9,489 research outputs found
No Man’s Land
This poem is inspired by a set of letters between Jes Jerry Jessen and his sister Helen during his time as a soldier during World War I
Civilize Them with Indian Boarding Schools
Indigenous communities continue to be pressured to conform to Anglo-American culture. Through the use of Indian boarding schools, Indigenous communities were interrupted in a myriad of detrimental ways related to their culture, especially in regard to intergenerational cultural continuance
Ambiguity and Social Interaction
We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.Ambiguity, Optimism, Pessimism, Strategic Games, Oligopoly, Strategic Delegation,Peace-making, Strategic Complements, Choquet Expected Utility
Tort Liability and Unawareness
Unawareness is a form of bounded rationality where a person fails to conceive all feasible acts or consequences or to perceive as feasible all conceivable act-consequence links. We study the implications of unawareness for tort law, where relevant examples include the discovery of a new product or technology (new act), of a new disease or injury (new consequence), or that a product can cause an injury (new link). We argue that negligence has an important advantage over strict liability in a world with unawareness—negligence, through the stipulation of due care standards, spreads awareness about the updated probability of harm
Reverse Bayesianism and Act Independence
Karni and Vierø (2013) propose a model of belief revision under growing awareness—reverse Bayesianism—which posits that as a person becomes aware of new acts, consequences, or act-consequence links, she revises her beliefs over an expanded state space in a way that preserves the relative likelihoods of events in the original state space. A key feature of the model is that reverse Bayesianism does not fully determine the revised probability distribution. We provide an assumption—act independence—that imposes additional restrictions on reverse Bayesian belief revision. We show that with act independence knowledge of the probabilities of the new act events in the expanded state space is sufficient to fully determine the revised probability distribution in each case of growing awareness. We also explore what additional knowledge is required for reverse Bayesianism to pin down the revised probabilities without act independence
Ambiguity and Social Interaction
We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements
Ambiguity and Social Interaction
We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.Ambiguity; Optimism; Pessimism; Strategic Games; Oligopoly; Strategic Delegation; Peace-making; Strategic Complements; Choquet Expected Utility
Ambiguity and Social Interaction
We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.Ambiguity, Optimism, Pessimism, Strategic Games, Oligopoly, Strategic Delegation, Peace-making, Strategic Complements, Choquet Expected Utility
Ambiguity and Social Interaction
We examine the impact of ambiguity on economic behaviour. We present a relatively non-technical account of ambiguity and show how it may be applied in economics. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. We also examine the effects of ambiguity on peace processes. It is shown that ambiguity can act to select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.Ambiguity, Optimism, Oligopoly, Peace processes, Choquet expected utility
Crisis in Iceland: Deposit-Guarantee Scheme Failure and State Liability
On January 28, 2013, the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association States held that Iceland was not required to compensate foreign depositors of Landsbanki, an Icelandic bank, when the deposit-guarantee scheme failed to reimburse depositors following the 2008 financial crisis. The court supported its conclusion with the text of the Directive that established deposit-guarantee schemes as well as policy arguments regarding consumer protection and moral hazard. The court also found that Iceland’s failure to repay foreign depositors did not constitute an act of discrimination. Although the court correctly interpreted both the text and policy goals of the Directive, the precedential value of the court’s decision may be limited due to the severity of the 2008 crisis
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