A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France

We examine what kind of competitive fringe has been built in France around the State owned incumbent without destroying it or significantly weakening its dominant position; what impacts has this particular reform process on the market in which the incumbent monopolist is still overly dominant; and what more can be done to strengthen the opening of the market while staying in this typical French policy framework (no industrial restructuring and no forced divestiture by the monopolist). We wonder if a larger window of opportunity will open up at some later date for contesting the position of the monopolist, especially when investment in generation resumes

Nordic Electricity Congestion's Arrangement as a Model for Europe: Physical Constraints or Operators' Opportunity

Nordic Electricity Congestion's Arrangement as a Model for Europe: Physical Constraints or Operators' Opportunit

Electricity Internal Market in the European Union: What to do next?

Like in the US, the EU “internal electricity market” remains unfinished and its construction can stall, fracturing into “national blocks” separated by permanent “border effects”. This is exactly what this paper seeks to avoid in the expected life of the current European Commission (2005-2009). It identifies the critical factors: national and EU market designs, industry structure and competition policy, deeper regional cooperation between TSOs and Regulators. It suggests 8 priority actions and 12 secondary improvements to sustain the dynamics of the construction of an EU set of open r egional markets with limited “border effects”, and explains the rationale for these recommendations

An Institutional Frame to Compare Alternative Market Designs in EU Electricity Balancing

The so-called â electricity wholesale marketâ is, in fact, a sequence of several markets. The chain is closed with a provision for â balancing,â in which energy from all wholesale markets is balanced under the authority of the Transmission Grid Manager (TSO in Europe, ISO in the United States). In selecting the market design, engineers in the European Union have traditionally preferred the technical role of balancing mechanisms as â security mechanisms.â They favour using penalties to restrict the use of balancing energy by market actors. While our paper in no way disputes the importance of grid security, nor the competency of engineers to elaborate the technical rules, we wish to attract attention to the real economic consequences of alternative balancing designs. We propose a numerical simulation in the framework of a two-stage equilibrium model. This simulation allows us to compare the economic properties of designs currently existing within the European Union and to measure their fallout. It reveals that balancing designs, which are typically presented as simple variants on technical security, are in actuality alternative institutional frameworks having at least four potential economic consequences: a distortion of the forward price; an asymmetric shift in the participantsâ profits; an increase in the System Operatorâ s revenues; and inefficiencies

Mapping the course of the EU "Power Target Model"... on its own terms

The European Union took more than 20 years to start defining a common market design for its internal electricity market: a European Power Target Model. And, a further 10 years to fully implement it. Meanwhile, the reference generation set of that model has shifted from CCGT burning gas to RES units transforming intermittent natural resources. Could the existing EU target model continue to work well for the short- term operation and long-term investment? If not, can the existing EU institutions easily produce an "RES resilient" new power target model

A Typical Case of Weak Institutional Complementarity in Institution Building : The Design of Transmission Network Monopoly in Competitive Electricity Markets

In a “Weak institutional complementarity” type of institution building it is typically the less replaceable institutional characteristic which dictates the path of change for the institution as a whole. We will show it is exactly what explains the diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. Firstly we argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analysed within an industry modular frame. Transmission is a set of several modules which have to be distinguished and separated in any design analysis and comparison. At least three modules make the core of transmission design: 1° the short run management of network externality; 2° the short run management of cross border trade; and 3° the long run management of network investment. Second in a new-institutional economics perspective we say that 1°monopoly design in a competitive policy cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the “institutional” definition and allocation of property rights on transmission; while 2°definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure: they basically have to complement each other. Third we apply this frame to compare PJM (USA) and NGC (UK) and we show it remarkably illuminates the reality.TSO; weak institutional complementarity; modular analysis

Toward a zero carbon energy policy in Europe: Defining a feasible and viable solution.

Reducing the European Union GHG emissions by at least 80% by 2050 will require a near zero carbon electricity, road and rail transport industry, and heating and cooling in buildings. As compared to "business as usual" the amount of energy required will basically vary according to the level of energy efficiency: it is the "system scale". Then it is the "system design" which will provide the needed carbon-free technologies consisting of renewable, nuclear and fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage. . A zero carbon energy system by 2050 is then demonstrated to be feasible. However it is far from easy and requires immediate and substantial policy action. The main policy implications are addressed in this paper. The 5 years 2010-2015 will be decisive in establishing a regulatory environment whereby the EU will be in a position, by 2020, to take the next steps to achieve the 2050 goal..EU Energy Policy; Emission Rights; Carbon free electricity production; regulation of electricity industry

The Gas Transportation Network as a ‘Lego’ Game: How to Play with It?

