Climate change perceptions across Europe : From climate change beliefs to climate change mitigation behaviors

Det overordnede målet med dette prosjektet var å få en bedre forståelse av faktorer som påvirker klimarelatert risikooppfatning i Europa. Prosjektet fokuserte på forholdet mellom oppfatninger av klimaendringenes årsaker og konsekvenser, klimabekymring og klimavennlig atferd, samt folks oppfatninger av viktige klimakonsekvenser i landet de bor i. Sekundærdata fra to store tverrnasjonale spørreundersøkelser, Runde 8 av European Social Survey (N = 44,387) og European Perceptions of Climate Change Projektet (N = 4, 048), ble brukt for å undersøke disse sammenhengene i tre separate artikler. Klimabekymring var kjernen i prosjektet. Mens de to første artiklene fokuserte på årsakene til og konsekvensene av klimabekymring, så den tredje artikkelen nærmere på hvordan bekymring er relatert til hva folk ser for seg at konsekvensene av klimaendringen vil være. Artikkel I undersøkte forholdet mellom oppfatninger av klimaendringenes årsaker og konsekvenser (klimaoppfatninger) og bekymring for klimaendringene, samt hvordan dette forholdet kan variere som funksjon av selvrapportert politisk orientering. Resultatene viste at de med sterkere tro på at klimaendringene er menneskeskapte og vil ha negative konsekvenser, rapporterte høyere nivåer av bekymring. Selv om det var en positiv sammenheng mellom slike klimaoppfatninger og bekymring for klimaendringene uavhengig av politisk orientering, så var sammenhengen sterkere for de som plasserte seg lenger til venstre på det politiske spekteret. Videre varierte sammenhengen mellom politisk orientering og klimabekymring mellom landene som var inkludert i studien og den var sterkest i Vest-Europa. Artikkel II undersøkte hvorvidt personlig eller kollektiv mestringstro, samt personlig eller kollektiv utfallsforventning, kan påvirke sammenhengen mellom klimabekymring og energisparende atferd. I artikkelen refererer mestringstro til troen på hvorvidt folk individuelt eller kollektivt kan bruke mindre energi, mens utfallsforventning refererer til troen på hvorvidt endringer i energibruk kan bidra til å redusere klimaendringene. To typer energiatferd ble undersøkt i studien: reduksjonsatferd (vanemessig eller lite kostbar atferd som å skru av apparater som ikke er i bruk) og effektivitetsatferd (langsiktige investeringer som å kjøpe energieffektive husholdningsapparater). Resultatene viste at klimabekymring var sterkere relatert til reduksjonsatferd blant de med høye nivåer av personlig eller kollektiv utfallsforventning, og sterkere relatert til effektivitetsatferd blant de med høye nivåer av kollektiv utfallsforventning. Bekymring for klimaendringene forklarte variasjon i energiatferd utover mestringstro og utfallsforventning. Artikkel III fokuserte på hvilke konsekvenser folk ser for seg at klimaendringene vil ha i landet de bor i, basert på spørreundersøkelser fra fire europeiske land. Respondentene ble bedt om å svare på følgende åpne spørsmål: ‘Klimaendringene kan påvirke forskjellige land på ulike måter. Hva tror du vil være den viktigste effekten av klimaendringene i [Frankrike/Tyskland/Norge/Storbritannia]?’. Svarene ble sortert inn i seks konsekvenskategorier som beskriver forventede klimakonsekvenser: (1) endringer i holdninger og mål, (2) endringer i menneskelige aktiviteter, (3) utslipp og forurensning, (4) endringer i klima og miljø, (5) konsekvenser for mennesker og (6) forventninger om få eller ingen klimakonsekvenser. Resultatene viste at folk flest assosierte klimaendringer med endringer i klima og miljø. Likevel kunne visse forskjeller mellom landene, samt mellom demografiske og ideologiske grupper identifiseres. For eksempel svarte de i aldersgruppene 55 – 64 og 65 +, de som plasserte seg lenger til høyre på det politiske spekteret, og menn oftere at de forventet få eller ingen klimakonsekvenser i landet de bor i. Resultatene viste også at de seks konsekvenskategoriene var ulikt relatert til klimabekymring. Ytterligere analyser undersøkte bredden (antall konsekvenskategorier som var nevnt) og dybden (hvor spesifikke de nevnte klimakonsekvensene var) i de åpne svarene og fant at begge aspektene var relatert til høyere nivåer av klimabekymring. Oppsummert støtter de rapporterte funnene ideen om at klimaoppfatninger og klimabekymring er relevante prediktorer for klimavennlig atferd. Avhandlingens største bidrag stammer fra funnene som viser at folks forventninger vedrørende klimakonsekvenser, samt sammenhengen mellom klimaoppfatninger, bekymring og energiatferd avhenger av faktorer som landet man bor i, demografi, politisk orientering og mestringstro. Funnene er relevante for å forstå folks emosjonelle og atferdsmessige reaksjoner på klimaendringene og for å utvikle effektive kommunikasjonsstrategier rettet mot ulike grupper.The overarching aim of the current project was to gain a better understanding of factors influencing climate change risk perceptions across Europe. The project focused on the associations between beliefs about the causes and consequences of climate change, worry about climate change, and climate change mitigation behavior, as well as on people's beliefs about important climate change impacts on the country in which they live. Secondary data from two large cross-national surveys of public perceptions, namely Round 8 of the European Social Survey (N = 44,387) and the European Perceptions of Climate Change Project (N = 4, 048) was used to investigate these relationships in three separate papers. Climate change worry was at the core of the project. While the first two papers focused on the causes and consequences of worry about climate change, the third paper looked more closely at how worry relates to what people imagine the impacts of climate change will be. Paper I explored the relationship between beliefs about the causes and consequences of climate change (climate change beliefs) and worry about climate change, and how this relationship varies as a function of self-reported political orientation. The results showed that those with stronger beliefs in the anthropogenic nature and negative consequences of climate change reported higher levels of worry. Although there was a positive relationship between such climate change beliefs and worry about climate change independent of political orientation, the relationship was stronger for those placing themselves further left on the political spectrum. Moreover, the relationship between political orientation and worry differed across the countries included in the study and was strongest in Western Europe. Paper II investigated whether personal or collective efficacy, as well as personal or collective outcome expectancy, influence the relationship between worry about climate change and energy-saving behaviors. In the paper, efficacy refers to beliefs about whether people individually or collectively can use less energy, while outcome expectancy refers to beliefs about whether changes in energy use would help reduce climate change. Two types of energy-saving behaviors were investigated in the study: curtailment behaviors (habitual or low-cost behaviors such as switching off appliances not currently in use) and efficiency behaviors (long-term investments such as buying energy efficient household appliances). The results showed that climate change worry was more strongly related to curtailment behaviors among those with high levels of personal or collective outcome expectancy and more strongly related to efficiency behaviors among those with high levels of collective outcome expectancy. Worry about climate change explained variance in energy-saving behaviors over and above efficacy and outcome expectancy. Paper III focused on beliefs about how climate change may affect one’s own country, based on survey data from four European countries. Respondents were asked to answer the following open-ended question: ‘Climate change may affect different countries in different ways. What do you think will be the most important effect of climate change on [France/Germany/Norway/the UK]?’. The provided answers were sorted into six impact categories describing expected climate change consequences: (1) changes to attitudes and goals, (2) changes to human activities, (3) emissions and pollution, (4) environmental changes, (5) impacts on humans and (6) expectations of few or no impacts. The results revealed that most people associated climate change with environmental changes. Still, certain differences between countries, as well as between demographic and ideological groups, could be identified. For example, those in the age groups 55 – 64 and 65 +, people placing themselves further right on the political spectrum, and men were more likely to expect few or no climate change effects on their country. The results also showed that the six impact categories were differentially related to worry about climate change. Further analyses accounted for the width (number of impact categories mentioned) and depth (how specific the mentioned impact was) of people’s open-ended responses and found that both aspects were related to higher levels of climate change worry. In sum, the reported findings support the notion that climate change beliefs and worry about climate change are relevant predictors of climate change mitigation behavior. This thesis’ largest contribution stems from the finding that people’s expectations regarding climate change impacts, as well as the relationship between climate change beliefs, worry, and energy-saving behaviors are conditional on factors such as country, demographics, political orientation, and efficacy beliefs. These findings are relevant for understanding people’s emotional and behavioral reactions to climate change and for developing effective communication strategies aimed at different groups.Doktorgradsavhandlin

