Law Review Publishing: Thoughts on Mass Submissions, Expedited Review, and Potential Reform

The current law review publishing system—in particular, mass submissions and expedited review—works well for prestige-driven professors; however, it places a tremendous burden on the editors of journals lower in the hierarchy. This problem is exacerbated by several professorial tactics including, most significantly, submitting articles to journals from which the professor would never accept an offer—not even when he or she fails to receive a “better” offer through the expedite process. This Essay discusses a potential fix: the eight-hour offer window. If a journal were to adopt a formal policy of holding its publication offers open for only eight hours, professors would, in theory, be unable to use the offer in the expedite process. Therefore, professors would not submit their articles to this journal unless and until they were serious about publishing in it. Unfortunately, what is good in theory does not always work in practice. This Essay discusses how professors would modify their existing tactics—tactics which currently include misrepresenting the terms of an offer in the expedite process—in order to defeat this attempted reform. The Essay also explores specific ways that a journal could overcome these tactics and implement meaningful reform despite the professoriate’s desire to protect the status quo

Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture? Reassessing the Patent-Challenge-Bloc\u27s Antitrust Status

A patent challenger who defeats a patent wins spoils that it must share with the world, including all its competitors. This forced sharing undercuts an alleged infringer\u27s incentive to stay in the fight to the finish - especially if the patent owner offers an attractive settlement. Too many settlements, and too few definitive patent challenges, are the result. I have argued previously that a litigation-stage bounty would help correct this tilt against patent challenges, for it would provide cash prizes to successful patent challengers that they alone would enjoy. Even the best-designed bounty, however, would likely fail to encourage patent validity challenges in all the cases where such encouragement would be salutary. Others have urged that, going forward, post-grant administrative review is a more promising approach to weeding out weak patents. A new post-grant review procedure, however, will do nothing to encourage worthy challenges to thousands of extant weak, overasserted patents. This article explores another litigation-stage approach to overcoming the free rider problem that undercuts patent validity challenges - namely, strong-form joint defense agreements among multiple accused infringers. Strong-form agreements, which go beyond light coordination and information sharing, have long been condemned as unlawful buyers\u27 cartels. The seminal case remains Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan. But current doctrine’s condemnation trades on a category mistake rooted in a fatally simplistic view that patents are commodity property (rather than what they are, which is probabilistic exclusion rights). Contrary to conventional wisdom, a binding commitment among accused infringers jointly to fund a full challenge to patent infringement allegations is not, nor is it akin to, a buyers’ cartel for buying commodities. Rather, it is a research joint venture, the goal of which is to generate valuable - but otherwise inappropriate - information about the patent\u27s true validity or scope

Two Centuries of Trademark and Copyright Law: A Citation-Network-Analysis Approach

The Supreme Court has decided many more patent cases than trademark or copyright cases. This is so not just in the past decade—the focus of the tenth annual Supreme Court IP Review at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, in September 2019—but in the past 20 decades. In gathering the entire body of the Court’s IP caselaw for study with cita-tion-network-analysis tools, I found that patent cases greatly outnum-ber trademark and copyright cases. Moreover, patent cases, especially patent and antitrust cases, dominate the metrics for the most central cases in the citation network

A Modest Proposal for Expediting Manuscript Selection at Less Prestigious Law Reviews

The matching market in unsolicited manuscripts, submitted to general law reviews, suffers from far too much wasted student effort. This is especially so among the less prestigious law review staffs, which scramble to read submissions they cannot land in the misguided belief they owe authors serious scholarly engagement with the drafts they submit. If they set aside this quaintly artisanal view—an apparent relic of the “Paper Chase” era that ill suits the age of ExpressO and Scholastica—students can process manuscripts far more efficiently. They need only update their manuscript-review systems according to the same market imperatives that drive the professors who submit the manuscripts, thus putting their respective interests on the same self-directed footing. For less prestigious journals, key moves include short-fuse automated offers and targeted categorical rejections of requests for expedited review

Open Letter on Ethical Norms in Intellectual Property Scholarship

As scholars who write in intellectual property (“IP”), we write this letter with aspirations of reaching the highest ethical norms possible for our field. In particular, we have noted an influx of large contributions from corporate and private actors who have an economic stake in ongoing policy debates in the field. Some dollars come with strings attached, such as the ability to see or approve academic work prior to publication or limitations on the release of data. IP scholars who are also engaged in practice or advocacy must struggle to keep their academic and advocacy roles separate.Our goal is to bring attention to the dramatic changes that are occurring in the field, highlight the potential pitfalls, and suggest a set of ethical norms to which we will strive to adhere. We conclude this letter with a set of ethical norms to which a large number of IP academics have already subscribed. We welcome additional signatories to the principles expressed in this letter

