935 research outputs found

    THE ECONOMICS OF GRAIN PRODUCER CARTELS

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    The objective of this study is to measure economic payoffs from a grain cartel. Two basic approaches to extract economic rents are considered: (i) Mandatory supply controls to restrict production and raise grain price, and (2) export price discrimination using export taxes or subsidies. The economic impacts of different producer cartel scenarios were estimated using a long-term, nine-region world trade simulation model incorporating the assumptions of neoclassical trade theory. The SWOPSIM program was used to write the model equations. Economic Research Service trade data for 1989 were used to initialize the model. Results reflect long-run changes from 1989conditions and are at 1989 general price levels. The model simultaneously estimated outcomes in markets for nine commodities: beef, pork, poultry meat, wheat, corn, coarse grains (other than corn), oilseeds (soybeans, rapeseed, and sunflower seed), oilmeal, and sugar. Cross-effects among commodities and input-output relationships between field crop and livestock production are accounted for by substitution and complementary coefficients in behavioral equations. Countries and groups of countries included in the model are Australia, Canada, the European Community (EC), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the United States (US), Japan, and the rest of the world (ROW). The simulation results report the consequences of restricting only US grain production (wheat, corn, and other coarse grains) from 5 to 20% below the 1989 production level. Grain supply restrictions were presumed to be mandatory, hence taxpayers incurred no additional outlays over those in 1989 . World price increases were modest for wheat, but greater for corn and other coarse grains in part because of differences in market share among grains. US consumers of grain and grain products buy less at higher prices and are worse off, as is the country as a whole. Consumer surplus falls nearly 2billionwhengrainsupplyisreduced202 billion when grain supply is reduced 20 %. Higher grain prices and lower costs more than compensate producers for less output, despite lower receipts attending an elastic demand. According to simulation results, cartel-like action restricting US supplies by 15% would most benefit American grain producers. Consumers in the US and the world lose more than producers gain from cartel action restricting production and lowering US exports of grain. Other competing exporters enjoy net benefits from higher world prices. However, because the rest of the world is a net consumer, net economic welfare of other countries is reduced. Also, overall world income is reduced by a cartel. As additional global production comes under the control of the cartel, more producer surplus can be extracted from consumers. Results were simulated for grain producers in four developed countries or regions (Australia, Canada, EC, and US) forming a cartel and simultaneously restricting production from 5 to 20%. As expected, world prices rise more with the comprehensive grain cartel than with the US acting alone. The more comprehensive international cartel helps producers extract greater rents from consumers. It is notable that none of the supply restriction schemes would benefit the US as a nation. Rest-of-the-world and total world welfare losses mount when supply restrictions are tightened from 5 to 20% of market output. When the US alone tightly restricts grain production, it loses more than ROW. When the US, Canada, Australia, and the EC jointly restrict production, ROW incurs greater welfare losses than the US. Turning next to support subsidies without supply controls, we estimated that net benefits to producers are greatest with export subsidies, expanding exports by 30% and with an attendant increase in domestic prices. The cartel can subsidize exports with collections from producers, leaving its members with some net gain. Results are even more favorable for producers if taxpayers pay the export subsidy as under the current Export Enhancement Program (EEP). However, because national welfare is reduced, a government truly representative of the nation's economic welfare would not rationally choose to subsidize exports. Overall US welfare is modestly increased when domestic price is lowered with an export tariff and exports decline. In contrast, the rest of the world as a net importer benefits from plans increasing US exports and lowering the world price of grains. But, any form of market distortion lowers overall global welfare. Total numbers are smaller but patterns are similar when only US com producers attempt the optimal subsidy or tariff strategy. A US com-only producer cartel would choose an export subsidy because the producers' benefits are positive even if they pay the export subsidy. Outcomes were simulated in which percentage increases in US exports were matched by equal percentage increases in exports of other major competitors (Canada, the European Community, and Australia). Retaliation causes the average cost of subsidizing US exports to nearly double to achieve any given percentage increase in exports. Retaliation by competing exporters removes much of the attractiveness of US export subsidies. If producers pay for export subsidies, their net gains are sharply eroded with retaliation. Welfare losses to the US as a nation and to the world enlarge with retaliation to subsidies. Thus the US and the world have a stake in successful multilateral negotiation reducing subsidies and attendant retaliation. It is conceivable that an effort by producers to form a cartel would so alienate the public that Congress would terminate current commodity programs, including export assistance on grain. Net benefits to producers from cartel activity never approached the 7 billion in rents they collect from current programs. It seems unlikely that a producer group would risk gains of this size for the prospect of cartel rents a sixth the size or less from international markets. Gains to US producers are less for a wheat cartel than for either the feed grain cartel or for the wheat-feed grain cartel included herein. The unfavorable outcomes originate from the export demand for US wheat made highly elastic by opportunities to substitute feed grain for wheat in production and consumption especially in the long run. That is, a high wheat price and controlled production of wheat encourages importers to produce wheat, cut back feed grain production, and import low-cost feed grains.Crop Production/Industries, International Relations/Trade,

