Pentaquark Exotic Baryons in the Skyrme Model

We investigate the pentaquark($P$) exotic baryons as soliton-antiflavored heavy mesons bound states in the limit of infinitely heavy meson mass. Our approach respects the chiral symmetry as well as the heavy quark symmetry. The results reveal a possibility for the loosely bound non-strange $P$-baryon(s).Comment: LaTeX, 11 pages, SNUTP-94/06 (revised

Universal scaling at non-thermal fixed points of a two-component Bose gas

Quasi-stationary far-from-equilibrium critical states of a two-component Bose gas are studied in two spatial dimensions. After the system has undergone an initial dynamical instability it approaches a non-thermal fixed point. At this critical point the structure of the gas is characterised by ensembles of (quasi-)topological defects such as vortices, skyrmions and solitons which give rise to universal power-law behaviour of momentum correlation functions. The resulting power-law spectra can be interpreted in terms of strong-wave-turbulence cascades driven by particle transport into long-wave-length excitations. Scaling exponents are determined on both sides of the miscible-immiscible transition controlled by the ratio of the intra-species to inter-species couplings. Making use of quantum turbulence methods, we explain the specific values of the exponents from the presence of transient (quasi-)topological defects.Comment: 13 pages, 12 figure

The Evolution of Extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of previous interactions. In the context of evolution of cooperation, repeated games represent the mechanism of reciprocation. Recently a new class of strategies has been proposed, so called 'zero determinant strategies'. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one's own payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies are 'extortioners' which ensure that any increase in the own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed percentage. Here we analyze the evolutionary performance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large populations they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat, but they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In very small populations, however, relative payoff differences between two players in a contest matter, and extortioners hold their ground. Extortion strategies do particularly well in co-evolutionary arms races between two distinct populations: significantly, they benefit the population which evolves at the slower rate - an instance of the so-called Red King effect. This may affect the evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts.Comment: contains 4 figure

Learning to Reach Agreement in a Continuous Ultimatum Game

It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have much difficulty with social dilemmas, as they are able to balance personal benefit and group benefit. As agents in multi-agent systems are regularly confronted with social dilemmas, for instance in tasks such as resource allocation, these agents may benefit from the inclusion of mechanisms thought to facilitate human fairness. Although many of such mechanisms have already been implemented in a multi-agent systems context, their application is usually limited to rather abstract social dilemmas with a discrete set of available strategies (usually two). Given that many real-world examples of social dilemmas are actually continuous in nature, we extend this previous work to more general dilemmas, in which agents operate in a continuous strategy space. The social dilemma under study here is the well-known Ultimatum Game, in which an optimal solution is achieved if agents agree on a common strategy. We investigate whether a scale-free interaction network facilitates agents to reach agreement, especially in the presence of fixed-strategy agents that represent a desired (e.g. human) outcome. Moreover, we study the influence of rewiring in the interaction network. The agents are equipped with continuous-action learning automata and play a large number of random pairwise games in order to establish a common strategy. From our experiments, we may conclude that results obtained in discrete-strategy games can be generalized to continuous-strategy games to a certain extent: a scale-free interaction network structure allows agents to achieve agreement on a common strategy, and rewiring in the interaction network greatly enhances the agents ability to reach agreement. However, it also becomes clear that some alternative mechanisms, such as reputation and volunteering, have many subtleties involved and do not have convincing beneficial effects in the continuous case

The width of Θ+\Theta^{+} for large NcN_{c} in chiral quark soliton model

In the chiral quark soliton model the smallness of $\Theta^+$ width is due to the cancellation of the coupling constants which are of different order in $N_c$. We show that taking properly into account the flavor structure of relevant SU(3) representations for arbitrary number of colors enahnces the nonleading term by an additional factor of $N_c$, making the cancellation consistent with the $N_c$ counting. Moreover, we show that, for the same reason, $\Theta^+$ width is suppressed by a group-theoretical factor ${\cal O}(1/N_c)$ with respect to $\Delta$ and discuss the $N_c$ dependence of the phase space factors for these two decays.Comment: 9 pages, 3 eps figures, in v2 reference added, minor typos correcte

Studying Paths of Participation in Viral Diffusion Process

Authors propose a conceptual model of participation in viral diffusion process composed of four stages: awareness, infection, engagement and action. To verify the model it has been applied and studied in the virtual social chat environment settings. The study investigates the behavioral paths of actions that reflect the stages of participation in the diffusion and presents shortcuts, that lead to the final action, i.e. the attendance in a virtual event. The results show that the participation in each stage of the process increases the probability of reaching the final action. Nevertheless, the majority of users involved in the virtual event did not go through each stage of the process but followed the shortcuts. That suggests that the viral diffusion process is not necessarily a linear sequence of human actions but rather a dynamic system.Comment: In proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Social Informatics, SocInfo 201