Utilitarianism and Obviousness

This article seeks to diagnose a serious defect in a highly influential supposed counterexample to utilitarianism: Bernard Williams's case of Jim and the Indians. Discussing this, Williams argues that, according to utilitarianism, it is obviously right to say that Jim should kill an Indian. But as this is not obviously right, Williams takes the example to furnish a forceful counterexample to utilitarianism. I note here that the force of the supposed counterexample is in fact very doubtful as the utilitarian can readily enough explain the non-obviousness of the claim that Jim should kill with reference to the non-obviousness of utilitarianism itself

On the alleged shallowness of compatibilism: A critical study of Saul Smilansky: Free Will and Illusion

[FIRST PARAGRAPHS] The millionaire’s idle, talentless and self-centered daughter inherits a large sum of money that she does not really deserve. The victim of kidnapping rots in a cell in 1980s Beirut in a captivity that springs not from any wrong he has done but from his ill-fortune in being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The hard-working, brilliant and self-denying Nobel Prize-winning scientist receives a large cheque for his extraordinarily productive labours. The murderer spends decades in jail for the terrible crimes he has freely committed. The first two cases are cases where justice seems ill-served, where someone’s good or ill-fortune reflects not what they deserve but mere luck. The second two are cases where justice seems to be honoured: what befalls Scientist and Murderer reflects not their good or bad luck but their merits and deserts. As is notorious, closer examination may begin to undermine these judgements. Scientist may have worked hard for his results but not for his brains. Even if Millionaire’s Daughter were to study as hard as he has, perhaps she lacks the native talent that take him to Stockholm. That, no less than her parents' great wealth, seems a matter of sheer luck

Michael Smith and the daleks: reason, morality, and contingency

Smith has defended the rationalist's conceptual claim that moral requirements are categorical requirements of reason, arguing that no status short of this would make sense of our taking these requirements as seriously as we do. Against this I argue that Smith has failed to show either that our moral commitments would be undermined by possessing only an internal, contextual justification or that they need presuppose any expectation that rational agents must converge on their acceptance. His claim that this rationalistic understanding of metaethics is required for the intelligibility of moral disagreement is also found to be inadequately supported. It is further proposed that the rationalist's substantive claims - that there are such categorical requirements of reason and that our actual moral commitments are a case in point - are liable to disappointment; and that the conceptual claim is fatally undermined by reflection on how we might best respond to such disappointment

Realism and idealism in the theory of value

This thesis defends an account of value which emphasizes the central place occupied by experiences among the objects of evaluation, a point that is particularly stark in the case of aesthetic value, to which a chapter is devoted that adumbrates the wider understanding of value subsequently defended. More generally it is argued that values do not transcend the attitudes and institutions in which they are embodied. They nonetheless enjoy in virtue of their structuring by norms of consistency, stability and deference enough in the way of objectivity to do justice to various phenomenological considerations often thought to favour realism. It is argued however that this level of objectivity is compatible with the rejection of any form of reductive naturalism and, more generally, of cognitivism- views which should indeed, it is argued, be rejected in favour of an expressivistic understanding of value

Removing the mustard oil bomb from seeds: transgenic ablation of myrosin cells in oilseed rape (Brassica napus) produces MINELESS seeds

Many plant phytochemicals constitute binary enzyme–glucoside systems and function in plant defence. In brassicas, the enzyme myrosinase is confined to specific myrosin cells that separate the enzyme from its substrate; the glucosinolates. The myrosinase-catalysed release of toxic and bioactive compounds such as isothiocyanates, upon activation or tissue damage, has been termed ‘the mustard oil bomb’ and characterized as a ‘toxic mine’ in plant defence. The removal of myrosin cells and the enzyme that triggers the release of phytochemicals have been investigated by genetically modifying Brassica napus plants to remove myrosinase-storing idioblasts. A construct with the seed myrosin cell-specific Myr1.Bn1 promoter was used to express a ribonuclease, barnase. Transgenic plants ectopically expressing barnase were embryo lethal. Co-expressing barnase under the control of the Myr1.Bn1 promoter with the barnase inhibitor, barstar, under the control of the cauliflower mosaic virus 35S promoter enabled a selective and controlled death of myrosin cells without affecting plant viability. Ablation of myrosin cells was confirmed with light and electron microscopy, with immunohistological analysis and immunogold-electron microscopy analysis showing empty holes where myrosin cells normally are localized. Further evidence for a successful myrosin cell ablation comes from immunoblots showing absence of myrosinase and negligible myrosinase activity, and autolysis experiments showing negligible production of glucosinolate hydrolysis products. The plants where the myrosin defence cells have been ablated and named ‘MINELESS plants’. The epithiospecifier protein profile and glucosinolate levels were changed in MINELESS plants, pointing to localization of myrosinases and a 35 kDa epithiospecifier protein in myrosin cells and a reduced turnover of glucosinolates in MINELESS plants