Composite Holohraphic Associative Recall Model (CHARM) and Blended Memories in Eyewitness Testimony

The idea that compositing or blending may occur in human episodic memory stems from two sources: (1) distributed models of human memory, and (2) studies that have focussed on the distortions and mistakes that occur in eyewitness testimony. In this paper,data that have been uncovered within the eyewitness testimony paradigm are simulated by a distributed memory model-CHARM (composite holographic associative recall memory). Studies done by Loftus have been interpreted as indicating that blending does occur; modification of these experiments conducted by McCloskey and Zaragosa have been claimed to refute Loftus' interpretation. It is shown that both of these results are predicted by the composite-trace model

Understanding the recruitment and selection of postgraduate researchers by English higher education institutions.

HEFC

Cognitive Binding: A Computational-Modeling Analysis of a Distinction between Implicit and Explicit Memory

Four models were compared on repeated explicit memory (fragment cued recall) or implicit memory (fragment completion) tasks (Hayman and Tulving, 1989a). In the experiments, when given explicit instructions to complete fragments with words from a just-studied list—the explicit condition—people showed a dependence relation between the first and the second fragment targeted at the same word. However, when subjects were just told to complete the (primed) fragments—the implicit condition—stochastic independence between the two fragments resulted. Three distributed models—CHARM, a competitive-learning model, and a back-propagation model produced dependence, as in the explicit memory test. In contrast, a separate-trace model, MINERVA, showed independence, as in the implicit task. It was concluded that explicit memory is based on a highly interactive network that glues or binds together the features within the items, as do the first three models. The binding accounts for the dependence relation. Implicit memory appears to be based, instead, on separate non interacting traces

The correction of errors committed with high confidence.

Abstract Most theories predict that when people indicate that they are highly confident they are producing their strongest responses. Hence, if such a high confidence response is in error it should be overwritten only with great difficulty. In contrast to this prediction, we have found that people easily correct erroneous responses to general information questions endorsed as correct with highconfidence, so long as the correct answer is given as feedback. Three potential explanations for this unexpected hypercorrection effect are summarized. The explanation that is tested here, in two experiments, is that after a person commits a high-confidence error the correct answer feedback, being surprising or unexpected, is given more attention than is accorded to the feedback to low-confidence errors. This enhanced attentional capture leads to better memory. In both experiments, a tone detection task was presented concurrently with the corrective feedback to assess the attentional capture of feedback stimuli. In both, tone detection was selectively impaired during the feedback to high confidence errors. It was also negatively related to final performance, indicating that the attention not devoted to the tone detection was effectively engaged by the corrective feedback. These data support the attentional explanation of the high-confidence hypercorrection effect

Neural Correlates of People's Hypercorrection of Their False Beliefs

Despite the intuition that strongly held beliefs are particularly difficult to change, the data on error correction indicate that general information errors that people commit with a high degree of belief are especially easy to correct. This finding is called the hypercorrection effect. The hypothesis was tested that the reason for hypercorrection stems from enhanced attention and encoding that results from a metacognitive mismatch between the person's confidence in their responses and the true answer. This experiment, which is the first to use imaging to investigate the hypercorrection effect, provided support for this hypothesis, showing that both metacognitive mismatch conditions—that in which high confidence accompanies a wrong answer and that in which low confidence accompanies a correct answer—revealed anterior cingulate and medial frontal gyrus activations. Only in the high confidence error condition, however, was an error that conflicted with the true answer mentally present. And only the high confidence error condition yielded activations in the right TPJ and the right dorsolateral pFC. These activations suggested that, during the correction process after error commission, people (1) were entertaining both the false belief as well as the true belief (as in theory of mind tasks, which also manifest the right TPJ activation) and (2) may have been suppressing the unwanted, incorrect information that they had, themselves, produced (as in think/no-think tasks, which also manifest dorsolateral pFC activation). These error-specific processes as well as enhanced attention because of metacognitive mismatch appear to be implicated

Memory and truth: correcting errors with true feedback versus overwriting correct answers with errors

In five experiments, we examined the conditions under which participants remembered true and false information given as feedback. Participants answered general information questions, expressed their confidence in the correctness of their answers, and were given true or false feedback. In all five experiments, participants hypercorrected when they had made a mistake; that is, they remembered better the correct feedback to errors made with high compared to low confidence. However, in none of the experiments did participants hyper'correct' when false feedback followed an initially correct response. Telling people whether the feedback was right or wrong made little difference, suggesting that people already knew whether the feedback was true or false and differentially encoded the true feedback compared to the false feedback. An exception occurred when false feedback followed an error: participants hyper'corrected' to this false feedback, suggesting that when people are wrong initially, they are susceptible to further incorrect information. These results indicate that people have some kind of privileged access to whether their answers are right or wrong, above and beyond their confidence ratings, and that they behave differently when trying to remember new “corrective” information depending upon whether they, themselves, were right or wrong initially. The likely source of this additional information is knowledge about the truth of the feedback, which they rapidly process and use to modulate memory encoding