Emotional researchers or emotional audiences? The effect of emotions in climate change communication

How should researchers communicate about (politicized) risks, such as climate change? Some argue that researchers should express more emotions to emphasize the seriousness of the climate issue and persuade the public to act. However, there is still a lack of research on the consequences of emotion expressions in research communication. In the current study, we investigated people's evaluations of climate researchers described as being angry or sad when communicating about climate change and whether the effects depend on the researcher's gender. Our results, based on a nationally representative survey experiment (Study 1, N = 2046), showed no significant interaction effects between the researchers' gender and emotion expression nor any main effects of gender. However, we did find that information provided by angry researchers was less trusted than information provided by researchers described as expressing sadness or no emotion. Researchers described as angry were further taken less seriously compared to researchers who did not express emotions. Still, the effects were very small and were not replicated in a follow-up study (Study 2, N = 1219). In Study 1, we also considered the respondents' own climate emotions. Those reporting stronger anger or sadness both took the researcher more seriously and had higher trust in the provided information. The effects of the respondents' own emotions were far larger than those of the emotion expressed by the researchers. We found no interaction effects for emotion similarity between the researcher and the respondent with regards to taking the researcher seriously. However, those reporting no sadness or low to moderate levels of anger had higher trust in information provided by non-emotional as compared to sad or angry researchers, respectively.publishedVersio

