Kühler, Michael

Mitrović, Veselin

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INTRODUCTIONhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-023-00143-4Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie (2023) 6:123–126For Your Own Good? History, Concept, and Ethics ofPaternalismPart IMichael Kühler · Veselin MitrovićAccepted: 18 April 2023 / Published online: 27 April 2023© The Author(s) 20231 IntroductionIt is fairly uncontroversial, even among liberals, that paternalism, i.e., interferenceswith a person’s freedom or autonomy for their own good (cp. Dworkin 2020, section2), is justified and called for if this person is not, not yet, or no longer sufficientlyautonomous and thus not able to decide and act in her best interest. This applies firstand foremost to children and people who are mentally incapacitated, be it temporarilyor permanently. However, once people are deemed sufficiently autonomous, liberalconsensus states that paternalistic interferences are out of the question (cp. theotherwise opposing seminal authors Kant 1996 [1793], 291; Mill 1977 [1859], 223).Yet, paternalistic interferences still pervade our lives, be it in the form of certainlaws or state actions or of social interaction on various levels. Granted, most if notall of the following examples also allow for an additional justification in terms ofother-regarding reasons or practical aims. Yet, it can hardly be denied that they alsoinclude a paternalistic understanding. Common trivial examples that also allow fora paternalistic interpretation are the obligation to wear seatbelts when driving oranti-smoking laws to avoid or at least lower one’s own risk of serious injury orillness respectively. Especially in the medical context, physicians often still face theexpectation to decide and act on behalf of their patients, i.e., to act paternalistically,despite the prominence of the principle of respect for autonomy in medical ethicsand getting a patient’s informed consent. Moreover, while other-regarding public Michael KühlerAcademy for Responsible Research, Teaching, and Innovation (ARRTI), Karlsruher Institut fürTechnologie, Karlsruhe, DeutschlandE-Mail: michael.kuehler@kit.eduVeselin MitrovićInstitute of Social Sciences, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, SerbiaE-Mail: vmitrovic@idn.org.rs124 M. Kühler, V. Mitrovićhealth reasons may also justify nutritional standards for the food industry, they yielda paternalistic impact. In private life, friends and family tend to interfere with ourlives if they think we are about to make a mistake that goes against our best interests.Finally, sometimes we even try to act paternalistically toward ourselves—strange asthis may sound—e.g., by using technology to manipulate and steer our own behaviortoward what we think is best for us but which we would not do if it were not forsuch manipulations.Consequently, it is hardly surprising that paternalism never ceased to be the sub-ject of intense debate, spawning various conceptions and arguments (for a generaloverview, see Dworkin 2020; for the recent debate, see, e.g., Thaler and Sunstein2003; Coons and Weber 2013; Conly 2013; Dufner and Kühler 2014; Kühler andNossek 2014; Schramme 2015; Grill and Hanna 2018). Basic theoretical questionsamount to paternalism’s definition in general. Several different conceptions havebeen put forward in philosophical debate, and it is far from clear to which of thesewe should refer to classify certain situations or actions as paternalistic or not. Mostprominently, hard paternalism, which even ignores autonomous decisions of per-sons, has been distinguished from soft paternalism, according to which paternalisticinterferences are essentially only meant to check whether a person’s decision is suf-ficiently autonomous or to improve on a person’s autonomy. While hard paternalismis, by definition, incompatible with respecting people’s autonomy, it has been arguedthat soft paternalism is justifiable precisely because it is (supposedly) compatiblewith respecting peoples’ autonomy. Moreover, libertarian or nudge paternalism hasbeen suggested not to interfere with peoples’ liberty, let alone their autonomy, whilestill being able to steer people in the direction of their own good.Against such lines of argument, it has been questioned whether soft paternalismand nudging should count as paternalism at all. Furthermore, regardless of whetherto classify such interferences as (soft or nudge) paternalistic or not, they may raiseserious ethical concerns of their own, e.g., when it comes to the kind of interferencesneeded to be able to check whether a person is sufficiently autonomous in the caseof soft paternalism, or whether nudging, due to its subtle manipulating nature, maystill count as interfering with a person’s autonomy. Finally, hard paternalism raisesthe question of what should count more in cases of conflict: a person’s well-being orautonomy, which includes the challenge of whether (respecting a person’s) autonomyshould be considered an essential part of well-being.These questions are not only of theoretical or metaethical interest, i.e., how tospell out conceptions of paternalism convincingly and in sufficient detail, but alsounavoidably comprise serious practical ethical challenges. Accordingly, there is anongoing debate on whether, and if so, on what grounds, either of these conceptionsmay be morally acceptable or even called for in specific contexts or situations.The contributions to this special issue discuss both the theoretical and the practi-cal ethical dimension of paternalism, with a particular emphasis on the interrelationbetween theoretical or metaethical analyses, on the one hand, and discussions invarious contexts of applied ethics, on the other hand. What implications may certainconceptual analyses and conceptions of paternalism have on specific assessmentsof concrete situations in applied ethics, and how plausible are these implications,especially when it comes to possible or contested justifications for paternalistic in-For Your Own Good? History, Concept, and Ethics of Paternalism 125terferences (vs. non-interfering)? Conversely, what can discussions in applied ethicsabout cases of (apparent) paternalistic interferences tell us about the appropriatenessof specific theoretical or metaethical analyses of such cases in terms of conceptionsand