Global Metal Use Targets in Line with Climate Goals.

Metals underpin essential functions in modern society, yet their production currently intensifies climate change. This paper develops global targets for metal flows, stocks, and use intensity in the global economy out to 2100. These targets are consistent with emissions pathways to achieve a 2 °C climate goal and cover six major metals (iron, aluminum, copper, zinc, lead, and nickel). Results indicate that despite advances in low-carbon metal production, a transformative system change to meet the society's needs with less metal is required to remain within a 2 °C pathway. Globally, demand for goods and services over the 21st century needs to be met with approximately 7 t/capita of metal stock-roughly half the current level in high-income countries. This systemic change will require a peak in global metal production by 2030 and deep decoupling of economic growth from both metal flows and stocks. Importantly, the identified science-based targets are theoretically achievable through such measures as efficient design, more intensive use, and longer product lifetime, but immediate action is crucial before middle- and low-income countries complete full-scale urbanization

Total material requirement for the global energy transition to 2050: A focus on transport and electricity

© 2019 The Author(s) Global energy transitions could fundamentally change flows of both minerals and energy resources over time. It is, therefore, increasingly important to holistically and dynamically capture the impacts of large-scale energy transitions on resource flows including hidden flows such as mine waste, as well as direct flows. Here we demonstrate a systematic model that can quantify resource flows of both minerals and energy resources under the energy transition by using stock-flow dynamics and the concept of Total Material Requirement (TMR). The proposed model was applied to the International Energy Agency's scenarios up to 2050, targeting 15 electricity generation and 5 transport technologies. Results indicate that the global energy transition could increase TMR flows associated with mineral production by around 200–900% in the electricity sector and 350–700% in the transport sector respectively from 2015 to 2050, depending on the scenarios. Such a drastic increase in TMR flows is largely associated with an increased demand for copper, silver, nickel, lithium and cobalt, as well as steel. Our results highlight that the decarbonization of the electricity sector can reduce energy resource flows and support the hypothesis that the expansion of low-carbon technologies could reduce total resource flows expressed as TMR. In the transport sector, on the other hand, the dissemination of Electric Vehicles could cause a sharp increase in TMR flows associated with mineral production, which could offset a decrease in energy resource flows. Findings in this study emphasize that a sustainable transition would be unachievable without designing resource cycles with a nexus approach

Sustainable energy transitions require enhanced resource governance

The global transition to fundamentally decarbonized electricity and transport systems will alter the existing resource flows of both fossil fuels and metals; however, such a transition may have unintended consequences. Here we show that the decarbonization of both the electricity and transport sectors will curtail fossil fuel production while paradoxically increasing resource extraction associated with metal production by more than a factor of 7 by 2050 relative to 2015 levels. Importantly, approximately 32–40% of this increase in resource extraction is expected to occur in countries with weak, poor, and failing resource governance, indicating that the impending mining boom may result in severe environmental degradation and unequal economic benefits in local communities. A suite of circular economy strategies, including lifetime extension, servitization, and recycling, can mitigate such risks, but they may not fully offset the growth in resource extraction. Our findings underscore the importance of institutional instruments that enhance the resource governance of entire low-carbon technology supply chains, along with circular economy practices. In the absence of such actions, the decarbonization of electricity and transport sectors may pose an ethical conundrum in which global carbon emissions are reduced at the expense of an increase in socio-environmental risks at local mining sites