Self-reported reasons for (not) being worried about climate change

A national sample from Norway (N = 2001) was asked to report how much they worry about climate change (closed-ended question), and then to write down their reasons for (not) being worried (open-ended question). Answers to the open-ended question were content analyzed and compared across responses to the closed-ended question. The results showed that the most common reason for being at least somewhat worried was concern about the consequences of climate change. Respondents reporting high worry were in particular more likely to bring up consequences for humans than those reporting medium worry. Respondents who reported low worry referred to a broader range of reasons in their answers, such as believing in natural rather than human causes of climate change, expressing a sense of optimism towards potential solutions, or being discontent with political measures or public discourse on climate change. These findings add novel insights into understanding the subjective meaning associated with the degree to which people report being worried about climate change.publishedVersio

The strength and content of climate anger

Climate-related anger is present in Greta Thunberg’s speeches and the acts of Extinction Rebellion, but also in the rise of movements protesting climate policies, such as the Yellow Vests. The current study (N = 2,046) gives insight into the content of climate anger among the Norwegian public, as well as the relationship between anger and climate change engagement. Analyzing responses to the open-ended survey question “What is it about climate change that makes you angry?”, we find that the most common reason was human actions causing climate change. Respondents also frequently pointed to responsible agents, especially politicians. Controlling for other climate emotions, as well as socio-demographics, anger strength was differentially related to three types of climate change engagement; it was the strongest predictor of self-reported activism, positively related to policy support, but not related to individual mitigation efforts. Among those reporting anger, directing it towards human qualities or actions was consistently and positively related to individual behavior, policy support, and activism while referring to responsible agents was not related to either. 'Contrarian' anger, reflecting skepticism towards the threat of climate change or dissatisfaction with mitigation measures, constituted 10% of the responses and had a negative effect on all outcomes. Overall, we find that both the strength and content of climate anger are relevant for climate change engagement. Our findings illustrate the need to avoid simplistic discussions of climate emotions and their motivational potential.publishedVersio

Expected climate change consequences and their role in explaining individual risk judgments

This study examines what individuals expect will be the most important impacts of climate change on their respective countries, and how these expectations relate to individual risk judgments. Open-ended responses from representative samples in four European countries (each n > 1000), were sorted into six categories: expectations of climate change leading to changes in attitudes and goals, human activities, emissions and pollution, environmental changes, impacts on humans, or few or no impacts. The results showed that the most frequently mentioned climate change impacts were related to environmental changes. Although most results were consistent across the UK, Norway, Germany, and France, some differences were identified. For example, respondents in the UK and Norway more frequently mentioned changes in human actions and activities among the most important climate change impacts. We also found differences between demographic groups; men, those in the oldest age groups, and those placing themselves further right on the political spectrum were more likely to expect few or no consequences of climate change on their country. Additional analyses examined relationships between the six impact categories and two different measures of individual risk judgments. Those expecting climate change to lead to changes in attitudes and goals, environmental changes, or impacts on humans reported higher levels of worry about climate change and expected more negative effects on their country. Climate change worry, but not the evaluation of how positive or negative effects will be on one’s country, was further related to the number of consequences mentioned in response to the open-ended question and the specificity conveyed.publishedVersio

In the green? Perceptions of hydrogen production methods among the Norwegian public

This article presents findings from a representative survey, fielded through the Norwegian Citizen Panel, examining public perceptions of hydrogen fuel and its different production methods. Although several countries, including Norway, have strategies to increase the production of hydrogen fuel, our results indicate that hydrogen as an energy carrier, and its different production methods, are still unknown to a large part of the public. A common misunderstanding seems to be confusing ‘hydrogen fuel’ in general with environmentally friendly ‘green hydrogen’. Results from a survey experiment (N = 1906) show that production method is important for public acceptance. On a five-point acceptance scale, respondents score on average 3.9 for ‘green’ hydrogen, which is produced from renewable energy sources. The level of acceptance is significantly lower for ‘blue’ (3.2) and ‘grey’ (2.3) hydrogen when respondents are informed that these are produced from coal, oil, or natural gas. Public support for hydrogen fuel in general, as well as the different production methods, is also related to their level of worry about climate change, gender, and political affiliation. Widespread misunderstandings regarding ‘green’ hydrogen production could potentially fuel public resistance as new ‘blue’ or ‘grey’ projects develop. Our results indicate a need for clearer communication from the government and developers regarding production methods to avoid distrust and potential public backfire.publishedVersio

