Being True, Sounding False

The essay explores multiple senses of “true,” arguing that truth not only has a performative sense, but that certain performances can themselves be true as when a friend is a true friend. Taking that thought in a metaphilosophical direction, the essay also argues that writing can be true to philosophy or sound false on those terms

Metacognitive function and fragmentation in schizophrenia: Relationship to cognition, self-experience and developing treatments

Bleuler suggested that fragmentation of thought, emotion and volition were the unifying feature of the disorders he termed schizophrenia. In this paper we review research seeking to measure some of the aspects of fragmentation related to the experience of the self and others described by Bleuler. We focus on work which uses the concept of metacognition to characterize and quantify alterations or decrements in the processes by which fragments or pieces of information are integrated into a coherent sense of self and others. We describe the rationale and support for one method for quantifying metacognition and its potential to study the fragmentation of a person\u27s sense of themselves, others and the relative place of themselves and others in the larger human community. We summarize research using that method which suggests that deficits in metacognition commonly occur in schizophrenia and are related to basic neurobiological indices of brain functioning. We also present findings indicating that the capacity for metacognition in schizophrenia is positively related to a broad range of aspects of psychological and social functioning when measured concurrently and prospectively. Finally, we discuss the evolution and study of one therapy that targets metacognitive capacity, Metacognitive Reflection and Insight Therapy (MERIT) and its potential to treat fragmentation and promote recovery

Insight, Neurocognition, and Schizophrenia: Predictive Value of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test

Lack of insight in schizophrenia is a key feature of the illness and is associated with both positive and negative clinical outcomes. Previous research supports that neurocognitive dysfunction is related to lack of insight, but studies have not examined how neurocognition relates to change in insight over time. Therefore, the current study sought to understand how performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) differed between participants with varying degrees of change in insight over a 6-month period. Fifty-two patients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder were administered the WCST and Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) at baseline, and the PANSS was again administered at a 6-month follow-up assessment. Results indicated that while neurocognition was related to insight at baseline, it was not related to subsequent change in insight. The implications of findings for conceptualization and assessment of insight are discussed

Social Dysfunction in Psychosis Is More Than a Matter of Misperception: Advances From the Study of Metacognition

Many with psychosis experience substantial difficulties forming and maintaining social bonds leading to persistent social alienation and a lack of a sense of membership in a larger community. While it is clear that social impairments in psychosis cannot be fully explained by symptoms or other traditional features of psychosis, the antecedents of disturbances in social function remain poorly understood. One recent model has proposed that deficits in social cognition may be a root cause of social dysfunction. In this model social relationships become untenable among persons diagnosed with psychosis when deficits in social cognition result in inaccurate ideas of what others feel, think or desire. While there is evidence to support the influence of social cognition upon social function, there are substantial limitations to this point of view. Many with psychosis have social impairments but not significant deficits in social cognition. First person and clinical accounts of the phenomenology of psychosis also do not suggest that persons with psychosis commonly experience making mistakes when trying to understand others. They report instead that intersubjectivity, or the formation of an intimate shared understanding of thoughts and emotions with others, has become extraordinarily difficult. In this paper we explore how research in metacognition in psychosis can transcend these limitations and address some of the ways in which intersubjectivity and more broadly social function is compromised in psychosis. Specifically, research will be reviewed on the relationship between social cognitive abilities and social function in psychosis, including measurement strategies and limits to its explanatory power, in particular with regard to challenges to intersubjectivity. Next, we present research on the integrated model of metacognition in psychosis and its relation to social function. We then discuss how this model might go beyond social cognitive models of social dysfunction in psychosis by describing how compromises in intersubjectivity occur as metacognitive deficits leave persons without an integrated sense of others' purposes, relative positions in the world, possibilities and personal complexities. We suggest that while social cognitive deficits may leave persons with inaccurate ideas about others, metacognitive deficits leave persons ill equipped to make broader sense of the situations in which people interact and this is what leaves them without a holistic sense of the other and what makes it difficult to know others, share experiences, and sustain relationships. The potential of developing clinical interventions focused on metacognition for promoting social recovery will finally be explored

Psychotherapy and schizophrenia: an analysis of requirements of an individual psychotherapy for persons with profoundly disorganized selves

13 p

Being Interrupted: The Self and Schizophrenia

21 p

Taking Emerson Personally

19 p

Relentless Unfolding: Emerson’s Individual

9 p

Between Impotence and Illusion : Adorno's Art of Theory and Practice

36 p

White Dawns, Black Noons,Twilit Days: Charles Simic's Poems Before Poetry

56 p