Critical material management for sustainable transition

Industrial Ecolog

Global copper cycles and greenhouse gas emissions in a 1.5 °C world

Moving towards a 1.5 °C world could fundamentally alter the future copper cycle through two key drivers: the implementation of decarbonization technologies and the imposition of an emissions budget on production activities. This study explores the impact of these drivers on the global copper cycle using a dynamic material flow analysis, coupled with an optimization technique. The results show that global final demand for copper could increase by a factor of 2.5 between 2015 and 2050, reaching 62 million metric tons, with approximately 4% of the increase coming from copper used in renewable energy-based power plants and 14% coming from electric vehicles. While there are sufficient resources to meet this growing demand, the greenhouse gas emissions of the copper cycle could account for approximately 2.7% of the total emissions budget by 2050, up from 0.3% today. Assessment of possible mitigation efforts by the copper industry shows that this can be halved, but will still be 35% short of the emissions budget target based on proportional responsibility, i.e., applying the same mitigation rate to all sectors. Rather, collective action is required by all stakeholders interacting with the copper cycle to bridge the mitigation gap, including through efforts to drive advanced sorting, higher fabrication yields, extended product lifetimes, and increased service efficiency of in-use copper stock

Implementing the material footprint to measure progress towards Sustainable Development Goals 8 and 12

Sustainable development depends on decoupling economic growth from resource use. The material footprint indicator accounts for environmental pressure related to a country’s final demand. It measures material use across global supply-chain networks linking production and consumption. For this reason, it has been used as an indicator for two Sustainable Development Goals: 8.4 ‘resource efficiency improvements’ and 12.2 ‘sustainable management of natural resources’. Currently, no reporting facility exists that provides global, detailed and timely information on countries’ material footprints. We present a new collaborative research platform, based on multiregional input–output analysis, that enables countries to regularly produce, update and report detailed global material footprint accounts and monitor progress towards Sustainable Development Goals 8.4 and 12.2. We show that the global material footprint has quadrupled since 1970, driven mainly by emerging economies in the Asia-Pacific region, but with an indication of plateauing since 2014. Capital investments increasingly dominate over household consumption as the main driver. At current trends, absolute decoupling is unlikely to occur over the next few decades. The new collaborative research platform allows to elevate the material footprint to Tier I status in the SDG indicator framework and paves the way to broaden application of the platform to other environmental footprint indicators

Responsible mineral and energy futures: Views at the nexus

© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. In an era of mineral resource constraints and radical transition in the energy sector, this paper reviews the extent to which a long-term view of production and use is adopted in both sectors. A long-term view including the mineral-energy nexus is deemed to be necessary (although not sufficient) for managing future resource constraints and energy transitions. Alarmingly, it identifies that the future of minerals resources and production is generally viewed only 5-10 years ahead rather than several decades or more as for energy. Additionally, the sectors are generally studied independently, rather than with a focus on the nexus. With these findings as evidence of an unaddressed problem, the paper then focusses on the current forces for change in the minerals industry: namely community drivers regarding social licence to operate, new technologies and consumer and government drivers on responsible minerals. As discussions of sustainable development become displaced by the emerging discourse of 'responsible' minerals, what is adopted and discarded? Whilst responsible minerals considers chain-of-custody, it does not adopt a long-term view and overlooks the mineral-energy nexus. Using three illustrative cases at the nexus of (i) rare earths-renewables, (ii) coal-steel and (iii) uranium-nuclear we extend the theoretical discussion on 'responsible' with a range of contemporary examples from the perspectives of producing (Australia) and consuming countries (Japan, Switzerland) and propose a research agenda for an expanded notion of responsible minerals which recognises the complexity of the mineral-energy nexus and connects it to progressing sustainable futures

The role of primary processing in the supply risks of critical metals

This study seeks to understand the role of primary processing, i.e. the first post-mining stage, in supply risk, by means of a case study on three critical metals (neodymium, cobalt, and platinum) in the context of Japan. Applying the ‘footprint’ concept with a multiregional input–output model, we have quantified the direct and indirect vulnerability of the Japanese economy to such risks. Considering the supply risks associated with primary processors, we find that Japanese final consumers are exposed to relatively higher supply risks for neodymium as compared with cobalt and platinum. Our study shows that the primary processing stage of a metal’s supply chain may contribute significantly to the overall supply risks, suggesting that this stage should be taken into due account in understanding and mitigating supply-chain vulnerability through, e.g. supplier diversification and alternative material development