    Assisted living facilities in Louisville Kentucky : a case study to examine aging in place.

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    As the older adult population in the United States continues its accelerated growth, there is a growing concern about the long-term care options for these elders. While nursing homes are no longer desirable and costly for federal and state governments, viable alternatives are being sought to meet this need. The development and rapid expansion of the numbers of assisted living communities have grown as older adults, family caregivers and government bureaucrats are looking for lower cost options. How beneficial are assisted living communities for the older adults that live in them? Most older adults seek to avoid multiple moves to meet their care needs and desire to age in place within a residential setting. This research examines assisted living communities (ALCs) in the Louisville, Kentucky to explore their benefit to older adults and to examine their ability to accommodate residential aging in place. The analysis consisted of examining four characteristics of the ALCs which are personal services, meals and social interaction, community policies and the physical configuration. The findings of this study conclude that assisted living communities provide significant benefits to older adults by the provision of supportive services to help in areas of activities of daily living. There are some assisted living communities that are more able to accommodate residents to age in place based on the provision of necessary services, highly personalized service and reasonable accommodations that are needed to help with physical decline. Finally, the assisted living communities operate along the continuum of care and facilitate residents to move to more intensive care when their supportive services needs are beyond the capacity of the ALC

    Space Cops and Cyber Cowboys: An Institutional Comparison of the Governance of Space Exploration and the Internet

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    A growing concern for human society is the question of technology, how they are to be used and how can they best be governed. The very question of whether technology is governable remains for the most part unexplored. This work will seek to examine these important questions. By utilizing a historical institutional perspective, two case studies of the governance of technologies that have emerged in the last century will be explored. Space Exploration technologies and the advanced networking of computers known as the Internet will serve as the case to illuminate the question of governing technology. Deep qualitative functional analysis of both the primary and peripheral institutions will provide insight into how technology is governed in theory and in practice, as well as how institutions are created and change over time. By moving beyond questions of governance for states and societies, this work will attempt to contribute to the literature of political science as the study of governance broadly speaking. This work will contribute to and speak to newer works on the governance of non-explicitly political realms, as opposed to more traditional approaches to the study of governance, perhaps allowing new insight and avenues of research into both the question of technology and governance more broadly. Distinct policy prescriptions will be created to both better govern these particular technologies as well as lay the foundation for effective institutional governance of technologies in the future

    European Economic Integration and the Consequences for U.S. Agriculture

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    The pace of political-economic change in former East Bloc nations of Europe defies accurate prediction. Some events such as more price-directed markets are predictable enough but integration of former East Bloc countries into the European Community remains a matter of speculation. Analysis indicates that the economics of agriculture favors acceptance by the European Community of members of the European Free Trade Association before former members of the. East Bloc. Analysis also indicates the considerable agricultural production potential of Central and East Europe will be unleased first by market-directed economies and later by integration with the EC -- if the latter occurs. US consumers gain more than producers lose so the economic welfare of Americans is raised modestly.International Relations/Trade,

    The Estimated Economic Impact of Alternative Levels of Harmonized Farm Commodity Price Supports in the European Community

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    Implementing a New Trade Paradigm: Opportunities for Agricultural Trade Regionalism in the Pacific Rim

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    The objective of this paper is to analyze the economic implications for American food producers, consumers, and society of alternative Pacific Rim free trade region (FIR) configurations.International Relations/Trade,
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