Implicit complexity for coinductive data: a characterization of corecurrence

We propose a framework for reasoning about programs that manipulate coinductive data as well as inductive data. Our approach is based on using equational programs, which support a seamless combination of computation and reasoning, and using productivity (fairness) as the fundamental assertion, rather than bi-simulation. The latter is expressible in terms of the former. As an application to this framework, we give an implicit characterization of corecurrence: a function is definable using corecurrence iff its productivity is provable using coinduction for formulas in which data-predicates do not occur negatively. This is an analog, albeit in weaker form, of a characterization of recurrence (i.e. primitive recursion) in [Leivant, Unipolar induction, TCS 318, 2004].Comment: In Proceedings DICE 2011, arXiv:1201.034

Experimental investigations of ambiguity: the case of most

In the study of natural language quantification, much recent attention has been devoted to the investigation of verification procedures associated with the proportional quantifier most. The aim of these studies is to go beyond the traditional characterization of the semantics of most, which is confined to explicating its truth-functional and presuppositional content as well as its combinatorial properties, as these aspects underdetermine the correct analysis of most. The present paper contributes to this effort by presenting new experimental evidence in support of a decompositional analysis of most according to which it is a superlative construction built from a gradable predicate many or much and the superlative operator -est (Hackl, in Nat Lang Semant 17:63–98, 2009). Our evidence comes in the form of verification profiles for sentences like Most of the dots are blue which, we argue, reflect the existence of a superlative reading of most. This notably contrasts with Lidz et al.’s (Nat Lang Semant 19:227–256, 2011) results. To reconcile the two sets of data, we argue, it is necessary to take important differences in task demands into account, which impose limits on the conclusions that can be drawn from these studies

The History and Prehistory of Natural-Language Semantics

Contemporary natural-language semantics began with the assumption that the meaning of a sentence could be modeled by a single truth condition, or by an entity with a truth-condition. But with the recent explosion of dynamic semantics and pragmatics and of work on non- truth-conditional dimensions of linguistic meaning, we are now in the midst of a shift away from a truth-condition-centric view and toward the idea that a sentence’s meaning must be spelled out in terms of its various roles in conversation. This communicative turn in semantics raises historical questions: Why was truth-conditional semantics dominant in the first place, and why were the phenomena now driving the communicative turn initially ignored or misunderstood by truth-conditional semanticists? I offer a historical answer to both questions. The history of natural-language semantics—springing from the work of Donald Davidson and Richard Montague—began with a methodological toolkit that Frege, Tarski, Carnap, and others had created to better understand artificial languages. For them, the study of linguistic meaning was subservient to other explanatory goals in logic, philosophy, and the foundations of mathematics, and this subservience was reflected in the fact that they idealized away from all aspects of meaning that get in the way of a one-to-one correspondence between sentences and truth-conditions. The truth-conditional beginnings of natural- language semantics are best explained by the fact that, upon turning their attention to the empirical study of natural language, Davidson and Montague adopted the methodological toolkit assembled by Frege, Tarski, and Carnap and, along with it, their idealization away from non-truth-conditional semantic phenomena. But this pivot in explana- tory priorities toward natural language itself rendered the adoption of the truth-conditional idealization inappropriate. Lifting the truth-conditional idealization has forced semanticists to upend the conception of linguistic meaning that was originally embodied in their methodology

A cognitive theory of graphical and linguistic reasoning: Logic and implementation

We discuss external and internal graphical and linguistic representational systems. We argue that a cognitive theory of peoples' reasoning performance must account for (a) the logical equivalence of inferences expressed in graphical and linguistic form; and (b) the implementational differences that affect facility of inference. Our theory proposes that graphical representations limit abstraction and thereby aid processibility. We discuss the ideas of specificity and abstraction, and their cognitive relevance. Empirical support comes from tasks involving (i) the manipulation of external graphics; and (ii) no external graphics. For (i), we take Euler's Circles, provide a novel computational reconstruction, show how it captures abstractions, and contrast it with earlier construals, and with Mental Models' representations. We demonstrate equivalence of the graphical Euler system, and the non-graphical Mental Models system. For (ii), we discuss text comprehension, and the mental ..

Critical study of Sylvain Delcomminette, Le Philèbe de Platon

This book concerns situation semantics, a novel approach to the semantics of natural lan-guages, which the authors have originated and which they have been developing since the beginning of the 80’s; partly in collaboration with other researchers at CSLI (the Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University). Situation semantics aims at the construction of a unified and mathematically rigorous theory of meaning and information content and the application of such a theory to the study of language. Situations and Attitudes (S & A) is the most comprehensive exposition of situa-tion semantics to appear so far. It is divided into four parts: Part A contains a general dis-cussion of human language and the nature of meaning. Part B contains the authors’ formal theory of situations. In Part C the formal theory is applied to the semantics of nat-ural languages. Part D, finally, concerns the semantics of (propositional) attitude reports. The present essay is a critical study of Barwise and Perry’s book, emphasizing the logical and model-theoretical aspects of their work. I begin by presenting the authors’ criticism of the classical view of logic and semantics within the tradition of Frege, Russell and Tarski. In this connection, I discuss the so-called Frege argument (“the slingshot”)