For Hierarchy in Animal Ethics

In my forthcoming book, How to Count Animals, More or Less (based on my 2016 Uehiro Lectures in Practical Ethics), I argue for a hierarchical approach to animal ethics according to which animals have moral standing but nonetheless have a lower moral status than people have. This essay is an overview of that book, drawing primarily from selections from its beginning and end, aiming both to give a feel for the overall project and to indicate the general shape of the hierarchical position that I defend there. In this essay, I contrast the hierarchical approach with its most important rival (which holds that people and animals have the very same moral status), sketch the main idea behind one central argument for hierarchy, and briefly review three potentially troubling implications of the hierarchical view. I close with a discussion of a promising possible solution to the most worrisome of the three objections

The Geometry of Desert

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 2005, given by Shelly Kagan, an American philosopher

Earthquake Size Distribution: Power-Law with Exponent Beta = 1/2?

We propose that the widely observed and universal Gutenberg-Richter relation is a mathematical consequence of the critical branching nature of earthquake process in a brittle fracture environment. These arguments, though preliminary, are confirmed by recent investigations of the seismic moment distribution in global earthquake catalogs and by the results on the distribution in crystals of dislocation avalanche sizes. We consider possible systematic and random errors in determining earthquake size, especially its seismic moment. These effects increase the estimate of the parameter beta of the power-law distribution of earthquake sizes. In particular, we find that estimated beta-values may be inflated by 1-3% because relative moment uncertainties decrease with increasing earthquake size. Moreover, earthquake clustering greatly influences the beta-parameter. If clusters (aftershock sequences) are taken as the entity to be studied, then the exponent value for their size distribution would decrease by 5-10%. The complexity of any earthquake source also inflates the estimated beta-value by at least 3-7%. The centroid depth distribution also should influence the beta-value, an approximate calculation suggests that the exponent value may be increased by 2-6%. Taking all these effects into account, we propose that the recently obtained beta-value of 0.63 could be reduced to about 0.52--0.56: near the universal constant value (1/2) predicted by theoretical arguments. We also consider possible consequences of the universal beta-value and its relevance for theoretical and practical understanding of earthquake occurrence in various tectonic and Earth structure environments. Using comparative crystal deformation results may help us understand the generation of seismic tremors and slow earthquakes and illuminate the transition from brittle fracture to plastic flow.Comment: 46 pages, 2 tables, 11 figures 53 pages, 2 tables, 12 figure

Why Making No Difference Makes No Moral Difference

Ascribing moral responsibility in collective action cases is notoriously difficult. After all, if my individual actions make no difference with regard to the prevention of climate change, the alleviation of poverty, or the outcome of national elections, why ought I to stop driving, donate money, or cast my vote? Neither consequentialist nor non-consequentialist moral theories have straightforward responses ready at hand. In this contribution, I present a new suggestion which, based on thoughts about causal overdetermination along the lines of Mackie’s INUS account, aims to show that causally overdetermined collective action cases are morally arbitrary in a way that makes it possible to ascribe moral responsibility even if individual actions make no difference

Socio-legal status and experiences of forced labour among asylum seekers and refugees in the UK

Socio-legal status determines the differential rights to residence, work and social welfare that accrue to migrants depending on their particular immigration status. This paper presents analysis of original empirical data generated in qualitative interviews with migrants who had both made a claim for asylum and experienced conditions of forced labour in the UK. Following an outline of the divergent socio-legal statuses assigned to individual migrants within the asylum system, early discussions in the paper offer a summary of key aspects and indicators of forced labour. Subsequent sections highlight the significance of socio-legal status in constructing such migrants as inherently vulnerable to severe exploitation. It is concluded that immigration policy and, more particularly, the differential socio-legal statuses that it structures at various stages of the asylum process, helps to create the conditions in which severe exploitation and forced labour are likely to flourish among asylum seekers and refugees in the UK

The moral obligation to be vaccinated: utilitarianism, contractualism, and collective easy rescue

Despite the success of vaccines in preventing and sometimes eradicating infectious diseases, and despite their demonstrated safety (Navin 2015, p. 6; CDC 2015a; Andre et al 2008), many people today refuse vaccination for themselves or their children. In the U.S. there has been a significant increase in cases of measles over the last few years due to increasingly widespread non-vaccination: in 2014, for example, there were 667 reported cases, the highest number since measles elimination was documented in the U.S. in 2000 (CDC 2016a). Similarly, in different parts of Europe there were measles outbreaks in 2016 and 2017, due to a significant decrease in measles vaccination rates; for example, in Italy there were more than 3,300 cases of measles in the first half of 2017, 88% of which were not vaccinated and 7% of which received just one dose of vaccine (ECDC 2017). Before the introduction of the measles vaccination program in 1963, 3-4 million people in the US were infected by measles every year, and 4-500 of them died (CDC, 2015b)

"The End of Immortality!" Eternal Life and the Makropulos Debate

Responding to a well-known essay by Bernard Williams, philosophers (and a few theologians) have engaged in what I call “the Makropulos debate,” a debate over whether immortality—“living forever”—would be desirable for beings like us. Lacking a firm conceptual grounding in the religious contexts from which terms such as “immortality” and “eternal life” gain much of their sense, the debate has consisted chiefly in a battle of speculative fantasies. Having presented my four main reasons for this assessment, I examine an alternative and neglected conception, the idea of eternal life as a present possession, derived in large part from Johannine Christianity. Without claiming to argue for the truth of this conception, I present its investigation as exemplifying a conceptually fruitful direction of inquiry into immortality or eternal life, one which takes seriously the religious and ethical surroundings of these concepts