment and outline an experiment in which participants controlled a virtual body through different BCI protocols based either on sensorimotor activity or on visually evoked potentials. Our findings show that BCI protocols can induce feelings of agency and that those BCI protocols based on sensorimotor activity have an advantage over those based on activity in visual areas. We further show that BCI protocols based on sensorimotor activity can even induce feelings of responsibility over the outcomes of that action, a finding that raises important ethical implications. We give particular focus to subjective reports from the debriefing after the experiment about the experience of BCI-induced agency over the action of a virtual body