Leadership and the independent regulator

Being a utility regulator has perils because the independence of the regulator necessarily removes power from politicians, operators, and others. Furthermore, regulators are sometimes scapegoats for unpopular policies and unavoidably become involved in shaping the policies that they are supposed to implement. As a result of such frictions, regulators are sometimes removed from office or marginalized in some way. How can regulators not only survive in such an environment, but also thrive? Jamison describes a leadership concept called adaptive leadership that regulators can use to help their countries adapt to new policies and changing situations, while allowing the regulator to stay in the game. The first leadership skill he discusses is the ability to get on the balcony to see what is really going on with operators, politicians, consumers, and others. Once this perspective is obtained, then the regulator can engage stakeholders in an adaptive process in which people make necessary changes to traditions and expectations, while hanging on to the things that are truly important. Regulators can do this by bringing attention to problems that people want to ignore because they involve difficult tradeoffs, providing certainty and stability when tensions become too high for work to be done, and keeping attention focused on the work and the issues.

Effects of Industry Concentration on Quality Choices for Network Connectivity

I examine the effects of market concentration on connectivity in network industries. Using Cournot interactions for a duopoly, each network chooses quantity, quality for communications within the provider's own network (internal quality), and quality for communications between the provider's network and other networks (external quality). I find that large networks choose higher internal quality than do small networks and large networks choose higher internal quality than external quality. I also find that providers prefer flexible technologies that allow them to simultaneously choose outputs and qualities. Small networks prefer higher external quality than internal quality except when they make credible quality commitments before choosing output and have higher marginal operating costs than large networks. Networks choose identical external quality unless they have exogenously determined customer bases

Oust the Louse: Does Political Pressure Discipline Regulators?

We consider a possible determinant of regulatory decisions by public utility commissioners: the desire to remain in office. We examine regulatory exit, where a regulator leaves a commission during a term or is not re-appointed/re-elected. With data from US states, we empirically investigate several hypotheses motivated by a political agency model of regulatory decision-making. Our empirical results generally support the hypotheses, including that higher electricity prices lead to ousting, that ousting is less common where it is more costly for the principal to whom the regulator reports, and that ousting is more likely where regulators are more accountable or are more likely to share the principal‘s preferences. Furthermore, the results provide limited evidence that regulatory exit is not due mainly to the revolving door. Ousting also appears to lower future electricity prices

Effects of Industry Concentration on Quality Choices for Network Connectivity

I examine the effects of market concentration on connectivity in network industries. Using Cournot interactions for a duopoly, each network chooses quantity, quality for communications within the provider's own network (internal quality), and quality for communications between the provider's network and other networks (external quality). I find that large networks choose higher internal quality than do small networks and large networks choose higher internal quality than external quality. I also find that providers prefer flexible technologies that allow them to simultaneously choose outputs and qualities. Small networks prefer higher external quality than internal quality except when they make credible quality commitments before choosing output and have higher marginal operating costs than large networks. Networks choose identical external quality unless they have exogenously determined customer bases