Effect of aerobic exercise and low-carbohydrate high-fat diet on glucose tolerance and android/gynoid fat in overweight/obese women: A randomized controlled trial

The study was designed to compare the effects of weight loss induced by a low-carbohydrate-high-fat diet or a normal diet, with and without exercise, on glucose tolerance measured as area under the curve (AUC), and android (A) and gynoid (G) fat distribution. The study was registered at clinicaltrials.gov; NCT04100356. In total, 57 women classified as overweight or obese (age 40 ± 3.5 years, body mass index 31.1 ± 2.6 kg/m2) were randomly assigned and completed a 10-week intervention using a low-carbohydrate high-fat diet or a normal diet, with or without aerobic interval exercise. An equal deficit of 700 kcal/day was prescribed, either restricting the diet only, or moderately restricting diet and including three 50-min high-intensity bicycle sessions per week. There were thus four groups: normal diet (NORM); low-carbohydrate-high-fat diet (LCHF); normal diet with exercise (NORM-EX); and low-carbohydrate-high-fat diet with exercise (LCHF-EX). Linear mixed models was used to assess differences between groups. With all groups pooled, the intervention resulted in a weight loss of 6.7 ± 2.5% (p < 0.001). The intervention did not result in differences between groups in AUC glucose, nor in fasting glucose or indicis for insulin resistance such as Homeostatic Model Assessment, Matsuda Insulin Sensitivity Index, insulinogenic index and disposition index. Post-intervention android fat was lower in LCHF than NORM (3,223 ± 727 vs. 2,533 ± 535 g, p = 0.041). LCHF reached a lower A/G ratio than NORM (0.94 ± 0.12 vs. 1.04 ± 0.09, p = 0.011) and LCHF-EX (0.94 ± 0.12 vs. 1.09 ± 0.09, p < 0.001) after the intervention. LCHF resulted in lower android fat mass compared to NORM and the lowest A/G ratio compared to the other matched groups, but with no accompanying improvement in AUC glucose. In conclusion, although all groups achieved improvements in glucose tolerance, no superior effect was observed with the LCHF diet, neither with nor without exercise.publishedVersio

Description of call handling in emergency medical dispatch centres in Scandinavia: recognition of out-of-hospital cardiac arrests and dispatcher-assisted CPR

Background The European resuscitation council have highlighted emergency medical dispatch centres as an important key player for early recognition of Out-of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest (OHCA) and in providing dispatcher assisted cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) before arrival of emergency medical services. Early recognition is associated with increased bystander CPR and improved survival rates. The aim of this study is to describe OHCA call handling in emergency medical dispatch centres in Copenhagen (Denmark), Stockholm (Sweden) and Oslo (Norway) with focus on sensitivity of recognition of OHCA, provision of dispatcher-assisted CPR and time intervals when CPR is initiated during the emergency call (NO-CPRprior), and to describe OHCA call handling when CPR is initiated prior to the emergency call (CPRprior). Methods Baseline data of consecutive OHCA eligible for inclusion starting January 1st 2016 were collected from respective cardiac arrest registries. A template based on the Cardiac Arrest Registry to Enhance Survival definition catalogue was used to extract data from respective cardiac arrest registries and from corresponding audio files from emergency medical dispatch centres. Cases were divided in two groups: NO-CPRprior and CPRprior and data collection continued until 200 cases were collected in the NO-CPRprior-group. Results NO-CPRprior OHCA was recognised in 71% of the calls in Copenhagen, 83% in Stockholm, and 96% in Oslo. Abnormal breathing was addressed in 34, 7 and 98% of cases and CPR instructions were started in 50, 60, and 80%, respectively. Median time (mm:ss) to first chest compression was 02:35 (Copenhagen), 03:50 (Stockholm) and 02:58 (Oslo). Assessment of CPR quality was performed in 80, 74, and 74% of the cases. CPRprior comprised 71 cases in Copenhagen, 9 in Stockholm, and 38 in Oslo. Dispatchers still started CPR instructions in 41, 22, and 40% of the calls, respectively and provided quality assessment in 71, 100, and 80% in these respective instances. Conclusions We observed variations in OHCA recognition in 71–96% and dispatcher assisted-CPR were provided in 50–80% in NO-CPRprior calls. In cases where CPR was initiated prior to emergency calls, dispatchers were less likely to start CPR instructions but provided quality assessments during instructions.publishedVersio