Loss Aversion, Presidential Responsibility, and Midterm Congressional Elections

I explore a behavioral model of political participation, first introduced by Quattrone and Tversky [1988], based on the primitives of prospect theory, as defined by Kahneman and Tversky [1979]. The model offers an alternative explanation for why the President’s party tends to lose seats in midterm congressional elections. The model is examined empirically and compared against competing explanations for the “midterm phenomenon”.Loss aversion, midterm elections, congressional elections, negative voting, midterm effect

Generic Difference of Expected Vote Share and Probability of Victory Maximization in Simple Plurality Elections with Probabilistic Voters

In this paper I examine single member, simple plurality elections with n > 2 probabilistic voters and show that the maximization of expected vote share and maximization of probability of victory are “generically different” in a specific sense. More specifically, I first describe finite shyness (Anderson and Zame (2000)), a notion of genericity for infinite dimensional spaces. Using this notion, I show that, for any policy x in the interior of the policy space and any candidate j, the set of n-dimensional profiles of twice continuously differentiable probabilistic voting functions for which x simultaneously satisfies the first and second order conditions for maximization of j’s probability of victory and j’s expected vote share at x is finitely shy with respect to the set of n-dimensional profiles of twice continuously differentiable probabilistic voting functions for which x satisfies the first and second order conditions for maximization of j’s expected vote share.Equivalence, Genericity, Candidate objectives, Probabilistic voting

Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Capacity

In this paper we investigate how “civil service” personnel management interacts with bureaucratic discretion to create high capacity, expert bureaucracies populated by policy-motivated agents. We build a model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship specific) policy expertise, and may be either policy-motivated or policy-indifferent. We show that under specific conditions on the nature of expertise and bureaucratic discretion over policy choices, merit system protections for job tenure encourage the development of expertise and problem solving capacity in the bureaucracy. In addition, we identify conditions under which typical civil service rules encourage policy-motivated bureaucrats to enter and remain in public service, and policy- indifferent bureaucrats to leave it.Bureaucracy, Expertise, Discretion, Civil Service

Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making

Important conceptualizations of both interest groups and bureaucratic agencies suggest that these institutions provide legislatures with greater information for use in policy making. Yet little is known about how these information sources interact in the policy process as a whole. In this paper we consider this issue analytically, and develop a model of policy making in which multiple sources of information – from the bureaucracy, an interest group, or a legislature’s own in-house development – can be brought to bear on policy. Lobbyists begin this process by selecting a venue – Congress or a standing bureaucracy – in which to press for a policy change. The main findings of the paper are that self-selection of lobbyists into different policy making venues can be informative per se; that this self-selection can make legislatures willing to delegate more authority to ideologically distinct bureaucratic agents; and that delegation of authority, while it takes advantage of agency expertise, can nevertheless lead to an increase in the legislature’s own in-house information gathering (e.g., hearings). Changes within the Federal Trade Commission during the 1970s are reinterpreted in the context of our model.Delegation, Lobbying, Bureaucracy, Venue Choice, Discretion

A Theory of Voting in Large Elections

This paper provides a game-theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections. In our model, voters’ strategies form a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior. We first show that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates, and then proceed to show that, with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters’ utilities, a Nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory. This equilibrium (1) consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters’ utilities, (2) exists even when voters can abstain, and (3) is unique when there are only 2 candidates

Elections and the Media: The Supply Side

This paper examines the role of the media in modern elections. In particular, the media industry is included in a traditional spatial voting framework. Consumers are modeled as random utility maximizers, and predictions are obtained, including an incumbency/celebrity advantage, emphasis of news concerning front-runners and unknown candidates, higher levels of coverage of volatile issues, higher levels of horse-race coverage in heterogeneous electorates, and lower levels of issue coverage in competitive news markets. The paper also includes a brief, cursory look at media coverage of Perot's candidacies in 1992 and 1996, illustrating how the model can be used "out of the box.

PERAMALAN JUMLAH PENUMPANG PESAWAT TERBANG DI PINTU KEDATANGAN BANDAR UDARA INTERNASIONAL PATTIMURA AMBON DENGAN MENGGUNAKAN METODE ARIMA BOX-JENKINS

The Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model is often used to forecast time series data. In the era of globalization, rapidly progressing times, one of them in the field of transportation. The aircraft is one of the transportation that the residents can use to support their activities, both in business and tourism. The objective of the research is to know the forecasting of the number of passengers of airplanes at the arrival gate of Pattimura Ambon International Airport using ARIMA Box-Jenkins method. The best model selection is ARIMA (0, 1, 3) because it has significant parameter value and MSE value is smaller

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