Clientelism, income inequality, and social preferences: an evolutionary approach to poverty traps

Political clientelism is a dyadic relation in which a politician (the patron) gives material goods and services to a citizen (the client), in exchange for political support. We argue that there is a two-way relation between clientelism and income inequality and poverty. In a poor society in which income inequality is high, clientelism will be a natural outcome. Once clientelism is established, it is harder for democracy to redistribute income and it is easier for the society to be caught in a poverty trap. We develop a two-part game-theoretic model. In the first part, clientelism emerges in a poor and unequal society as a consequence of social preferences, in particular, strong reciprocity. In the second part, using evolutionary and stochastic game theory, we show that clientelism causes income inequality and poverty.

Enriquecer la arquitectura

El modelo tectónico de entender la arquitectura consistente en diferenciar la piel de los huesos debe enriquecerse con un modelo organicista que incluya los vasos y los nervios. Se pretende así incorporar las instalaciones y tecnologías de la edificación en la concepción arquitectónica desde los primeros pasos del quehacer del arquitecto

Vínculo entre hombre y entorno en la Luz difícil de Tomás González

Este texto busca demostrar que la alusión que se hace de dos espacios naturales en el trabajo artístico de David, personaje de La Luz Difícil de Tomás González, se da para rememorar estos paisajes con los cuales creó un vínculo afectivo -- Se pondrá de manifiesto la forma en la que ese vínculo se puede rastrear en sus dos formas artísticas: la pintura y la literatura -- También es importante para entender cómo se establece el vínculo hombre – entorn

La reciprocidad y la paradoja del votante

This article shows that for a citizen with reciprocal preferences, voting can be a rational act. Even in elections with many voters, when the probability of being the pivotal voter is close to zero, the utility generated by strong reciprocal sentiments can compensate the material costs of voting. This paper offers a behavioral model with social preferences that represents the conditions that make voting more attractive than abstention. Using the dynamics of replication to explore the voting game evolution, it concludes that positive reciprocal sentiments promote voting for the candidate in power, while negative reciprocity promotes abstention or voting for a rival candidate.reciprocity, paradox of voting, social preferences, evolutionary games

Fabric defect detection using the wavelet transform in an ARM processor

Small devices used in our day life are constructed with powerful architectures that can be used for industrial applications when requiring portability and communication facilities. We present in this paper an example of the use of an embedded system, the Zeus epic 520 single board computer, for defect detection in textiles using image processing. We implement the Haar wavelet transform using the embedded visual C++ 4.0 compiler for Windows CE 5. The algorithm was tested for defect detection using images of fabrics with five types of defects. An average of 95% in terms of correct defect detection was obtained, achieving a similar performance than using processors with float point arithmetic calculations

Revisiting Rose's common currency debate

The main objective of this research is to revisit the estimation of the effect of a common currency on international trade by applying the new methodology proposed by Helpman, Melitz and Rubistein (2008) and incorporating tourism to the theoretical framework. Rose (2000) estimates an empirical model of bilateral trade, finding a significant coefficient for a currency union variable of 1.2, suggesting an effect of currency unions on trade of over a 200%. Rose (2000)’s finding did not receive full acceptance and further research was consequently devoted to find reasons of such high effect. This still remains as a major puzzle in the International Economics. Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) hold that there may still be some omitted factors that drives countries to both participate in currency unions and trade more. In this research a gravity equation for trade is estimated controlling by international tourism.Common currency, tourism, gravity equation

On the impact of exchange rate regimes on tourism

The main objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of the exchange rate arrangements on international tourism. The ambiguity of literature about the effect of exchange rate volatility contrasts with the magnitude of the impact of a common currency on trade. On the basis of a gravity equation we estimate a moderate effect of a currency union on tourism of almost 12%. Furthermore, we estimate a gravity equation for international trade, obtaining that the common currency effect on trade is reduced when tourism is introduced as a regressor. This suggests that tourism flows may contribute to explain the excessive magnitude of the estimated effect of a common currency on trade in this literature. Finally, we analyze the impact of several de facto exchange rate arrangements on tourism, finding that less flexible exchange rates promotes tourism flows.Tourism, Exchange Rate Regime, Common Currency