The effects of psychosocial stress on intergroup resource allocation

This is the final version. Available from the publisher via the DOI in this record.Stress changes our social behavior. Traditionally, stress has been associated with “fight-or-flight” – the tendency to attack an aggressor, or escape the stressor. But stress may also promote the opposite pattern, i.e., “tend-and-befriend” – increased prosociality toward others. It is currently unclear which situational or physiological factors promote one or the other. Here, we hypothesized that stress stimulates both tendencies, but that fight-or-flight is primarily directed against a potentially hostile outgroup, moderated by rapid-acting catecholamines, while tend-and-befriend is mainly shown towards a supportive ingroup, regulated by cortisol. To test this hypothesis, we measured stress-related neurohormonal modulators and sex hormones in male and female participants who were exposed to a psychosocial stressor, and subsequently played an intergroup social dilemma game in which they could reveal prosocial motives towards an ingroup (ingroup-love) and hostility towards an outgroup (outgroup-hate). We found no significant effects of stress on social preferences, but stress-related heart-rate increases predicted outgroup-hostile behavior. Furthermore, when controlling for testosterone, cortisol was associated with increased ingroup-love. Other-regarding behavior was overall higher in male than female participants. Our mixed results are of interest to scholars of the effects of stress on prosocial and aggressive behavior, but call for refinement in future replications

Exploring the similarities and differences between medical assessments of competence and criminal responsibility

The medical assessments of criminal responsibility and competence to consent to treatment are performed, developed and debated in distinct domains. In this paper I try to connect these domains by exploring the similarities and differences between both assessments. In my view, in both assessments a decision-making process is evaluated in relation to the possible influence of a mental disorder on this process. I will argue that, in spite of the relevance of the differences, both practices could benefit from the recognition of this similarity. For cooperative research could be developed directed at elucidating exactly how various mental disturbances can affect decision-making processes

Foraging for foundations in decision neuroscience: insights from ethology

Modern decision neuroscience offers a powerful and broad account of human behaviour using computational techniques that link psychological and neuroscientific approaches to the ways that individuals can generate near-optimal choices in complex controlled environments. However, until recently, relatively little attention has been paid to the extent to which the structure of experimental environments relates to natural scenarios, and the survival problems that individuals have evolved to solve. This situation not only risks leaving decision-theoretic accounts ungrounded but also makes various aspects of the solutions, such as hard-wired or Pavlovian policies, difficult to interpret in the natural world. Here, we suggest importing concepts, paradigms and approaches from the fields of ethology and behavioural ecology, which concentrate on the contextual and functional correlates of decisions made about foraging and escape and address these lacunae

A biologically plausible model of time-scale invariant interval timing

The temporal durations between events often exert a strong influence over behavior. The details of this influence have been extensively characterized in behavioral experiments in different animal species. A remarkable feature of the data collected in these experiments is that they are often time-scale invariant. This means that response measurements obtained under intervals of different durations coincide when plotted as functions of relative time. Here we describe a biologically plausible model of an interval timing device and show that it is consistent with time-scale invariant behavior over a substantial range of interval durations. The model consists of a set of bistable units that switch from one state to the other at random times. We first use an abstract formulation of the model to derive exact expressions for some key quantities and to demonstrate time-scale invariance for any range of interval durations. We then show how the model could be implemented in the nervous system through a generic and biologically plausible mechanism. In particular, we show that any system that can display noise-driven transitions from one stable state to another can be used to implement the timing device. Our work demonstrates that a biologically plausible model can qualitatively account for a large body of data and thus provides a link between the biology and behavior of interval timing

Temporal-Difference Reinforcement Learning with Distributed Representations

Temporal-difference (TD) algorithms have been proposed as models of reinforcement learning (RL). We examine two issues of distributed representation in these TD algorithms: distributed representations of belief and distributed discounting factors. Distributed representation of belief allows the believed state of the world to distribute across sets of equivalent states. Distributed exponential discounting factors produce hyperbolic discounting in the behavior of the agent itself. We examine these issues in the context of a TD RL model in which state-belief is distributed over a set of exponentially-discounting “micro-Agents”, each of which has a separate discounting factor (γ). Each µAgent maintains an independent hypothesis about the state of the world, and a separate value-estimate of taking actions within that hypothesized state. The overall agent thus instantiates a flexible representation of an evolving world-state. As with other TD models, the value-error (δ) signal within the model matches dopamine signals recorded from animals in standard conditioning reward-paradigms. The distributed representation of belief provides an explanation for the decrease in dopamine at the conditioned stimulus seen in overtrained animals, for the differences between trace and delay conditioning, and for transient bursts of dopamine seen at movement initiation. Because each µAgent also includes its own exponential discounting factor, the overall agent shows hyperbolic discounting, consistent with behavioral experiments