theoretical distinctions of paternalism? Could they provide us with convinc-ing reasons for criticizing and revising detailed conceptual analyses of paternalism?Finally, what can we learn from historical examples of paternalistic practices forcurrent debate? In addressing these questions, the contributions to this special issueshed further light on the history, concept, and ethics of paternalism.The special issue is split into two parts. This first part contains two contributions,one by Thomas Gutmann and one by Veselin and Milica Mitrović. The second part,with additional contributions, will be published in the upcoming journal issue.In this first part, Thomas Gutmann, in his contribution “Liberalism and (How toAvoid) Paternalism” first presents a rough sketch of the core dynamics of the anti-paternalist liberal tradition (from Kant to Dworkin) centered around the notion ofnormative individualism and protecting the conditions of autonomy as a set of indi-vidual rights expressive of one’s sovereignty over oneself. Historically, as Gutmannexplains, the liberal tradition starts with a strong anti-paternalist momentum. Gut-mann then demonstrates that, within the theory of paternalism, a distinction mustbe drawn between “personal autonomy” designating a family of ideal, gradual, andhence at least moderately perfectionist conceptions about what an autonomous per-son is, on the one hand, and what Feinberg calls “autonomy as a right,” on the other.The anti-paternalist liberal tradition, as Gutmann shows, focuses only on “autonomyas a right.” Finally, Gutmann analyzes the so-called “argument from justice,” whichclaims that paternalistic and anti-paternalistic policies do have distributive effects oftheir own and might be a matter of distributive fairness, and discusses several optionsfor understanding this claim and its relevance as well as criticizes most autonomy-enhancing approaches for blending out the dialectics of protection and tutelage.The second contribution, Veselin and Milica Mitrović’s paper “Nesting Pater-nalism. Patterns of the Paternalistic Behaviour from Neolithization and the Mod-ern Age,” widens the perspective by including historical and sociological findingsto paint a broader, exemplary picture of paternalistic practices throughout history.While paternalism can appear with other forms of social actions toward others andourselves, a particular set of activities may be interpreted as a specific part of pater-nalistic behavior. The authors then question the hypothesis that some social groupsvalue the benefits provided by leading authorities more than their autonomy. In thisregard, exemplary historical and sociological findings are supposed to inform thephilosophical discussion on paternalism by broadening the topic’s scope. Firstly,the authors compare archaeological remains from the Early Neolithic (9700-6250years B.C.), characterized by the appearance of prominent leaders with qualitiesof modern paternalistic leadership. They both indicate behavior accompanied bya family atmosphere in the workplace. The second data set was obtained throughsociological research conducted by the Enquete on the Serbian national sample. Adiachronic perspective revealed similar relations between leaders and subordinatesat this point. Certain groups with narrowed decision-making autonomy begin tothink paternalistically, even though there is a fine line between paternalism, protec-tionism, and authoritarianism. The main differences between paternalism and other126 M. Kühler, V. Mitrovićrelated concepts (authoritarianism, protectionism, collectivism) are the grade andtype of subjects’ consent about the action for their own good. The authors argue thatstronger collectivistic and authoritarian attitudes enable nesting paternalism, i.e., thegradual acceptance of a paternalistic culture. In this process, an individual sacrificesautonomy for social benefits and integration into the cultural milieu. Nesting pater-nalism parallels “nesting dolls.” It denotes collateral patronizing behaviors enclosedin another, such as paternalism, protectionism, and authoritarianism. One of the mainderivates of such paternalism is anti-paternalism, which consists of condescendingacts to prevent paternalism.Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long asyou give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this articleare included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to thematerial. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is notpermitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directlyfrom the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.ReferencesConly, Sarah. 2013. Against Autonomy. Justifying Coercive Paternalism. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press.Coons, Christian, and Michael Weber, ed. 2013. Paternalism. Theory and Practice. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.Dufner, Annette, and Michael Kühler, ed. 2014. Private Autonomy, Public Paternalism? Ethical Theoryand Moral Practice 17/3, Special Issue. Dordrecht: Springer.Dworkin, Gerald. 2020. Paternalism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta,Fall 2020. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.Grill, Kalle, and Jason Hanna, ed. 2018. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism. NewYork: Routledge.Kant, Immanuel. 1793. On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use inpractice. In Practical Philosophy, tran. Mary J. Gregor, 271–309. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1996.Kühler, Michael, and Alexa Nossek, ed. 2014. Paternalismus und Konsequentialismus. Ethica 27. Münster:Mentis.Mill, John Stuart. 1859. On Liberty. In The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XVIII – Essayson Politics and Society Part I, ed. John M. Robsen, 213–310. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1977.Schramme, Thomas, ed. 2015. New Perspectives on Paternalism and Health Care. 2015th ed. Cham:Springer.Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2003. Libertarian Paternalism. The American Economic Review93: 175–179.

For Your Own Good? History, Concept, and Ethics of Paternalism – Part I

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For Your Own Good? History, Concept, and Ethics of Paternalism – Part I

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