Jim McCarthy’s achievements at the intersection of science with public policy

Along with his distinguished research career as a biological oceanographer and marine biologist and his inspiring service as a teacher, advisor, and mentor to students and junior colleagues at Harvard University, Jim McCarthy has been a scientific statesman of the first order, bringing insights from his research and his deep understanding of the role of science in society into the arenas of management of scientific enterprises and public and policy-maker education about the science relating to some of the greatest challenges of our time. His roles at the intersection of science with public issues have included stints as director of the Harvard Museum of Comparative Zoology, cochair of the Working Group II (Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability) for the Third Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, chair of the Board of the Union of Concerned Scientists, chair of the Scientific Committee of the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program, vice chair of the New England Climate Impact Assessment, and member of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, among others. In all of these roles, he has been a model of insightful leadership, selfless service, integrity, and commitment to science and the public interest

Uranium availability and the breeder decision

The high priority assigned by the Federal government to the early development and commercial deployment of the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) is attributed by some to the supposition that, without the breeder, a supply-price squeeze on uranium will soon materialize. The present paper examines this supposition by considering the technology and economics of uranium utilization in nonbreeder reactors, in the context of available information about uranium resources at various prices and projections of the growth of nuclear power through 2020. Reactor characteristics, cost sensitivities, and estimates of uranium resources used here are based largely on publications of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. The results show that existing reactor technologies -- light-water reactors (LWRs), high temperature gas reactors (HTGRs), or a mix of these -- could meet even the most enthusiastic projections of the expansion of nuclear generation through 2020 from presently known domestic uranium supplies, exploitable at $50 per pound of U_3O_8 or less. The increment in electricity costs that arises from increasing uranium prices in the absence of commercial breeder reactors is about 1 mill/kwhe in 2000 and about 2 mills/kwhe in 2020 in the worst case (very high growth, no HTGRs), and significantly less in more plausible cases. In the prospective of the probable costs of the alternatives, these increments are modest; for example, the breeder's greater insensitivity to the cost of uranium ore could easily be cancelled out if capital costs for the LMFBR prove higher than early estimates. Briefer attention is given here to potential difficulties with rapid expansion of uranium mining operations, with enrichment capacity, and with environmental impact of mining low grade ores. Timely action in the first two areas would be required to meet high growth projections, but no fundamental obstacles are apparent. The environmental issue needs more study, but on present evidence does not constitute a persuasive case for an early commitment to the LMFBR. It is concluded that the urgency often ascribed to early deployment of LMFBRs on grounds of uranium availability is, in fact, illusory

Rescue US energy innovation

President Trump has proposed severe cuts to US government spending on energy research, development and demonstration, but Congress has the ‘power of the purse’ and can rescue US energy innovation. If serious cuts are enacted, the pace of innovation will slow, harming the economy, energy security and global environmental quality. The Trump Administration has proposed a 57% reduction in US government investments in energy research, development and demonstration (RD&D) at the Department of Energy (DOE), from US$3.8 billion allocated for fiscal year 2017 (FY2017) under the continuing resolution to US$1.6 billion in the FY2018 request (unless otherwise stated, all dollar figures are given in constant 2015 US dollars). These severe reductions, if enacted by Congress, would reduce the pace of US energy-technology innovation, ultimately harming the US economy, energy security, environmental quality and the capacity of the world’s second largest emitter of greenhouse gases to do its share in reducing the emissions that are driving global climate change. This abdication of leadership would adversely affect not just US interests but global interests as well

The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Excel spreadsheets used to calculate the breakeven uranium price and the cost of electricity also available. (See appendix A for details)This report assesses the economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The breakeven uranium price at which reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from existing light-water reactors (LWRs) and recycling the resulting plutonium and uranium in LWRs would become economic is assessed, using central estimates of the costs of different elements of the nuclear fuel cycle (and other fuel cycle input parameters), for a wide range of range of potential reprocessing prices. Sensitivity analysis is performed, showing that the conclusions reached are robust across a wide range of input parameters. The contribution of direct disposal or reprocessing and recycling to electricity cost is also assessed. The choice of particular central estimates and ranges for the input parameters of the fuel cycle model is justified through a review of the relevant literature. The impact of different fuel cycle approaches on the volume needed for geologic repositories is briefly discussed, as are the issues surrounding the possibility of performing separations and transmutation on spent nuclear fuel to reduce the need for additional repositories. A similar analysis is then performed of the breakeven uranium price at which deploying fast-neutron breeder reactors would become competitive compared with a once-through fuel cycle in LWRs, for a range of possible differences in capital cost between LWRs and fast-neutron reactors. Sensitivity analysis is again provided, as are an analysis of the contribution to electricity cost, and a justification of the choices of central estimates and ranges for the input parameters. The equations used in the economic model are derived and explained in an appendix. Another appendix assesses the quantities of uranium likely to be recoverable worldwide in the future at a range of different possible future prices.Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Universit

The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel

This report assesses the economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The breakeven uranium price at which reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from existing light-water reactors (LWRs) and recycling the resulting plutonium and uranium in LWRs would become economic is assessed, using central estimates of the costs of different elements of the nuclear fuel cycle (and other fuel cycle input parameters), for a wide range of range of potential reprocessing prices. Sensitivity analysis is performed, showing that the conclusions reached are robust across a wide range of input parameters. The contribution of direct disposal or reprocessing and recycling to electricity cost is also assessed. The choice of particular central estimates and ranges for the input parameters of the fuel cycle model is justified through a review of the relevant literature. The impact of different fuel cycle approaches on the volume needed for geologic repositories is briefly discussed, as are the issues surrounding the possibility of performing separations and transmutation on spent nuclear fuel to reduce the need for additional repositories. A similar analysis is then performed of the breakeven uranium price at which deploying fast neutron breeder reactors would become competitive compared with a once-through fuel cycle in LWRs, for a range of possible differences in capital cost between LWRs and fast neutron reactors. Sensitivity analysis is again provided, as are an analysis of the contribution to electricity cost, and a justification of the choices of central estimates and ranges for the input parameters. The equations used in the economic model are derived and explained in an appendix. Another appendix assesses the quantities of uranium likely to be recoverable worldwide in the future at a range of different possible future prices

Socio-Economic Instability and the Scaling of Energy Use with Population Size

The size of the human population is relevant to the development of a sustainable world, yet the forces setting growth or declines in the human population are poorly understood. Generally, population growth rates depend on whether new individuals compete for the same energy (leading to Malthusian or density-dependent growth) or help to generate new energy (leading to exponential and super-exponential growth). It has been hypothesized that exponential and super-exponential growth in humans has resulted from carrying capacity, which is in part determined by energy availability, keeping pace with or exceeding the rate of population growth. We evaluated the relationship between energy use and population size for countries with long records of both and the world as a whole to assess whether energy yields are consistent with the idea of an increasing carrying capacity. We find that on average energy use has indeed kept pace with population size over long time periods. We also show, however, that the energy-population scaling exponent plummets during, and its temporal variability increases preceding, periods of social, political, technological, and environmental change. We suggest that efforts to increase the reliability of future energy yields may be essential for stabilizing both population growth and the global socio-economic system