27 research outputs found
Disparate Statistics
Statistical evidence is crucial throughout disparate impactâs three-stage analysis: during (1) the plaintiffâs prima facie demonstration of a policyâs disparate impact; (2) the defendantâs job-related business necessity defense of the discriminatory policy; and (3) the plaintiffâs demonstration of an alternative policy without the same discriminatory impact. The circuit courts are split on a vital question about the âpractical significanceâ of statistics at Stage 1: Are âsmallâ impacts legally insignificant? For example, is an employment policy that causes a one percent disparate impact an appropriate policy for redress through disparate impact litigation? This circuit split calls for a comprehensive analysis of practical significance testing across disparate impactâs stages. Importantly, courts and commentators use âpractical significanceâ ambiguously between two aspects of practical significance: the magnitude of an effect and confidence in statistical evidence. For example, at Stage 1 courts might ask whether statistical evidence supports a disparate impact (a confidence inquiry) and whether such an impact is large enough to be legally relevant (a magnitude inquiry). Disparate impactâs texts, purposes, and controlling interpretations are consistent with confidence inquires at all three stages, but not magnitude inquiries. Specifically, magnitude inquiries are inappropriate at Stages 1 and 3âthere is no discriminatory impact or reduction too small or subtle for the purposes of the disparate impact analysis. Magnitude inquiries are appropriate at Stage 2, when an employer defends a discriminatory policy on the basis of its job-related business necessity
How People Judge What Is Reasonable
A classic debate concerns whether reasonableness should be understood statistically (e.g., reasonableness is what is common) or prescriptively (e.g., reasonableness is what is good). This Article elaborates and defends a third possibility. Reasonableness is a partly statistical and partly prescriptive âhybrid,â reflecting both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Experiments reveal that people apply reasonableness as a hybrid concept, and the Article argues that a hybrid account offers the best general theory of reasonableness.
First, the Article investigates how ordinary people judge what is reasonable. Reasonableness sits at the core of countless legal standards, yet little work has investigated how ordinary people (i.e., potential jurors) actually make reasonableness judgments. Experiments reveal that judgments of reasonableness are systematically intermediate between judgments of the relevant average and ideal across numerous legal domains. For example, participantsâ mean judgment of the legally reasonable number of weeksâ delay before a criminal trial (ten weeks) falls between the judged average (seventeen weeks) and ideal (seven weeks). So too for the reasonable num- ber of days to accept a contract offer, the reasonable rate of attorneysâ fees, the reasonable loan interest rate, and the reasonable annual number of loud events on a football field in a residential neighborhood. Judgment of reasonableness is better predicted by both statistical and prescriptive factors than by either factor alone.
This Article uses this experimental discovery to develop a normative view of reasonableness. It elaborates an account of reasonableness as a hybrid standard, arguing that this view offers the best general theory of reasonableness, one that applies correctly across multiple legal domains. Moreover, this hybrid feature is the historical essence of legal reasonableness: the original use of the âreasonable personâ and the âman on the Clapham omnibusâ aimed to reflect both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Empirically, reasonableness is a hybrid judgment. And normatively, reasonableness should be applied as a hybrid standard
Does religious belief impact philosophical analysis?
One popular conception of natural theology holds that certain purely rational arguments are insulated from empirical inquiry and independently establish conclusions that provide evidence, justification, or proof of Godâs existence. Yet, some raise suspicions that philosophers and theologiansâ personal religious beliefs inappropriately affect these kinds of arguments. I present an experimental test of whether philosophers and theologiansâ argument analysis is influenced by religious commitments. The empirical findings suggest religious belief affects philosophical analysis and offer a challenge to theists and atheists, alike: reevaluate the scope of natural theologyâs conclusions or acknowledge and begin to address the influence of religious belief
Personal Identity
Our aim in this entry is to articulate the state of the art in the moral psychology of personal identity. We begin by discussing the major philosophical theories of personal identity, including their shortcomings. We then turn to recent psychological work on personal identity and the self, investigations that often illuminate our person-related normative concerns. We conclude by discussing the implications of this psychological work for some contemporary philosophical theories and suggesting fruitful areas for future work on personal identity
Philosophy\u27s Practical Turn
Has modem philosophy taken a practical turn? If such a turn requires the first emphasis on practicality, then probably not. Prior philosophy has not discarded or neglected practicality. But a turn might instead be understood as a profound transformation.\u27 Even if philosophy\u27s practical concern is not new, perhaps its targets, methods, or character have changed significantly
Water is and is not H 2 O
The Twin Earth thought experiment invites us to consider a liquid that has all of the superficial properties associated with water (clear, potable, etc.) but has entirely different deeper causal properties (composed of âXYZâ rather than of H2O). Although this thought experiment was originally introduced to illuminate questions in the theory of reference, it has also played a crucial role in empirically informed debates within the philosophy of psychology about peopleâs ordinary natural kind concepts. Those debates have sought to accommodate an apparent fact about ordinary peopleâs judgments: Intuitively, the Twin Earth liquid is not water. We present results from four experiments showing that people do not, in fact, have this intuition. Instead, people tend to have the intuition that there is a sense in which the liquid is not water but also a sense in which it is water. We explore the implications of this finding for debates about theories of natural kind concepts, arguing that it supports views positing two distinct criteria for membership in natural kind categories â one based on deeper causal properties, the other based on superficial, observable properties
Are There Cross-Cultural Legal Principles? Modal Reasoning Uncovers Procedural Constraints on Law
Despite pervasive variation in the content of laws, legal theorists and anthropologists have argued that laws share certain abstract features and even speculated that law may be a human universal. In the present report, we evaluate this thesis through an experiment administered in 11 different countries. Are there cross-cultural principles of law? In a between-subjects design, participants (N = 3,054) were asked whether there could be laws that violate certain procedural principles (e.g., laws applied retrospectively or unintelligible laws), and also whether there are any such laws. Confirming our preregistered prediction, people reported that such laws cannot exist, but also (paradoxically) that there are such laws. These results document cross-culturally and âlinguistically robust beliefs about the concept of law which defy peopleâs grasp of how legal systems function in practice
Addressing climate change with behavioral science: a global intervention tournament in 63 countries
Effectively reducing climate change requires marked, global behavior change. However, it is unclear which strategies are most likely to motivate people to change their climate beliefs and behaviors. Here, we tested 11 expert-crowdsourced interventions on four climate mitigation outcomes: beliefs, policy support, information sharing intention, and an effortful tree-planting behavioral task. Across 59,440 participants from 63 countries, the interventionsâ effectiveness was small, largely limited to nonclimate skeptics, and differed across outcomes: Beliefs were strengthened mostly by decreasing psychological distance (by 2.3%), policy support by writing a letter to a future-generation member (2.6%), information sharing by negative emotion induction (12.1%), and no intervention increased the more effortful behaviorâseveral interventions even reduced tree planting. Last, the effects of each intervention differed depending on peopleâs initial climate beliefs. These findings suggest that the impact of behavioral climate interventions varies across audiences and target behaviors