Default, Foreclosure, and Strategic Renegotiation

Locum AB har i uppdrag av Stockholms läns landsting att förvalta vårdens fastigheter. För att underlätta för sina hyresgäster erbjuder Locum Facility Management-tjänster dit bland annat vaktmästeri och andra kringaktiviteter ingår. För att vara förberedda på och kunna anpassa sig efter hur deras hyresgästers behov har förändrats över tid vill de utföra en kartläggning över vilka arbetsuppgifter som deras upphandlade entreprenörer gör i dagsläget och ifall det går att effektivisera dessa. Detta ledde till denna rapport- Värdeflödeskartläggning över vaktmästeritjänsteleveransen vid Rosenlunds sjukhus och Mariamottagningarna, där en värdeflödeskartläggning genomförs för att kartlägga vilka arbetsuppgifter som utförs av vaktmästerientreprenören, om det går att identifiera några slöserier inom detta system och ifall dessa eventuella slöserier i går att eliminera eller minska. En värdeflödeskartläggning är ett verktyg där en verksamhets värdeflöden kartläggs med utgångspunkt med hur det ser ut i nuläget, och med ett framtaget framtida målläge med en uppfattning om hur det går att tänka sig att det borde fungera i framtiden. Med dessa som grund analyseras sedan nuläget för att identifiera slöserier, och utifrån dessa observationer och med målläget som utgångspunkt kan sedan en handlingsplan tas fram med syftet att eliminera dessa slöserier. Denna rapports fokus ligger främst på att kartlägga nuläget, och därefter analysera huruvida dessa slöserier går att minska. Rapporten ger en bild av vilka arbetsuppgifter som utförs av vaktmästerientreprenören i dagsläget, och hur dessa arbetsuppgifter utförs. Kartläggningen av vaktmästeritjänsteleveransen visade också att det fanns slöserier, men att dessa till största del berodde på anledningar som låg utanför entreprenörens kontroll. De enskilt största slöserierna som identifierades var väntan på hiss på Rosenlunds sjukhus och att vaktmästaren på Mariamottagningarna var tvungen att gå och hämta samt lämna post som skickades från hyresgästerna på ett postkontor. Rapporten ger förslag på hur dessa slöserier skulle kunna elimineras. Detta innebär att den tid som skulle kunna frigöras då skulle kunna läggas på att utföra andra arbetsuppgifter som adderar värde för hyresgästerna. I de nämnda fallen skulle dessa slöserier kunna elimineras genom förskjutna arbetstider så att aktiviteter som kräver hiss inte utförs då det är högt tryck på hissarna, samt att posten levereras och hämtas från Mariamottagningarna. Med den värdeflödeskartläggning som gjorts över nuläget på de båda vårdenheterna har beställaren av rapporten en möjlig grund att utgå ifrån för framtida arbete med att kunna erbjuda sina hyresgäster en bättre service och möjligheter till att bedriva sin verksamhet med bästa möjliga förutsättningar. Denna rapport visar också att det är möjligt att tillämpa en värdeflödeskartläggning på ett system där processerna kan variera sett över olika dagar. Detta då de modeller över hur värdeflödeskartläggningar inom administration och tjänster hittills till mestadels utförts på standardiserade stödjande processer inom tillverkningsindustrin

The Efficiency of Self-Regulated Payments Systems: Learning From the Suffolk System

This paper analyzes the operation of the Suffolk System, an interbank note-clearing network operating throughout New England from the 1820s through the 1850s. Banks made markets in each other's notes at par, which allowed New England to avoid discounting of bank notes in trade. Privately enforced regu- lations prevented free riding in the form of excessive risk taking. Observers of the Suffolk System have been divided. Some emphasized the stability and effi these arrangements. Others argued that the arrangements were motivated by rent-seeking on the part of Boston banks, and were primarily coervice and exploitative. In the neighboring Mid-Atlantic states, regulations limited the potential for developing a regional clearing system centered in New York City on the model of the Suffolk System. This difference makes it possible to compare the performance of banks across regulatory regimes to judge the relative merits of the sanguine and jaundiced views of the Suffolk System. Evidence supports the sanguine view. New England's banks were able to issue more notes and these notes traded at uniform and low discount rates compared to those of other banks. An examination of the balance sheets and stock returns of Boston and New York City banks indicates that the stock market perceived that bank lending produced less risk for bank debt holders in Boston than in New York. The benefits of the system extended outside of Boston. Peripheral New England banks displayed high propensities to issue notes, and wer able to maintain low specie reserves. Boston banks did not show high profit rates or high ratios of market-to-book values of equity; thus there is no evidence that Boston banks extracted rents from their control of the payments system.

