Optimal financial contracting and debt maturity structure under adverse selection

We analyze a model in which a risk-averse country finances its development project under asymmetric information. Before the project renders its fruits, two types of news will become available, one of which will reduce the asymmetry of information between the country and its investors. We characterize the optimal financial contract both when complete financial contracting is possible and when the country is restricted to using only short-term and long-term debt.

Signaling Credibility --- Choosing Optimal Debt and International Reserves

This paper evaluates the challenges facing developing countries when there is uncertainty about the policy maker type. We consider a country characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for fiscal outlays, high tax collection costs, and sovereign risk, where future output depends on the type of policymaker in place today. There are two policymakers -- type T chooses debt and international reserves to smooth tax collection costs; type S has higher discount factor, aiming at obtaining current resources for narrow interest groups, and preferring not to undertake costly reforms that may enhance future output. Financial markets do not know the type of policymaker in place and try to infer its type by looking at its financial choices. We show that various adverse shocks (lower output, higher real interest rate, etc.) can induce a switch from an equilibrium where each policy maker chooses its preferred policy to another where T distorts its policies in order to separate itself from S in the least costly way. This is accomplished by type T reducing both international reserves and external debt. Further decline in output would induce type T to lower debt, and reserves would fall at a higher rate than otherwise expected.

Risk aversion and debt maturity structure

We study the relationship of risk aversion and debt maturity structure. In a model in which adverse selection in financial markets creates a role for the use of short-term debt, we allow the possibility of borrowers being risk-averse. This creates a trade-off between reduced expected financing costs and higher risk and allows for the study of the effect of risk aversion on optimal maturity structure. We prove that, as risk aversion increases, so does the percentage of debt that is long-term.risk aversion, debt maturity structure, adverse selection.

Information sharing and lending market competition under strong adverse selection

In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (Eur Econ Rev 51, 77- 99, 2007) show that information sharing increases banks' profits to the detriment of creditworthy entrepreneurs in a model of a banking duopoly with switching costs and poaching. They restrict their analysis to the case in which adverse selection is not too strong.We analyze the complementary case and show that, when the economy suffers from strong adverse selection, information sharing still increases banks' profits, but it may or may not hurt talented entrepreneurs

The Administrative Contract and the Public Tender

Para alcanzar sus fines, el Estado requiere de la colaboración voluntaria de los particulares, lo cual se concreta mediante el contrato administrativo, cuya adjudicación suele verse trastocadas por el flagelo de la corrupción. Entre los mecanismos utilizables para evitar y combatir la corrupción administrativa en la adjudicación de los contratos administrativos, destaca la licitación pública.To achieve its goals, the State requires the voluntary collaboration of individuals, which takes form of an administrative contract, whose award is often disrupted by administrative corruption. Public tendering stands out among the mechanisms to prevent and fight administrative corruption in the award of administrative contracts

Eficiencia en instituciones microfinancieras - aplicación del DEA: (análisis envolventes de datos)

Las instituciones de microfinanzas (IMF) en el Perú se pueden agrupar en Cajas Municipales de Ahorro y Crédito (CMAC), Cajas Rurales de Ahorro y Crédito (CRAC) y Empresas de Desarrollo de la Pequeña y Micro Empresa (EDPYME). Los tres tipos de IMF se diferencian desde su origen por el objetivo, la coyuntura económica y política, y el marco legal bajo el cual fueron creados. De acuerdo con el marco normativo, cada uno de los sistemas microfinancieros se encuentra autorizado a realizar diferentes tipos de operaciones, y el universo de dichas operaciones no es el mismo que el permitido a las empresas bancarias. Este trabajo intenta responder a dichos planteamientos y analiza la eficiencia relativa de las IMF aplicando una herramienta no tradicional: el análisis envolvente de datos (DEA, por sus siglas en inglés). El trabajo se divide en cuatro secciones. En la primera sección se desarrolla el marco teórico y la metodología por usar; en la segunda sección se esboza una reseña del sector y de la eficiencia de las instituciones microfinancieras en el Perú. En la tercera sección se especifica el modelo, la selección de las variables para aplicar el DEA y se analizan los resultados obtenidos. Una simulación de cambios regulatorios y su impacto en el nivel de eficiencia se desarrolla en la cuarta sección. Finalmente, se presentan las conclusiones y recomendaciones

Cómo razonar en Derecho Administrativo: cómo pasar de la teoría a la práctica en los estudios de grado y posgrado

El presente Proyecto de Innovación Docente ofrece nuevos mecanismos para ayudar a los alumnos a familiarizarse con la búsqueda y análisis de los materiales normativos, jurisprudenciales y doctrinales que les permitan aplicar sus conocimientos teóricos a la resolución de problemas jurídicos prácticos

A generalization of the Pfähler-Lambert decomposition

The aim of this paper is to provide a generalization of the Pfähler (1990) and Lambert (1989, 2001) decomposition that allows us to overcome some limitations of the original methodology. In particular, our proposal allows avoiding the problem of sequentiality when the tax has several types of deductions or allowances, schedules or tax credits. In addition, our alternative decomposition is adapted to the dual income class of tax structures. Moreover, in order to adapt this methodology to real-world taxes, our alternative includes the re-ranking effects of real taxes, caused by the existence of differentiated treatments based on non-income attributes. This theoretical proposal is illustrated with an empirical analysis for the Spanish Personal Income Tax reform enforced in 2007

Controlling ligand surface density on streptavidin-magnetic particles by a simple, rapid, and reliable chemiluminescent test

International audienc