Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining

In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option A always gives the proposer a higher payoff than option B. The payoff of the responder depends on the (randomly determined) state of nature, i.e., in state s2 payoffs of the two players are aligned while they are not in state s1. The responder is always informed about the actual state. The proposer knows the actual state in our first treatment but not in the second. We find that proposers indeed benefit from ignorance because the responders accept almost all offers (even the unfavorable ones) if the payoffs of the responder have not been transparent for the proposer. In additional treatments we investigate situations where the proposer can deliberately remain ignorant. One could assume that remaining ignorant on purpose would be punished by the responder at least if an unfavorable outcome results. Surprisingly, we find that strategically remaining ignorant tends to be beneficial for the proposer particularly if the responder does not know with certainty whether it was the proposer's intention to remain ignorant or whether it was not her intention.strategic ignorance, bargaining, intentions, experiment

People are more likely to promise to help you if you ask them in person or by phone

Synchronous communication usually gets people to say yes, but follow through will always be low, write Julian Conrads and Tommaso Reggian

Lying and Team Incentives

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.compensation schemes, lying, team, experiment

On Fraud, Ignorance, and Lying: Essays in Behavioral Business Ethics

By means of four experimental studies, this dissertation analyses fraud, ignorance, and lying from a behavioral business ethics perspective

QDB: A new database of plasma chemistries and reactions

One of the most challenging and recurring problems when modeling plasmas is the lack of data on the key atomic and molecular reactions that drive plasma processes. Even when there are data for some reactions, complete and validated datasets of chemistries are rarely available. This hinders research on plasma processes and curbs development of industrial applications. The QDB project aims to address this problem by providing a platform for provision, exchange, and validation of chemistry datasets. A new data model developed for QDB is presented. QDB collates published data on both electron scattering and heavy-particle reactions. These data are formed into reaction sets, which are then validated against experimental data where possible. This process produces both complete chemistry sets and identifies key reactions that are currently unreported in the literature. Gaps in the datasets can be filled using established theoretical methods. Initial validated chemistry sets for SF 6 /CF 4 /O 2 and SF 6 /CF 4 /N 2 /H 2 are presented as examples

The effect of communication channels on promise-making and promise-keeping: experimental evidence

In modern organizations, new communication channels are reshaping the way in which people get in touch, interact and cooperate. This paper, adopting an experimental economics framework, investigates the effect of different communication channels on promise-making and promise-keeping in an organizational context. Inspired by Ellingsen and Johannesson (Econ J 114:397–420, 2004), five experimental treatments differ with respect to the communication channel employed to solicit a promise of cooperation, i.e., face-to-face, phone call, chat room, and two different sorts of computer-mediated communication. The more direct and synchronous (face-to-face, phone, chat room) the interpersonal interaction is, the higher the propensity of an agent to make a promise. Treatment effects, however, vanish if we then look at the actual promise-keeping rates across treatments, as more indirect channels (computer-mediated) do not perform statistically worse than the direct and synchronous channels

The effect of communication channels on dishonest behavior

The present research investigates the effects of various communication channels on dishonest behavior. We rely on a simple truth telling experiment (i.e., a repeated coin flip) and let subjects report their outcome through communication channels that differ in distance and anonymity (face-to-face, in lab telephone, in lab web-form, and home web-form). We find dishonest behavior across all communication channels, with important treatment differences. Reporting of extreme outcomes that maximize payoff increases in distance and anonymity. To the contrary, partial lying decreases in distance and anonymity. Furthermore, we find gender to moderate the effects and women tend to drive these results. The findings have important implications for the design of real-world communication structures that are relevant when honest reporting is particularly relevant, for example in insurance claims, income reports for tax purposes, or applicant screenings in labor markets. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved

(Dis-)honesty: Measuring overcharging in a real-world market

The present research investigates the occurrence of honest vs. dishonest behavior in a real-world competitive retail market involving the sales of loose candy that is priced according to a pay-per-weight scheme. Our results provide evidence for a high degree of honesty among sellers. There are only a few cases of overcharging, in particular when scales are hidden from the buyer (Study 1). Further details suggest that many sellers are consistently honest over repeated sales, and that honesty is robust to the appearance of the buyer or the amount that was purchased (Study 2). We discuss sellers’ concerns for reputation as a plausible explanation for our results

Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment

Ambiguity about the chances of winning represents a key aspect in lotteries. By means of a controlled field experiment, we exogenously vary the degree of ambiguity about the winning chances of lotteries organized to incentivize the contribution for a public good. In one treatment, people have been simply informed about the maximum number of potential participants (i.e. the number of lottery tickets released). In a second treatment, this information has been omitted as in all traditional lotteries. Our general finding shows that simply reducing the degree of ambiguity of the lottery leads to a sizable and significant increase (67%) in the participation rate. This result is robust to alternative prize configurations