Default, foreclosure, and strategic renegotiation / 1542

Includes bibliographical references (p. 21-24)

Payments Settlement under Limited Enforcement: Private versus Public Systems

What are the benefits provided by a payment system? What are the tradeoffs in public versus private payment systems and in restricted versus open payments arrangements? Modern payment systems encompass a variety of institutional designs with varying degrees of counterparty protection. We develop a framework which allows for an examination and comparison of payment systems, and specification of conditions leading to their adoption. We relate these conditions to the design of present large-value payment systems (Fedwire, CHIPS, Target, etc.)Payment systems, limited enforcement, settlement risk

Demandable debt as a means of payment: banknotes versus checks

We examine the question of whether transactable forms of privately issued, demandable debt are better used as "banknotes" or "checks." The distinction between the two is that a check must be redeemed by the issuing bank with each use, whereas a banknote can circulate. We find that the answer to the question depends critically on the cost of early redemption. If this cost is small, banknotes will not circulate, so the question is moot. If this cost is large, incentive problems will prevent the issue of banknotes. For intermediate values of the early redemption cost, the option of early redemption limits the bank's risk-taking behavior, so that banknotes will be preferred over checks.Checks ; Money ; Payment systems

Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives

In this paper we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments. Net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves, but increases moral hazard problems. The "put option" value of default under net settlement can also distort banks' investment incentives. Absent these distortions, net settlement dominates gross, although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default. Net settlement becomes more attractive relative to gross settlement if bank assets have to be liquidated at less than book value. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers G21, G28. This paper was presented at the Financial Institutions Center's conference on Performance of Financial Institutions, May 8-10, 1997.

Real-time gross settlement and the costs of immediacy

Using a neoclassical monetary model, we investigate the welfare cost of a payment system that operates as a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system. We illustrate how the cost of such systems does not ultimately derive from factors such as "payments gridlock" but instead from the credit constraints imposed by RTGS. We also investigate the welfare consequences of various approaches to the allocation of daylight credit by central banks. The two most popular approaches, collateralization and charging an administered intraday interest rate, are shown to be effective along some dimensions but flawed in others.Money ; Payment systems

The economics of payment finality

Payment finality is critical to decentralized exchange. By specifying how the transfer of one type of claim extinguishes another, the rules governing finality minimize opportunities for default along credit chains and allocate other risks. ; The authors provide a basic analysis of finality and its role in facilitating exchange. They first present a simple, historically based model of transferable debt and finality. The discussion demonstrates the desirability of transferable debt and why rules governing payment finality are needed to sort out who will bear the losses in the event of default. Over time, the introduction of such rules helped establish the concept of negotiability, which greatly increased the efficiency of trade. ; A second model shows how a more modern payment system works. The large volume and scope of payments in modern systems have resulted in disparate sets of finality rules. For example, the finality of check payments is generally tentative, and the risks are often concentrated on a single party. Credit and debit card payments are generally more final, and the liability for potential losses tends to be shared among participants. Choosing the degree of finality for a given situation involves a trade-off between the benefits of finality and the costs of an erroneous or fraudulent transfer. The introduction of new technologies for payments may improve these trade-offs, but finality will remain the essential service provided.Payment systems ; Credit cards ; Checks

Bank deposit rate clustering: theory and empirical evidence

An examination of banks' optimal deposit-rate-setting behavior when some customers have limited recall, showing that when banks exploit this phenomenon, deposit rates will tend to be set at round fractions and will be relatively "sticky" at these levels.Bank deposits ; Interest ; Prices

A Theory of Transactions Privacy

In this paper, we consider the costs and benefits of transactions privacy. In the environment we consider, privacy is the concealment of potentially useful information, but concealment also potentially bestows benefits. In some versions of the environment, the standard Coasian logic applies: given an unambiguous initial assignment of rights and sufficient flexibility in contracting, efficiency in information revelation with result. Coasian bargaining may be impeded, however, by either an inability to make certain commitments or by the presence of significant investments that must be made before the transaction occurs. In such cases, initial assignments of rights (for example, privacy laws) can have consequences for efficiency.