Challenges to generating evidence-informed policy and the role of systematic reviews and (perceived) conflicts of interest

BACKGROUND: Multiple efforts to generate evidence-informed policy have attempted to teach policymakers how to understand and apply scientific research findings in their decision-making. These efforts have had limited success, because policymakers generally do not understand scientific methods. OBJECTIVE: We piloted efforts to teach policy intermediaries – specifically consumer advocacy groups – how to understand and apply health research, anticipating that they might offer such evidence to policymakers in more accessible forms. DESIGN: Four workshops focusing on research design and methods were conducted with consumer advocacy groups in 2010. We coded and analyzed participant responses regarding their confidence in interpreting research findings and assessments of research credibility, and the extent to which their knowledge about research findings changed after completing the workshops. RESULTS: Our findings suggest that although participants expressed strong interest in understanding scientific research, their ability to develop confidence about scientific research methods was limited. However, like policymakers, consumer advocacy group members intuited that financial conflicts of interest could compromise scientific findings, although they initially underestimated their effects on research results. After training, consumer advocates also saw the value of using systematic reviews rather than individual studies. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that although advocates may not feel confident in their understanding of scientific research, they found it easier to understand the value of systematic reviews and the risks of conflicts of interest than other statistical concepts and terminology. Focusing on making these types of information available may offer a useful way for policymakers and consumer advocates to interpret the validity of policy-relevant scientific research

Citizenship Norms in Eastern Europe

Research on Eastern Europe stresses the weakness of its civil society and the lack of political and social involvement, neglecting the question: What do people themselves think it means to be a good citizen? This study looks at citizens’ definitions of good citizenship in Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary, using 2002 European Social Survey data. We investigate mean levels of civic mindedness in these countries and perform regression analyses to investigate whether factors traditionally associated with civic and political participation are also correlated with citizenship norms across Eastern Europe. We show that mean levels of civic mindedness differ significantly across the four Eastern European countries. We find some support for theories on civic and political participation when explaining norms of citizenship, but also demonstrate that individual-level characteristics are differently related to citizenship norms across the countries of our study. Hence, our findings show that Eastern Europe is not a monolithic and homogeneous bloc, underscoring the importance of taking the specificities of countries into account

Information effect on voter turnout: How campaign spending mobilises voters

We explore the impact of campaign effort on constituency-level turnout variation in Britain, under the premise that higher levels of campaign visibility stimulate electoral participation. We focus on the relationship between the competitiveness of the race and campaign effort as a provider of electoral information on the one hand, and voter turnout on the other hand. In doing so, we address the role of campaign effort and competitiveness in shaping turnout both independently as well as jointly. Further to this, we seek to add nuance to our understanding of how electoral campaigns mobilise voters by evaluating the comparative ability of different parties – based on whether or not they are ‘viable’ contenders in a particular constituency – to stimulate turnout. We find evidence that campaign effort mobilises voters and has a significant positive effect on voter turnout; this effect is independent from, and unconditioned by, the competitiveness of the race. However, we do find that this effect is mostly driven by the campaign effort of the ‘viable’ contenders in the constituency

Information effect on voter turnout: How campaign spending mobilises voters

We explore the impact of campaign effort on constituency-level turnout variation in Britain, under the premise that higher levels of campaign visibility stimulate electoral participation. We focus on the relationship between the competitiveness of the race and campaign effort as a provider of electoral information on the one hand, and voter turnout on the other hand. In doing so, we address the role of campaign effort and competitiveness in shaping turnout both independently as well as jointly. Further to this, we seek to add nuance to our understanding of how electoral campaigns mobilise voters by evaluating the comparative ability of different parties – based on whether or not they are ‘viable’ contenders in a particular constituency – to stimulate turnout. We find evidence that campaign effort mobilises voters and has a significant positive effect on voter turnout; this effect is independent from, and unconditioned by, the competitiveness of the race. However, we do find that this effect is mostly driven by the campaign effort of the ‘viable’ contenders in the constituency

Voting as a Signaling Device

In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively related to the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon effects and small changes in the electoral incentives may generate large changes in turnout due to signaling effects. (iv) Signaling incentives increase the sensitivity of turnout to voting incentives in communities with low opportunity cost of social interaction, while the opposite is true for communities with high cost of social interaction. Therefore, the model predicts less volatile turnout for the latter type of communities