Gas transportation networks exhibit a quite substantial variety of technical and economical properties ranges roughly from an entrenched natural monopoly to near to an open competition platform. This empirical fact is widely known and accepted. However the corresponding frame of network analysis is lacking or quite fuzzy. As an infrastructure, can a gas network evolve or not from a natural monopoly (an essential facility) to an open infrastructure (a highway facility)? How can it be done with the same transportation infrastructure components within the same physical gas laws? Our paper provides a unified analytical frame for all types of gas transportation networks. It shows that gas transport networks are made of several components which can be combined in different ways. This very lego property of gas networks permits different designs with different economic properties while a certain infrastructural base and set of gas laws is common to all transportation networks. Therefore the notion of gas transportation network as a general and abstract concept does not have robust economic properties. The variety and modularity of gas networks come from the diversity of components, the variety of components combinations and the historical inclusion of components in the network. First, a gas network can combine different types of network components (primary or secondary ones). Second, the same components can be combined in different ways (notably regarding actual connections and flow paths). Third, as a capital-intensive infrastructure combining various specific assets, gas transportation networks show strong path dependency properties as they evolve slowly over time by moving from an already existing base. The heterogeneity of gas networks as sets of components comes firstly from the heterogeneity of the network components themselves, secondly from the different possibilities to combine these components and thirdly from the ‘path dependence’ character of gas network constructions. These three characteristics of gas networks explain the diversity of economic proprieties of the existent gas networks going from natural monopoly to competitive markets.

Modelling the effects of nuclear fuel reservoir operation in a competitive electricity market

In many countries, the electricity systems are quitting the vertically integrated monopoly organization for an operation framed by competitive markets. In such a competitive regime one can ask what the optimal management of the nuclear generation set is. We place ourselves in a medium-term horizon of the management in order to take into account the seasonal variation of the demand level between winter (high demand) and summer (low demand). A flexible nuclear set is operated to follow a part of the demand variations. In this context, nuclear fuel stock can be analyzed like a reservoir since nuclear plants stop periodically (every 12 or 18 months) to reload their fuel. The operation of the reservoir allows different profiles of nuclear fuel uses during the different seasons of the year. We analyze it within a general deterministic dynamic framework with two types of generation: nuclear and non-nuclear thermal. We study the optimal management of the production in a perfectly competitive market. Then, we build a very simple numerical model (based on data from the French market) with nuclear plants being not operated strictly as base load power plants but within a flexible dispatch frame (like the French nuclear set). Our simulations explain why we must anticipate future demand to manage the current production of the nuclear set (myopia can not be total). Moreover, it is necessary in order to ensure the equilibrium supply-demand, to take into account the non-nuclear thermal capacities in the management of the nuclear set. They also suggest that non-nuclear thermal could stay marginal during most of the year including the months of low demand.Electricity Market; nuclear generation; optimal reservoir operation; electricity fuel mix; perfect competition with reservoir

Modeling the effects of nuclear fuel reservoir operation in a competitive electricity market

In many countries, the electricity systems are quitting the vertically integrated monopoly organization for an operation framed by competitive markets. In such a competitive regime one can ask what the optimal operation/management of the nuclear generation set is. We place ourselves in a medium-term horizon of the management in order to take into account the seasonal variation of the demand level between winter (high demand) and summer (low demand). A flexible nuclear set is operated to follow a part of the demand variations. In this context, nuclear fuel stock can be analyzed like a reservoir since nuclear plants stop periodically (every 12 or 18 months) to reload their fuel. The operation of the reservoir allows different profiles of nuclear fuel uses during the different seasons of the year. We analyze it within a general deterministic dynamic framework with two types of generation : nuclear and non-nuclear thermal. We study the optimal management of the production in a perfectly competitive market. Then, we build a very simple numerical model (based on data from the French market) with nuclear plants being not operated strictly as base load power plants but within a flexible dispatch frame (like the French nuclear set). Our simulations explain why we must anticipate future demand to manage the current production of the nuclear set (myopia can not be total). Moreover, it is necessary in order to ensure the equilibrium supply-demand, to take into account the non-nuclear thermal capacities in the management of the nuclear set. They also suggest that non-nuclear thermal may remain marginal during most of the year including the months of low demand.Nuclear technology, non-nuclear thermal technology, electricity, nuclear fuel "reservoir", perfect competition, merit order, follow-up of load, seasonal demand.