Complementâ induced activation of the cardiac NLRP3 inflammasome in sepsis

Cardiac dysfunction develops during sepsis in humans and rodents. In the model of polymicrobial sepsis induced by cecal ligation and puncture (CLP), we investigated the role of the NLRP3 inflammasome in the heart. Mouse heart homogenates from shamâ procedure mice contained high mRNA levels of NLRP3 and ILâ 1β. Usingthe inflamm a some protocol, exposure of cardiomyocytes (CMs) to LPS followed by ATP or nigericin caused release of mature ILâ 1β. Immuno staining of left ventricular frozen sections before and 8 h after CLP revealed the presence of NLRP3 and ILâ 1β proteins inCMs. CLP caused substantial increases in mRNAs for ILâ 1β and NLRP3 in CMs which are reduced in the absence of either C5aR1 or C5aR2. After CLP, NLRP32/2 mice showed reduced plasma levels of ILâ 1βand ILâ 6. In vitro exposure of wildâ type CMs to recombinant C5a (rC5a) cause delevations in both cytosolic and nuclear/mitochondrial reactive oxygen species (ROS), which were C5aâ receptor dependent. Use of a selective NOX2 inhibitor prevented increased cytosolic and nuclear/mitochondrial ROS levels and release of ILâ 1β. Finally, NLRP32/2 mice had reduced defects in echo/Doppler parameters in heart afterCLP. These studies establish that the NLRP3 inflammasome contributes to the cardiomyopathy of polymicrobial sepsis.â Kalbitz, M., Fattahi, F., Grailer, J. J., Jajou, L., Malan, E. A., Zetoune, F. S., Huberâ Lang, M., Russell, M. W., Ward, P. A. Complementâ induced activation of the cardiac NLRP3 inflammasome in sepsis. FASEB J. 30, 3997â 4006 (2016). www.fasebj.orgPeer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/154362/1/fsb2fasebj30120728r.pd

Health gains and fi nancial risk protection aff orded by public fi nancing of selected interventions in Ethiopia: an extended cost-eff ectiveness analysis

Background The way in which a government chooses to fi nance a health intervention can aff ect the uptake of health interventions and consequently the extent of health gains. In addition to health gains, some policies such as public fi nance can insure against catastrophic health expenditures. We aimed to evaluate the health and fi nancial risk protection benefi ts of selected interventions that could be publicly fi nanced by the government of Ethiopia. Methods We used extended cost-eff ectiveness analysis to assess the health gains (deaths averted) and fi nancial risk protection aff orded (cases of poverty averted) by a bundle of nine (among many other) interventions that the Government of Ethiopia aims to make universally available. These nine interventions were measles vaccination, rotavirus vaccination, pneumococcal conjugate vaccination, diarrhoea treatment, malaria treatment, pneumonia treatment, caesarean section surgery, hypertension treatment, and tuberculosis treatment. Findings Our analysis shows that, per dollar spent by the Ethiopian Government, the interventions that avert the most deaths are measles vaccination (367 deaths averted per $100 000 spent), pneumococcal conjugate vaccination (170 deaths averted per$100 000 spent), and caesarean section surgery (141 deaths averted per $100 000 spent). The interventions that avert the most cases of poverty are caesarean section surgery (98 cases averted per$100 000 spent), tuberculosis treatment (96 cases averted per $100 000 spent), and hypertension treatment (84 cases averted per$100 000 spent). Interpretation Our approach incorporates fi nancial risk protection into the economic evaluation of health interventions and therefore provides information about the effi ciency of attainment of both major objectives of a health system: improved health and fi nancial risk protection. One intervention might rank higher on one or both metrics than another, which shows how intervention choice—the selection of a pathway to universal health coverage—might involve weighing up of sometimes competing objectives. This understanding can help policy makers to select interventions to target specifi c policy goals (ie, improved health or fi nancial risk protection). It is especially relevant for the design and sequencing of universal health coverage to meet the needs of poor populations

Near-island biological hotspots in barren ocean basins

Phytoplankton production drives marine ecosystem trophic-structure and global fisheries yields. Phytoplankton biomass is particularly influential near coral reef islands and atolls that span the oligotrophic tropical oceans. The paradoxical enhancement in phytoplankton near an island-reef ecosystem—Island Mass Effect (IME)—was first documented 60 years ago, yet much remains unknown about the prevalence and drivers of this ecologically important phenomenon. Here we provide the first basin-scale investigation of IME. We show that IME is a near-ubiquitous feature among a majority (91%) of coral reef ecosystems surveyed, creating near-island ‘hotspots' of phytoplankton biomass throughout the upper water column. Variations in IME strength are governed by geomorphic type (atoll vs island), bathymetric slope, reef area and local human impacts (for example, human-derived nutrient input). These ocean oases increase nearshore phytoplankton biomass by up to 86% over oceanic conditions, providing basal energetic resources to higher trophic levels that support subsistence-based human populations