A Patent Reformist Supreme Court and Its Unearthed Precedent

How is it that the Supreme Court, a generalist court, is leading a project of innovation reform in our times while the court of appeals established to encourage innovation is having its precedent stricken down time and again? This decade the Supreme Court has issued far more patent law decisions than in any decade since the passage of the Patent Act of 1952. In doing so, the Supreme Court has overruled the Federal Circuit in roughly threequarters of the patent cases in which the Supreme Court has issued opinions. In most of these cases, the Supreme Court has established rules that favor accused infringers over patent holders, and the result has been an era of patent litigation reform far more impactful than anything Congress has achieved. Scholars have observed that the Supreme Court tends to overrule Federal Circuit decisions that (1) impose rigid legal rules as opposed to flexible standards; (2) adopt special rules for patent law cases rather than applying general principles of law and equity applicable to all federal cases; and/or (3) fail to grant sufficient discretion to the district courts. This paper examines the twenty-eight Supreme Court opinions overruling the Federal Circuit since 2000 and quantifies their rationales to discover that, while these reasons are often invoked, the Supreme Court’s most common rationale is that the Federal Circuit has disregarded or cabined its older precedent from before the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit, from before the 1952 Patent Act, and even from before the 20th Century. The Court has relied on this rationale in twenty-one of the twenty-eight cases. The paper then seeks to probe beneath the surface level patterns to discover the deeper roots of the discord between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. Constitutional law scholars have observed that the Supreme Court’s policy preferences are the primary, unstated motivation behind its decisions. The Court writes opinions that rely on the flexible tools of precedent and stare decisis in order to implement its policy choices while maintaining its institutional reputation for neutrality. The Court does this by influencing precedent vitality; the Court selects which of its precedent to rely upon and augment and which of its precedent to distinguish and narrow. This process runs in direct conflict with the Federal Circuit, a court that was originally conceived and viewed by some of its members as a court intended to bring uniformity to patent law in a way that would reinvigorate patent rights. The Federal Circuit would implement the 1952 Patent Act in a way that would draw patent law out of the nineteenth century. But for the Supreme Court, the 1952 Act was a mere codification of patent law as developed by the courts for over a hundred years. Hence, the Federal Circuit seeks to influence precedent vitality at direct cross-purposes with the Supreme Court. The result of the Supreme Court’s project has been a new era of common law patent reform in favor of accused infringers, which is gaining momentum as the Supreme Court decides far more patent cases than it has since the passage of the Patent Act of 1952

Rand Patents and Exclusion Orders: Submission of 19 Economics and Law Professors to the International Trade Commission

In this comment to ITC Investigation 337-TA-745 (Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Motorola v. Apple) we, as teachers and scholars of economics, antitrust and intellectual property, remedies, administrative, and international intellectual property law, former Department of Justice lawyers and chief economists, a former executive official at the Patent and Trademark Office, a former counsel at the ITC Office of the General Counsel, and a former Member of the President’s Council of Economic Adviser take the position that ITC exclusion orders generally should not be granted under § 1337(d)(1) on the basis of patents subject to obligations to license on “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND) terms. Doing so would undermine the significant pro-competitive and pro-consumer benefits that RAND promises produce and the investments they enable. A possible exception may arise if district court jurisdiction is lacking, the patent is valid and infringed, and the public interest favors issuing an exclusion order. We explain our position in the comment

Patent Ships Sail an Antitrust Sea

The deeper truths evoked by patent ships sailing an antitrust sea are three. First, free competition is the pervasive, baseline reality, the background norm; patent protection is the temporary, partial exception. Second, we grasp both patent and antitrust policy with a common science: economics. Third, although neither patent nor antitrust law doctrines are good tools for fixing fundamental problems in the other body of law, both bodies of law help us better understand the shortcomings of the other. I explore these ideas in turn, below

Brandeis\u27s IP Federalism: Thoughts on \u3ci\u3eErie\u3c/i\u3e at Eighty

Justice Brandeis is, in intellectual property law’s precincts, most famous for his lone dissent in International News Service v. Associate Press, the misappropriation case one can find in virtually every I.P. survey casebook (and many property law casebooks as well). But in the wider legal world, Brandeis is likely most famous for his earthquake opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. Do Brandeis’s opinions in these two cases speak to each other? Can considering them together inform broader reflections on the texture of our federalism in the I.P. context? This piece, prepared in connection with the “Erie at Eighty” conference in fall 2018, makes the case that the answer to both questions is “yes.

Charting Supreme Court Patent Law, Near and Far

The Supreme Court has been markedly more active in patent law in recent years, as many have noted. How much has patent law changed as a result? The amount of change one sees is, in important respects, a function of the lens through which one looks. In this network analysis of the Supreme Court’s citations to its own case law in all its intellectual property cases from 1947 to 2017, inclusive, I am reminded of Alphonse Karr’s famous quip: “Plus ça change, plus c’est law mȇme chose” — the more it changes, the more it’s the same thing. I report these empirical results as part of my commentary on Seth Waxman’s newly published analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent, more intense engagement with patent law