„Tough Love“ – Liebe, Autonomie und Paternalismus

Mein Paper widmet sich anhand von Keith Lehrers Konzeption "autonomer Liebe" dem Konfliktpotential zwischen romantischer Liebe und (individualistisch verstandener) personaler Autonomie. Meine These lautet, dass Lehrer diesen Konflikt nicht zu lösen vermag, da er den Bezug der liebenden Person auf das für die geliebte Person Gute und damit die paternalistische Dimension der Liebe vernachlässigt. Romantische Liebe entpuppt sich insofern stets als eine auf die eine oder andere Weise "tough love"

Introduction

This paper provides an introduction to the relevant debates revolving the three topics the connections between which are the being discussed in this volume--justice, autonomy, and love--outlining various conceptions and related questions. It also contains an overview of the contributions to the three sections of the volume: I) Justice Within Relationships of Love, II) Loving Partiality and Moral Impartiality, and III) The Political Dimension of Love and Justice

Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie / Einleitung : Das Schöne, Wahre und Gute Das sinnvolle Leben in der Diskussion

Die Kategorie des Sinns oder des Sinnvollen findet in der jüngeren Diskussion um die normative Theorie des guten Lebens erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit. Viele Autoren gehen mittlerweile davon aus, dass eine umfassende Bestimmung des guten Lebens nicht mehr ohne die Erwähnung und Erläuterung der Wertdimension des sinnvollen Lebens auskommt. Typischerweise wird dieses Syntagma so verstanden, dass damit ein Wertaspekt des (bisherigen) Teil- oder Gesamtlebens eines (menschlichen) Individuums gemeint ist, welches in einer bestimmten, von anderen Wertdimensionen des guten Lebens noch abzugrenzenden Hinsicht als lobenswert, bedeutsam oder bewundernswert ausgezeichnet wird. Umstritten ist dabei jedoch zum einen, ob das sinnvolle Leben eine eigenständige Wertkategorie innerhalb des guten Lebens darstellt, und zum anderen, falls dem so wäre, wie diese Kategorie dann genau zu explizieren wäre, nicht zuletzt im Verhältnis zu den etablierten Wertkategorien innerhalb des guten Lebens, wie etwa dem Wohlergehen. Die in diesem Schwerpunkt versammelten Aufsätze unternehmen den Versuch, zum Verständnis der vielschichtigen und kontrovers diskutierten Dimension des Sinns beizutragen.The category of meaning or meaningfulness recently has received widespread attention within the debate on the good life. Indeed, many authors suppose that any comprehensive normative theory of the good life needs to include an account of the meaningful life, understood as one of its particular value dimensions. Usually, this syntagma is understood in terms of referring to a certain valuable aspect of a given life or one of its temporal parts, labelled as praiseworthy, significant, or admirable. Controversy abounds, however, when it comes to questions such as whether the meaningful life constitutes an independent value category within the good life, or, if so, how this category relates to the other, more established categories of the good life like human well-being. The articles collected in this special issue attempt to contribute to the controversies on the understanding of the multi-layered dimension of the meaningful life and try to shed further light on it.(VLID)325093

Novel desmoplakin mutation: juvenile biventricular cardiomyopathy with left ventricular non-compaction and acantholytic palmoplantar keratoderma

Two sons of a consanguineous marriage developed biventricular cardiomyopathy. One boy died of severe heart failure at the age of 6 years, the other was transplanted because of severe heart failure at the age of 10 years. In addition, focal palmoplantar keratoderma and woolly hair were apparent in both boys. As similar phenotypes have been described in Naxos disease and Carvajal syndrome, respectively, the genes for plakoglobin (JUP) and desmoplakin (DSP) were screened for mutations using direct genomic sequencing. A novel homozygous 2 bp deletion was identified in an alternatively spliced region of DSP. The deletion 5208_5209delAG led to a frameshift downstream of amino acid 1,736 with a premature truncation of the predominant cardiac isoform DSP-1. This novel homozygous truncating mutation in the isoform-1 specific region of the DSP C-terminus caused Carvajal syndrome comprising severe early-onset heart failure with features of non-compaction cardiomyopathy, woolly hair and an acantholytic form of palmoplantar keratoderma in our patient. Congenital hair abnormality and manifestation of the cutaneous phenotype in toddler age can help to identify children at risk for cardiac death

Exploring the phenomenon and ethical issues of AI paternalism in health apps

Health apps, including consumer-oriented fitness apps, have two functions. They are supposed to monitor and promote users’ health, the latter by way of being an instance of persuasive technology. The use of artificial intelligence (AI) allows for AI health apps, i.e., health apps that act more and more autonomously when it comes to analyzing users’ health data and arriving at tailor-made results on how to improve their health. Consequently, AI health apps seem to gain a paternalistic potential. This is a game-changer, for corresponding issues of paternalism can then no longer be traced back to human engineers. Instead, the paternalizing party just is the AI system. Hence, AI health apps lead to the novel issue of AI paternalism in health care. In this paper, I explore this novel phenomenon and its ethical implications. Firstly, I discuss from a critical perspective whether the notion of AI paternalism makes (conceptual) sense to begin with. Unsurprisingly, I argue that it does and how so. Secondly, I briefly indicate important ethical issues that AI paternalism in health apps raise and which need to be discussed in more detail in order to judge under which conditions (certain forms of) AI paternalism might be considered acceptable, if at all